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CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Profile 
Turkmenistan, also known as Turkmenia, is one of the Turkic states in Central 
Asia.  It is an independent neutral country which is located on the Eastern shore 
of the Caspian Sea, bordered by Afghanistan to the southeast, Iran to the south 
and southwest, Uzbekistan to the east and northeast, Kazakhstan to the north 
and northwest.
1 
It was formerly the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Turkmen SSR) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which 
defines the strip of land largely inhabited by Turkic ethnic group called the 
Turkmen.  The ethnic origins of the Turkmens, a loose alliance of Turkic tribes 
are generally traced to the Oghuz.  It occupies an area of 488,100 square 
kilometers
2
.
 
Most of its land is a vast arid desert. In fact, Central Asia's two 
largest deserts—the Garagum and the Gyzylgum—make up almost 90% of 
Turkmenistan's territory. To the south are the Balkan and Kopet Dag 
mountains
3
.
 
Other geographical features are the Caspian Sea in the west, 
Charjew, on the Amu Darya in the east, and Dashoguz in the north. Other 
major rivers are the Tejen, the Murgap, and the Atrek. Mostly, Turkmenistan 
has a subtropical desert climate that is severely continental. Summers are long, 
hot, and dry, and winters are mild and dry
4
.
 
Most precipitation falls between 
January and May. It is the least populated of the five former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia. With a population around five million, the majority of the people 
are ethnic Turkmens (85%); other sizeable minorities are Uzbeks (5%) and 
Russians (4%). Smaller minorities include Kazakhs, Azeris, Armenians, 
Ukrainians, Balochis, Koreans, and Tatars
5
.
 
The Turkmens are divided into five 
major tribes: the Ersary, Goklen, Teke, Yasyr, and Yomut. There are more than 
                                                 
1 G.M. Howe, The Soviet Union-A Geographical Study, Longman, Hongkong, 1986, pp.437-438. 
2 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Columbia University Press Newyork, 2004, p.1. 
3 Elizabeth E Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule, London, 1960, p.10.  
4 Doosumov Rustom, Uzbekistan: A Nation Path to the Market in “Central Asia in Transition: Dilammas of 
Political and Economic Development”, edited by Boris Rumer, Aakar Books, 2003, p.137. 
5 The World Fact Book, USA, p. 3. [cited Nov 10, 2009].  Available from:   
http://www.cia.gov/factbook 
 
two dozen tribal groupings among the Turkmens today, the largest of which are 
Yomut, Ersari and Teke, to which president Niyazow belonged.  
Turkmenistan‘s economy is largely based on natural resource extraction. 
Although the hydrocarbon sector performs well, according to the US Fund for 
Peace, fifty-eight percent of the population lives below the poverty level.  
According to the US State Department, in 2006, GDP per capita was $8,500. 
Poverty in rural areas also contributes to lower living standards
6
.
 
In the Caspian 
Sea region of Turkmenistan, particularly in the Cheleken region where much of 
the oil development is centered, many people are employed in the oil and gas 
sector.  Others are employed in agriculture, fishing and in the marine transport 
sector. As has been well documented elsewhere, the USSR‘s oil wealth came 
primarily from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia itself. Turkmenistan was 
also a significant contributor of natural resources to other Soviet republics, 
including oil and natural gas, which the Soviets began exploiting heavily in the 
1970s. Other resources included cotton, fruits, and vegetables. This created an 
economy focused on resource exploitation rather than development. Therefore, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan, as many 
republics, went through a period of economic hardship, from which it is still 
recovering. During the Soviet period, Turkmenistan was one of the poorest 
republics, and since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has continued to fall 
behind its Central Asian neighbours in most areas of development. Infant and 
maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU), gross domestic production is lower than in the other Central Asian 
states and economic development is slow in comparison to its neighbours
7
.
 
 
Turkmenistan has no state religion. It is predominately-Muslim country. An 
estimated 87% of the population practices Sunni Islam and 11 % Russian 
Orthodoxy. Islam in Turkmenistan often includes elements of mysticism and 
shamanism
8
. The literacy rate is 99.7%
9
. Life expectancy is 68.3 years. 
                                                 
6 Economy of Turkmenistan, Wikipedia encyclopedia, p.1. 
7 Michelle Kinman, Turkmenistan’s Crude Awakening Oil, Gas and Environment in the South Caspian, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/Turkmenistan_statistics.html, accessed December 1, 2010. 
8 Religion of Turkmenistan, Wikipedia encyclopedia, p.1. 
Although Russian is widely spoken in the region, the official language of 
Turkmenistan is Turkmen. Like other Central Asian people, the Turkmens have 
a rich folklore tradition of epic stories, tales, and lyric poems. A popular legend 
says that when Allah (God) made the world, the Turkmens were the first to get 
a land filled with sunshine, but the last to get any water. The Turkmen folklore 
tradition also includes various superstitions. Knowledge of and belief in 
charms, omens, lucky and unlucky days of the week, and the evil eye are 
common to almost every Turkmen. Each Turkmen tribe and clan has its own 
series of legends and tales that define tribal genesis and trace genealogy
10
. 
 
Turkmenistan is governed under the constitution of 1992. The president, who is 
both head of state and head of government, is elected by popular vote for a 
five-year term. There are two legislative bodies. The People's Council, which 
has the greater authority, consists of up to 2,500 delegates, some elected by 
popular vote and some are appointed. Members of the 50-seat National 
Assembly are popularly elected to serve five-year terms. A law adopted in 
2003 effectively makes the president the head of both the executive and 
legislative branches of government. According to the constitution, 
Turkmenistan is a secular democratic and presidential republic.  The 
government has three branches: Executive -- President and the Council of 
Ministers, Legislative -- Mejlis (Parliament), and Judicial -- Supreme Court. 
The legal system is based on the civil law system.
11
 Turkmenistan's date of 
independence from the Soviet Union is recognized as October 27, 1991.
12
 The 
United Nations formally recognized Turkmenistan‘s declaration of ―permanent 
neutrality‖ in 1995. Turkmenistan has 5 administrative subdivisions: Velayats 
                                                                                                                                            
9 United Nations Development Programme Report 2011, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_literacy_rate 
10 Countries and Their Cultures, Tajikistan to Zimbabwe,  
http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Tajikistan-to-Zimbabwe/Turkmens.html 
11 Peter L. Roudik, The History of the Central Asian Republics, (Greenwood Press, 88 Post RoadWest, 
Westport, CT 0688), p.153. 
12 Horak, ‘The ideology of the Turkmenbashy regime’,Perspective on European Politics and Society, Vol. 6, 
Issue 2, Special Issue: Eurasia and the Wider World, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2005,  
p.313. 
(provinces)
13
 The capital is Ashgabat and currency is Manat. Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov is the President and Rashid Meredov, the Foreign Minister. 
 
 
Historical Background 
The territory of Turkmenistan has a long and checkered history, as armies from 
one empire after another decamped there on their way to more prosperous 
territories.  The region's written history begins with its conquest by the 
Achaemenid Empire of ancient Persia, as the region was divided between the 
satrapies of Margiana, Kharezm and Parthia. Alexander the Great conquered 
the territory in the 4th century BC on his way to Central Asia, around the time 
that the Silk Road was established as a major trading route between Asia and 
the Mediterranean Region. 150 years later, Persia's Parthian Kingdom 
established its capital in Nisa, now in the suburbs of the capital, Ashgabat
 
.  
After replacement of the Parthian empire by Persian Sassanids, another native 
Iranian dynasty, the region remained territory of the Persian Empire for several 
centuries. In the 7th century AD, Arabs conquered this region, bringing with 
them Islam and incorporating the Turkmen into the greater Middle Eastern 
culture
.  
The Turkmenistan region soon came to be known as the capital of 
Greater Khorasan, when the caliph Al-Ma'mun moved his capital to Merv.
14
 
Although Turkmenistan was still populated mostly by nomadic herders, 
permanent settlements were prospering in the fertile river valleys. Farmers 
raised grains, vegetables, and fruits along the Amu Darya River; and Merv and 
Nisa became centers of sericulture (the raising of silkworms). A busy caravan 
route, connecting China and the city of Baghdad (in modern Iraq), passed 
through Merv. In addition, merchants, traders, and missionaries introduced the 
religions of Buddhism and Zoroastrianism to the region.
15
 
 
                                                 
13 The five provinces are Akhal, Balkan, Dashoguz, Lebap, and Mary. 
14 Tarikh published as Annales, ed. De Gorge, series 2, vol. II, pp. 1243-53 (Arabic text); a cooperative 
translation project currently published as The History of al-Tabari  (passages pertaining to this subject in 
vol. xxiii, pp. 191-201, by M. Hindus).     
15 Svat Soucek,  AHistory of Inner Asia, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 1, p.49. 
 
Central Asia came under Arab control after a series of invasions in the late7th 
and early 8th centuries. Meanwhile, the Oguz—the ancestors of the Turkmen—
were migrating from eastern Asia into central Asia, the Middle East, and Asia 
Minor (modern Turkey). The Arab conquest brought the religion of Islam to 
the Oguz and to the other people of central Asia. In 1040, the Seljuk clan of the 
Oguz tribe established the Seljuk Empire, with its capital at Merv. At one time, 
the Seljuk realm stretched all the way to Baghdad. Other Oguz groups moved 
west across the Caspian Sea, settling in Azerbaijan and in Asia Minor, where 
they joined the Seljuk Turks in establishing the Ottoman Empire. After mixing 
with the settled people in Turkmenistan, the Oguz living north of the Kopet-
Dag Mountains gradually became known as the Turkmen. In the 11th and 12th 
centuries, the main centers of Turkmen culture were at Khiva in the north (now 
in Uzbekistan) and at Merv in the south. Khiva controlled the cities and 
farming estates of the lower Amu Darya Valley. Merv became a junction of 
trade in silk and spices between Asia and the Middle East. This business 
created vast wealth in the ancient city, where the Seljuk rulers built fabulous 
mosques and palaces. At the same time, a growing class of wealthy traders and 
landowners was challenging the Seljuks for control of Turkmenistan. It was in 
1157 that the revolt of powerful landowners, lead to the collapse of the Seljuk 
Empire. Consequently, the leaders of Khiva took control of Turkmenistan, but 
their reign was brief
16
. In 1221, Central Asia suffered a disastrous invasion by 
Mongol warriors who were sweeping across the region from their base in 
eastern Asia. Under their commander Genghis Khan, the Mongols conquered 
Khiva and burned the city of Merv to the ground. The Mongol leader ordered 
the massacre of Merv's inhabitants as well as the destruction of Turkmenistan's 
farms and irrigation works. The Turkmen who survived the invasion retreated 
northward to the plains of Kazakhstan or eastward to the shores of the Caspian 
Sea. After Chenghis Khan's death in 1227, the Mongols lost control of 
Turkmenistan.
17
 Small, semi-independent states arose under the rule of the 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p.98.  
17 Ibid., p.107-108. 
region's landowners. In the 1370‘s, the Mongol leader Timur (known as 
Tamerlane in Europe), a descendant of Genghis Khan, conquered these states 
once more and established the Timurid Empire but after Timur's death in 1405, 
the realm weakened and soon disintegrated. The Mongol invasions had divided 
the Turkmen into small clans and had pushed them into the desert.
18
 Later, as 
the Mongols retreated from Turkmenistan, the Turkmen fell under the control 
of Muslim khans (rulers) who established khanates in Bukhara (in modern 
Uzbekistan) and Khiva. The rivalry between the khans and the rulers of Persia 
touched off centuries of war in Turkmenistan. Persians, Turkmen, and the 
khans fought for the scattered oases in southern Turkmenistan. From the 14th 
through the 17th century, Turkmenistan was in decline. To escape the conflicts, 
most Turkmen moved to the remote deserts along the borders of Persia and 
Afghanistan. 
 
In the 18th century, after centuries of poverty and isolation, the Turkmen began 
to rebuild their way of life. The poet Magtymguly created a literary language 
for the Turkmen and laid the foundations for their modern culture and 
traditions. Keimir-Ker, a Turkmen from the Tekke clan, led a rebellion of the 
Turkmen against the Persians, who were occupying most of Turkmenistan. 
Popular ballads and folk legends still recount the deeds of Keimir-Ker.
19
 At this 
time, the Russian Empire was expanding into central Asia from the plains and 
forests of Eastern Europe. The Russian czar, Peter the Great, sent the first 
Russian expeditions into Turkmenistan. Peter was seeking a route for Russian 
trade with southern Asia and the Middle East. In 1716, however, members of a 
Turkmen clan murdered the czar's representatives near Khiva. Russia waited 
for more than a century before sending another mission into Turkmenistan. 
Nevertheless, trade between Turkmen merchants and Russia continued and was 
helped by the building of a port on the Caspian Sea at Krasnovodsk, (modern 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p.124. 
19 Ibid., p.6. 
Turkmenbashi).
20
 In 1802, members of several Turkmen clans officially 
became Russian subjects. During the 19th century, the Turkmen also asked for 
Russia's help during their frequent rebellions against the khans and against the 
shahs of Persia. The Russians were seeking new markets for their goods, fertile 
land for the growing of cotton, and access to Turkmenistan's natural resources. 
As a first step in the conquest of the region, the Russians agreed to provide 
arms and food to the Turkmen rebels. Russia began sending military 
expeditions into Turkmenistan in the second half of the 19th century. From 
1863 to 1868, Russian armies defeated and annexed the khanates of Bukhara 
and Khiva. The people of western Turkmenistan, who were seeking 
independence from the khans, willingly joined the Russian Empire, but the 
Turkmen of eastern and southern Turkmenistan fiercely resisted Russian 
annexation.
21
 In 1879, at Geok-Tepe near Ashgabat (modern Ashgabat) 
Turkmen warriors of the Tekke den stopped a large Russian force. Two years 
later, the Russians besieged Geok-Tepe, eventually capturing it as well as 
Ashgabat. By 1885, all of the Turkmen clans had submitted to Russian control. 
The Russians annexed Mary and pushed across Turkmenistan to the borders of 
Persia and Afghanistan. The building of the Transcaspian Railroad, which 
connected Krasnovodsk (modern Turkmenbashi), Mary, and trading centers to 
the east, opened up the region for economic development
22
. From 1890 to 
1917, Turkmenistan was part of Russian Turkestan, a province that included 
central Asia and its Muslim nationalities—the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks, the 
Kyrgyz, the Tajiks, and the Turkmen. Within Turkestan, however, the Turkmen 
had a lesser status. Their lands were defined as the Transcaspian Region and 
were ruled as a military colony. This negligence by Russia's government 
allowed the Turkmen to maintain their culture, language, and nomadic way of 
life. In the early 20th century, discontent with  czarist rule spread among the 
people of the Russian Empire which was being drawn into a bloody 
                                                 
20 Francis Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross, Ph.D, The Heart of Asia, (Methuen and Co.36 Essex 
Streek, W.C. London, 1899.), chap.ii, p.240. 
21 Hugo Stumn, Russia in Central Asia, Foreign Department Press, 1876, Chap. ii, p. 20-21. 
22 Peter L. Roudik, op cit., p.80.  
international conflict. During World War I (1914-1918), the Turkmen and other 
people of Central Asia moved to reclaim their homelands. A violent uprising 
broke out in 1916, when the Turkmen, led by Junaid Khan, defeated the 
Russians at Khiva. The Turkmen established a national government that lasted 
until 1918
23
. In October 1917, the Communist leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin 
overthrew the Russian government. The Communists succeeded in taking 
control of Ashgabat in the summer of 1918. In response, Junaid Khan and 
forces loyal to the Old Russian regime joined together to drive out the 
Communists. In July of 1919, these anti-Communist allies established the 
independent state of Transcaspia. By the fall of 1920, however, the Communist 
Red Army was advancing from Tashkent (in modern Uzbekistan) and from 
Bukhara. The Communists gradually subdued Turkmenistan by military 
occupation and by putting Communist politicians in control of local 
governments. In 1922, the Communists founded the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR)
24
. Two years later; they established the Turkmen Soviet 
Socialist Republic (SSR) as a full member of the USSR. 
 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made harsh 
and sweeping changes throughout the USSR. Private property was seized
25
, and 
the Soviet government used brutal methods to punish opposition. These 
policies sparked a rebellion in Turkmenistan, and in 1927 the Soviets lost 
control of the republic to a national resistance movement called the Turkmen 
Freedom
26
. After reclaiming the Turkmen SSR in 1932, Stalin executed 
thousands of Turkmenistan's Communist leaders—including the president and 
the premier—whom he accused of helping the nationalists. After the terror of 
the 1930s, the Communist regime in Ashgabat became completely obedient to 
the central Soviet government in Moscow. The period 1929-38 was decisive in 
creating the Soviet institutional system as it stood until 1989.  At this time, 
                                                 
23 Francis Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross, Ph.D., op.cit., Chap.V, p.289. 
24 Ibid., p.104. 
25 Ibid., p.105. 
26 Ibid., p.110.  
under the leadership of Stalin, who had been building a power base as General 
Secretary of the Party, the industrialization and collectivization drives were 
launched. Huge new industries were created and millions of people moved off 
the land into the towns
27
. At the same time, the scale of repression was 
massively escalated and millions of people died by execution, in the camps, or 
of starvation in the villages
28
. Within the Communist Party itself, a series of 
purges took place that resulted in a massive change in leadership. In these ten 
years, the size of the state and its bureaucracy expanded enormously, with the 
biggest growth evident in the institutions responsible for administering the 
command economy. Meanwhile, another international conflict was brewing in 
Europe. The western Soviet Union was devastated by World War II (1939-
1945), when Germany invaded with a huge military force. Fierce fighting 
destroyed factories, farms, and cities throughout western Russia and Ukraine. 
Stalin was clearly unnerved by the loss of life and territory following the 
Germans' surprise attack. The Soviet Union eventually played the decisive role 
in defeating the German army, capturing Berlin and occupying most of Eastern 
Europe that then came under their domination. However, it did so at enormous 
cost to human life; at least 20 million Soviet citizens died in the effort
29
. In the 
aftermath of the war, the Soviet political system appeared vindicated: its 
institutions had managed the war effort and economic growth resumed at high 
levels by comparison with the capitalist west. Most of the Soviets people seem 
optimistic about the future prospects for their country, which were reflected in 
Khrushchev's promise to build communism by the 1980s and stimulated by 
Soviet advances in space, however, a number of developments combined to 
shatter this confidence
30
.
  
                                                 
27 The rise of Stalin: AD1921–1924". History of Russia. History World.  
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?HistoryID=ac14&ParagraphID=qxe#qxe. 
Retrieved 19 Nov. 2010.  
28  Abbott Gleason (2009). A companion to Russian history. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 373. ISBN 978-1-4051-3560-
3. http://books.google.com/?id=JyN0hlKcfTcC&pg=PA373. 
29 Geoffrey A. Hosking (2006). Rulers and victims: the Russians in the Soviet Union. Harvard  
University Press. p. 242. ISBN 978-0-674-02178-5.  
http://books.google.com/?id=CDMVMqDvp4QC&pg=PA242. 
30 First, Khrushchev himself revealed the connection between the system and repression. The revelations 
about Stalin fatally undermined the legitimacy of the regime. Second, there emerged a high degree of 
institutional conservatism, particularly among the bodies responsible for managing the economy. This 
 Growing awareness of the crisis in the country helped Mikhail Gorbachev to 
institute several new policies after coming to power in 1985. Glasnost allowed 
open criticism of the Communist party and of the country's economic system. 
Perestroika eased government control over many small businesses, which could 
now set their own wages, prices, and production schedules. Turkmen 
Communist leaders, however, were slow to adopt these reforms
31
. Annamurad 
Khodzhamuradov, who became the Turkmen SSR's leader in 1986, remained 
loyal to the Soviet government but never accepted Gorbachev's reforms, even 
the major liberalization movement that shook Russia in the late 1980s made 
many Soviet republics to gain their independence from Moscow
32
. However, in 
1990 the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan declared sovereignty as a nationalist 
response to perceive exploitation by Moscow. Although Turkmenistan was ill 
prepared for independence and communist leader Saparmurad Niyazov 
preferred to preserve the Soviet Union, in October 1991 the fragmentation of 
that entity forced him to call a national referendum that approved 
independence
33
.  
 
When the Soviet Union began to collapse, Turkmenistan and the rest of the 
Central Asian republics first heavily favored maintaining a reformed version of 
the state, mainly because they needed the economic power and common 
markets of the Soviet Union to prosper.  Nevertheless, Turkmenistan declared 
independence on 27 October 1991
34
,
  
Albeit one of the last Soviet republics to 
secede.  Turkmenistan gained official recognition in December 25, 1991, a day 
before the final dissolution of the Soviet Union and joined U.N. the following 
year. In 1991, it became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, an international organization of former Soviet republics. However, 
                                                                                                                                            
resulted in declining growth and, alongside this, an increase for corruption. Beginning in the 1970s, the 
performance of the Western economies, knowledge of which became increasingly available, matched and 
then passed that of the Soviet Union. 
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Turkmenistan reduced its status in the organization to "associate member" in 
August 2005.  The reason stated by the Turkmen president was the country's 
policy of permanent neutrality
35
. The former leader of the Turkmen Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Saparmurat Niyazov, remained in power as Turkmenistan's 
leader after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Under his post-Soviet rule, 
Russian-Turkmen relations greatly suffered.
 
 He styled himself as a promoter of 
traditional36
 
Muslim and Turkmen culture (calling himself "Turkmenbaşy,‖ or 
"leader of the Turkmen people"), but he became notorious in the West for his 
dictatorial rule and extravagant cult of personality37. The extent of his power 
greatly increased during the early 1990s, and in 1999, he became President for 
Life38 until his sudden death on December 21, 2006.  Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhammedov was elected the new president with 89% of the vote and 
95% turnout on 11 February 2007.  
 
Historical Perspective of Islam in Central Asia  
The arrival of Islam in Central Asia is attributed largely to the wars fought 
between the Arab raiders and the native tribesmen in the third quarter of the 
seventh century. The year 644 AD marked the beginning of Arab conquests 
and by the end of the seventh century, most of the Central Asian region had 
been conquered by the Arabs.
 
Although Islam was not the first monotheist 
religion to be introduced in Central Asia, it has remained alive in the Central 
Asian culture since the seventh century AD
39
.
 
Samanids adopted Islam as the 
official religion in the Samanid state for the first time in the Central Asian 
region (875-999 A.D). Samanids abolished small city-states and fiefdoms 
(three Khanates known as Khiva, Kokand, Bukhara) created politically 
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centralized state with Bukhara as its capital, Khiva, Kokand and Samarkand as 
federating units. Bukhara later stood out to be the educational and religious hub 
of Muslims. It was independent of Baghdad caliphate and was ruled by the 
local dynasty of the provincial governors.
40 
 
By the end of the tenth century, Islam occupied an important status in the 
Samanid state‘s politics since the Samanid Muslim preachers sought to 
Islamize nomadic people.
42 
Samanids regulated and expanded the Silk Route, 
which made Bukhara, the Samanid capital, as centre of religious, cultural and 
trade activities. Samanids incorporated religion into politics and set a new trend 
of using religion and language as instruments for exerting and spreading 
political influence. As the local people of this region were familiar with Persia, 
the Samanid rulers found it easier to administer the dynasty through use of 
Persian language.
41 
 
The Samanid Empire ended by the year 999 AD. with the arrival of the catalyst 
Turkic tribes (Ghaznavids-Qarakhanids). Subsequently, the Seljuks defeated 
them and established their dominance all over the Central Asian region. Islam 
neither dilapidated nor flourished under these rulers. With the lessening of the 
significance of the land route that linked Central Asia to the outer world 
because of the regulation of sea routes to India, Europe and Africa, the advent 
of the seventeenth century brought the decline of Silk Route trade 
dramatically
42
.
 
The decline of trade led to the decrease in income of these states 
and meant that Central Asian rulers lost the capability of keeping large standing 
armies to keep their influence and expand their kingdoms. Islamic clergy who 
had tremendous influence over the life of a common man impeded innovations 
in education and social life, as they thought innovations and modernization as 
anti-Islamic traditions. In mosques, preaching of these clerics through prayer 
sermons depicted this trend evidently, as the common people spent their lives 
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according to teachings of these clerics. This trend further marginalized and 
isolated Central Asia from the rest of the developing world.  
 
Subsequent years marked the rise of Shaybani dynasty (1451-1510 AD). As a 
result of the events that marked the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the Shabayni dynasty that upheld Islam as their supreme 
religion, gradually degenerated into city-based fiefdoms. In the eighteenth 
century, three Khanates (fiefdoms) ruled by the patriarchs called Khans 
emerged
43
. Islam as depicted by Islamic clergy survived in those days and the 
common man relied on clergy for religious guidance more than on Quran.
44
  
 
In the mid of 1860s, the Russian considerations to take Central Asia into the 
fold of Russian empire were made imperative by the fact that the cutting off of 
the US cotton supplies for the Russian factories had brought the Russian 
industrial cycle to a halt. Central Asia in this situation provided the best cotton 
raw material. On the other hand, the Russian empire did not want to lose this 
region in the critical era of the Great Game, when Great Britain and Russian 
empires wanted to outmaneuver each other. Russia felt consistently threatened 
from the expansion of British Empire towards Afghanistan that could lead to 
Central Asia
45
.  
 
Islam during the Period of Tsars   
During the period between 1865 and 1876, the Russian Tsars captured 
Tashkent and rest of the Uzbek areas. The Tsarist army also subjugated 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, however, the border between Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan were kept open. The bandits (Islamic revolutionists) and the tribal 
chiefs often took refuge in each other‘s territories46. Islam in Central Asia 
became less diverse and dynamic not because of the reason that new Russian 
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rulers imposed restrictions on Islam, but due to the fact that Russians gave the 
Muslim ultra-conservative clerics  incentives of modernized life, health, 
education and industrial benefits to enhance coherence between the new 
masters and the ruled ones
47
.
 
The new Russian rulers got only partly successful 
as the incorporation of the modern way of life and Western ideas gave way to 
modern interpretation of Islam known as Usul-e-Jadida or Jadidism (new 
educational principles). Jadidism was one of the intellectual Islamic 
movements, which swept over the colonized Muslim world in the late 
nineteenth century
48
.
 
Jadidism remained an intellectual rather than a popular 
movement. Cleavages in the movement, due to ideological and political 
differences, hindered the way of progress of this movement. The Jadids also 
joined the communist party after 1917, and helped in building indigenous 
communist parties, but it did not benefit them as expected. When Stalin came 
to power, he termed the Jadids as the Bourgeois reformers who in thousands 
were later brutally eliminated in the purge of 1937
49
.
 
 
Islam under the Bolshevik Rule 
The Bolshevik Revolution engulfed Central Asia in 1917, by establishing 
Bolshevik rule over the entire region. The Bolsheviks found Central Asia as 
deeply fragmented and highly politicized region with anti-Russian feelings put 
ablaze by the Islamic clerics. In 1917, the Bolsheviks awarded the right of self-
determination to the local ethnic national groups
50
.
 
Sacred Islamic monuments, 
books and things pillaged by the Tsars were returned to the mosques. The days 
of Muslim celebrations were declared to be the legal holidays throughout 
Central Asia. An equivalent court system was formed in 1921, with Islamic 
courts rendering justice in harmony with Sharia laws. A special Sharia 
Commission was established in the Soviet Commissariat of Justice. Some 
Sharia sentences that contravened Soviet law, such as stoning or the cutting off 
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of hands, were forbidden. Decisions of the Sharia courts that concerned these 
matters had to be confirmed by higher organs of justice. A corresponding 
education system was also established. In 1922, rights to certain ―Waqf‖51 
(religious bequest) properties were restored to Muslim administration, with the 
condition that they would be used for education only. As a result, the system of 
madarsahs (religious schools) was established. In 1925, there were 1,500 
madarsahs with 45,000 students in the Caucasus state of Dagestan, as opposed 
to just 183 state schools. In contrast, by November 1921, 1,000 Soviet schools 
had some 85,000 pupils in Central Asia. The Muslim Commissariat in Moscow 
oversaw Russia's policy towards Islam. Muslims with few communist 
qualifications were given leading positions in the Commissariat. The result was 
the division of the Islamic movement. Majority of Muslim leaders aided the 
Soviets, persuaded by the fact that Soviet power meant religious liberty. There 
was serious discussion generated among Muslim population about the 
similarity of Islamic values to the socialist principles. Popular slogans of the 
time included: ―Long live Soviet power, long live the Sharia, religion, freedom 
and national independence!‖52. It quickly became apparent to the Muslims in 
Central Asia that the right of self-determination given by Bolsheviks was only 
used as an instrument to win support from millions of non-Russians 
particularly Muslims. The Bolsheviks made alliances with the Kazakh pan-
Islamic group, the Ush-Zhuz which joined the Communist Party in 1920
53
. The 
Basmachi revolts (Islamic movement)
54
 which started during the years of the 
Bolshevik resistance to the Russian Tsarist rule never died and remained alive 
in the social undercurrents of Central Asian republics against all Bolshevik 
efforts. 
 
 
The Stalinist Repression  
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Stalin became the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party in 1922
55
. 
Whilst the Basmachi revolts still stayed alive across the Central Asian region, 
Stalin decided to disband the ―bandits‖ to suppress unrest in the region. The 
last of the Basmachi revolts was finally crushed in 1929, in Tajikistan. Many 
Basmachi leaders with their thousands of followers fled to Afghanistan. Stalin 
consequently re-drew the map of Turkistan and divided the region into five 
socialist republics with well-defined demarcated borders. Demarcation was not 
done according to the geographical or ethnic considerations; main purpose was 
the consolidation of the Russian rule and suppression of opposition in the 
region
56
.
 
Socialist bearings were imposed with full thrust on all spheres of life 
in Central Asia in 1929. The Stalinist regime embarked on oppressive methods 
for the introduction of Atheism in Central Asia.
57
 Having consolidated the 
power; the Soviets launched castigatory campaigns against all religious forces 
present in the new Communist Russia. Islam was particularly beleaguered 
because it was thought to be the most conservative and reactionary of all 
religions. They depicted Islam as ―mullah‖ (Islamic cleric) led force that was 
suspected to be supported and financed by the British imperialists trying to 
impede the way of Socialism.
58 
In this era of Socialist repression; mosques 
were locked or converted into workshops. Women were forbidden to dress up 
according to Islamic traditions and Islamic teachings were banned. In Soviet 
empire, only four thousand mosques were operative in 1929. Despite harsh 
crushing and even physical annihilation of a great part of the religious 
institutions, Islam, clan and local traditions were preserved in Central Asia 
through Makallahs (part of village-indigenous community).
59
 This remained 
the basic units of social structure of Central Asia and still retains its influence 
today. Makallahs had mosques that were operated as centers of Islamic 
education. However, these mosques had been operating covertly since the 
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1920s.
60
 
 
Makallahas remained the centers of Islamic education throughout 
Central Asia even during the Stalinist rule. Paradoxically, the situation 
improved for Muslims in Central Asia as Hitler invaded Soviet Union in 1941. 
Stalin appeased the Muslims of Central Asia, as he needed people to fight the 
war for Soviet Union and set up four directorates to mobilize and control the 
Muslims of Central Asian states simultaneously. Central Asian region also 
benefited from the industrial development as the industrial infrastructure was 
shifted from Soviet main land to the Central Asian land.
61 
 
Khrushev’s Liberalisation of Religion  
The brief period during (1955-1958) marked the slight relaxation of astringent 
Soviet policies. Khrushev adopted this policy to liberalize Stalin‘s harsh 
political structure, seeking to gain support for the Soviet policies in the Muslim 
world by showing tolerance towards Islam within its own territory. Islamic 
schools were established in Tashkent and Bukhara, where Islamic clerics were 
trained to synthesize Islam and Socialism. Muslim high-ranking clerics were 
brought from Islamic countries as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco to 
Tashkent to certify the compatibility of Islam with socialism.
62 
 
Gorbachev’s Policy towards Islam   
President Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-1980s promulgated the policy of 
restructuring, called ―Perestroika.‖ Perestroika comprised of a set of strategies 
aimed at liberalization of political and social policies. This set of policies did 
not include the lifting of constraints from religious practices but the people of 
Central Asia interpreted this slight lift of ban as an opportunity to revitalize 
their religious practices.
63
 As a result, Central Asian citizens showed deep 
interest in Islam. Thousands of mosques were built and Islamic literature was 
brought in from all over the Islamic world. The Islamic reading material was 
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distributed among the population by the itinerant clerics
64
  who became public 
orators and prayer leaders in these Makhallas.
65
 The main reason for this 
instant bent of the population towards Islam was that Islam never relinquished 
its appeal even during the era of the severest Soviet oppression. The survival of 
Islam in Central Asia is attributed to the strong ethnic Islamic traditions and the 
external support of the Muslim and the Western hemisphere to keep Islam alive 
during the Soviet rule. The itinerant Islamic clerics and the Sufi societies that 
operated in a covert manner contributed enormously to the survival of Islam in 
this period. The well-organized Sufi societies published and distributed Islamic 
literature. Even within the local Communist parties in Central Asia, some 
native Muslim Communist leaders hired mullahs and the Sufis to perform the 
Islamic rituals. Women also played a leading role in keeping the Islamic 
traditions alive at home. Moreover, they maintained the prayer places. Women 
also facilitated to keep the shrine praying regulated.
66
   
 
Roots of Islamic Resurgence in Central Asia  
The Afghan war and the Soviet disintegration in the year 1990 had a long 
lasting impact over the Central Asian states, politics and religion. In 1980s, 
thousands of Central Asians were recruited in the Red Army to fight the 
Afghan Islamist warriors. Consequently, the Central Asians were introduced to 
the wider Muslim concepts and Muslim brethren. Despite the fact that Central 
Asian Muslim soldiers were brought to fight for their Communist masters 
against their co-religionists they got deeply impressed by the devotion of the 
Afghan Mujahideen towards Islam. A large number of Central Asian soldiers 
who were taken as prisoners of war were indoctrinated and joined 
Mujahideen.
67
 Thousands of these Islamists studied in Islamic madarsahs 
spread on Pakistan‘s territory. The Muslims began to envisage a fight beyond 
the Afghan borders as Islamists running madrasahs started planning to reserve 
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places for Central Asian Islamists, who received education and living 
allowances. These Islamists entered Pakistan in droves without any visas and 
passports.
68 
The strengthening of Islamism in Central Asia is mainly attributed 
towards the Islamists infiltration from Afghanistan into Tajik and Uzbek 
territories. This became particularly evident in 1985 as movements for 
recognition of right of self-determination triggered up in Soviet republics.  This 
was further accelerated by an overall worsening of the Soviet economic 
system.
69
 After the Soviet disintegration, in the absence of political control and 
weak social infrastructure, Islam proved to be a unifying force for the Central 
Asian societies.  
 
Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Impact on Central Asian States  
The end of the Soviet rule caught the Central Asians by surprise. The Central 
Asian leaders reluctantly viewed the independence from Soviet rule as an 
unwanted blessing. Central Asia stood connected to Moscow by strong 
communication, transport and administrative network. Therefore, its centuries 
old ties with Russia could not be broken instantly due to demarcation of new 
borders. The presidents of five newly incepted Central Asian States met in 
Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, on the eve of December 12, 1991, to formulate a 
strategy to cope with the new transition that their nations were faced with. The 
Minsk Treaty which disbanded Soviet Union had not even been presented to 
the Central Asian leaders for consultation.
70
 Central Asian leaders faced the 
fears of running independent states; problems of inflation, security and foreign 
policy among others. The leaders embarked on policies of political suppression 
and media censorship as the only solution to counter the growing domestic 
problems of these states.
71
 Few democrats in Central Asia looked up to Russia 
for political inspiration and Central Asian youth drew inspiration from Muslim 
states for new ideological guidance. The reinforcement of Islam in Central Asia 
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was enhanced by absence of any religious and political system. This gave way 
to the strengthening of ethnic ties and anti-Russian sentiments. Among the 
politically and economically dissatisfied youth, teachings in madarsahs 
ingrained the spirit of conservatism and aggressiveness towards un-Islamic 
political system. Natural antagonism towards modernization and democratic 
ideals was also developed. The students of these madarsahs raised popular 
support winning slogans such as ―building the caliphate‖, or justice and equal 
opportunities for all; these slogans praised the importance of Islamic economic 
system as a remedy to all poverty-related problems. Central Asian States 
adopted the policy of Secular-neutrality and the stance of steering their policies 
without any religious or ethnic influences. Orthodox Islam in Central Asia was 
incorporated with politics in early 1990s and at first, this phenomenon showed 
itself in Tajikistan. There are three basic reasons for this, the first being the 
collapse of official communist ideology and its associated security system. 
Second is the growth of national self-consciousness in which historical and 
cultural roots are often linked to religion. Third are the socio-economic 
setbacks that have accompanied the transition from centrally controlled 
economic system to free-market economic system. Moreover, Islam has been 
used by various factions of Central Asian societies to determine their influence 
in their states and gain benefits.‘72  Turkmen populace comprises of 89 % of 
Muslim population and 9 % of Eastern Orthodox people. Turkmen President, 
Suparmurat Niyazov, has often stressed on the official stance of Turkmen 
government that is based on ―secularist isolationism.‖ The country has seen a 
steady growth of Islamic trends among the masses despite strict government 
regulations and policies, aimed at restricting the Islamic groups operations in 
the country. President Niyazov, said in a statement, ―We have firmly 
proclaimed the principle that Turkmenistan is a secular state. We have no 
grounds to think that someone intends to change this principle.‖73 Another 
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government statement asserted the, ―inadmissibility of interference of religion 
in organizational and state affairs.‖74  
 
The Kazakh population is an ethnic mix of Russians and Muslims in equal 
proportions. The ruling elite led by Nursultan Nazarbayev is dominantly 
inclined towards Western ideologies and socio-political trends.
75
 Unlike the 
rest of the Central Asian States, Nazarbayev created a separate ―muftiate‖ 
(council of religious clerics) for Kazakhstan. The 1993 constitution clearly 
identifies Kazakhstan as a secular state, forbidding religious parties in any form 
in the state territory.
76 
 
The Kyrgyz population comprises of Sunni Muslims who practice Islam 
according to their tribal traditions. The Soviet rule only had trivial effect over 
the Islamic traditions and way of life.
77 
Islam has not been a vital factor of 
Kyrgyz politics and the state constitution preamble clearly describes 
Kyrgyzstan as secular state and restraints the incursion of any religion and 
ideology into state constitution.
78
 In Kyrgyzstan, primarily in the cities of Osh 
and Jalal-Abad as well as in Batken, a number of Islamist groups named were 
trying to secure official registration with the Justice Ministry.
79
 
 
Tajik population has 85% Sunni Muslims and 10% belong to Shiite faction. 
Islam had played a vital role in Tajik politics in 1990's.  The incursion of mass 
political Islamic groups in political mainstream urged the Communist party of 
Tajikistan to take into consideration the Islamic heritage of Central Asian 
States. The Tajik opposition wanted to depict Islam as a destabilizing factor for 
the existent regime, but the Imam Ali Rahmonov regime has shown inclination 
towards the Iranian version of Islam and has refuted the Tajik opposition 
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80
 1992–97 civil war made Islam an important force in Tajik society 
and strengthened it within the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Today the 
(UTO), which is considered to be a moderate Islamist force, is cooperating with 
the Tajik government in accordance with the peace agreement of June 1997.
81
  
 
Uzbekistan remained hub of economic activity and political power during the 
Soviet rule. The Soviets made Uzbekistan the biggest cotton-producing region 
of the Soviet empire. Bukhara and Samarkand remained centers of cultural 
heritage and Islamic education for centuries. Islamic schools remained 
operative in these areas and anti-communist movements also originated at these 
schools. The incumbent Uzbek President Islam Karimov has pursued the policy 
of crushing opposition groups right from the time of inception of Uzbekistan in 
1990.Uzbekistan has seen steady growth of political cum religious  groups. 
Erk, Birlik Haq Parasti, Hizb-u-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
are prominent political parties.  
 
 
Advent of Islam in Turkmenistan 
The Turkmen of Turkmenistan, like their kin in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, 
are mostly Sunni Muslims with a microscopic percentage of Shia Muslims. 
Although the great majority of Turkmen readily identify themselves as 
Muslims and acknowledge Islam as an integral part of their cultural heritage, 
many support a revival of the religion‘s status primarily as an element of 
national revival. Turkmen usually do not attend Mosque regularly or 
demonstrate their adherence publicly, except through participation in officially 
sanctioned national traditions associated with Islam on a popular level, 
including life-cycle events such as weddings, burials, and pilgrimages.
82
 
 
Islam came to Turkmenistan during the Muslim conquest of the region under 
the caliphate of Hazrat Umar Farooq (RA) and Hazrat Uthman Gani (RA), 
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however the process of expansion and consolidation of Islam in the region was 
made possible by the tireless efforts of Sufi Sheikhs. Being God fearing and 
men of understanding, critical in the process of reconciling Islamic beliefs with 
pre-Islamic belief systems, Sufis often were recognized as ―patron saints‖ of 
particular clan or tribe.
83
 However, the repressive policies of Soviets regarding 
the propagation, expansion and consolidation of Islam in the region made all 
sizeable and influential institutes irrelevant. During the Soviet rule, all religious 
beliefs were attacked by the communist authorities as superstition and ―vestiges 
of the past‖. Most of the religious schools and religious observances were 
banned, thousands of mosques were closed, and many signs of the Muslim 
religion were made illegal.
84
 An official Muslim Board of Central Asia, with its 
headquarter in Tashkent, was established during the 2
nd
 world war to supervise 
Islam in Central Asia. For the most part, the Muslim Board functioned as an 
instrument of propaganda whose activities did little to enhance the Muslim 
cause.
85
 Atheist introduction stifled the religious development and contributed 
to the isolation of Turkmen from the international Muslim community. Some 
religious customs such as, burial and male circumcision continued to be 
practiced throughout the Soviet period but most of the religious beliefs, 
knowledge and customs were preserved only in rural areas in ―folk from‖86 as a 
kind of ―unofficial Islam‖87 which was not sanctioned by the state.88 By 1960s, 
the Soviet regime realized that Islam could not be entirely eradicated from 
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Central Asia for domestic as well as political reasons, Moscow established 
―official Islam‖89 allowing the functioning of a handful of state-controlled 
mosques and religious schools. Similarly, the regime permitted a small number 
of Muslims to make the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Makah.
90
 Even before Soviet 
occupation of Central Asian lands, the population was subjected to oppression 
and torture by the Amirs but was left alone to practice their age-old customs 
and religion, while radical Islam spread elsewhere in the Arab World, Central 
Asia was kept out of its influence by the Iron curtain. It was not until the 
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 that most of the Central Asian people 
became aware of these ideas and ideologies because the most widely practiced 
form of Islam in Central Asia was traditional Sufism, which placed stress on 
mysticism, music, poetry and tolerance and did not subject women to severe 
constraints.
91
 Thus, even under Soviet rule in Central Asia, adherence to Islam 
continued as a covert activity with local Communist party chiefs deliberately 
turning a blind eye to private observance of Islam. 
 
Turkmenistan became independent on October 26, 1991, amidst the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union.
92
 At the time of independence, the former head of 
Turkmenistan‘s communist party, Saparmurad Niyazov, was elected president 
of the newly independent nation in an uncontested election. The authoritarian, 
Niyazov, assumed the title ―Turkameabashi”, or ―Leader of all Turkmen” but 
was accused of developing a totalitarian cult of personality. His opus, the 
Ruhnama,
93
 was a mandatory reading in Turkmenistan‘s schools (which is still 
taught there), renaming months and the days of the week by introduction of the 
new Turkmen calendar.
94
 This in fact, demonstrates his concern for Islam and 
Islamic literature. Besides, opposition parties were banned in Turkmenistan and 
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the government controlled all sources of information. The leaders of Central 
Asian states differ on how to govern their traumatized people. Although they 
were coming from the old communist system but they were of the same kind; 
having authoritative, and with little tolerance to democracy. Over the years, 
leaders like Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenistan), Islam Karimov 
(Uzbekistan), Nursultan Nazarbeyey (Kazakhstan), have turned out to be 
power-hungry politicians who have bestowed upon themselves vast powers, 
intolerant to criticism and opposition.
95
 After assuming power, the first 
secretary of communist party of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, 
disbanded the party and changed its name to Turkmenistan Democratic Party, 
became a democrat and proclaimed Turkmenistan a secular state.
96
 The current 
government oversees "official Islam" through a structure inherited from the 
Soviet period. Turkmenistan Muslim Religious Board, together with that of 
Uzbekistan, constitutes the Religious Board of Mavarannahr situated in 
Tashkent, exerts considerable influence in appointments of religious leaders in 
Turkmenistan. The governing body of Islamic judges (Qaziat) is registered 
with the Turkmenistan ministry of justice and a council of religious affairs 
under the cabinet ministers monitors activities of clergy. Those who wish to 
become members of the official clergy are required to attend official religious 
institutions; a few, however, may prove their qualification simply by taking an 
examination.
97
 According to 1995 census, ethnic Turkmen constituted 77% of 
the population who were predominantly Sunni Muslims. Although the great 
majority of Turkmen readily identify themselves as Muslim and acknowledge 
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Islam as an integral part of their cultural heritage, many are non-believers and 
support revival of the religion as an element of national revival. They do not 
attend mosque services or demonstrate their religious adherence publicly, 
except through participation in officially sanctioned national traditions 
associated with Islam on a popular level.
98
 
 
Since 1990, efforts have been made to regain some of the cultural heritage lost 
under Soviet rule, president Niyazov has ordered that basic Islamic principles 
must be taught in public schools. A good number of religious institutions 
including religious schools and mosques have been established with the active 
support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. As a practice of Abbasid regime, 
religious classes are held in both the schools and mosques, the subjects like 
Qu‘ran, Hadith and the history of Islam are being taught on regular basis by 
scholars of excellence in Arabic language.
99
 
 
With a view to satisfy the wishes of the population, Turkmenistan government 
has allowed a modest, state-sponsored and tightly controlled revival of Islam 
since independence. As against four mosques operating during the Soviet era, 
there are an estimated 318 mosques open for Muslims now.
100
 Nevertheless, 
mosque-based Islam does not play a dominant role in the society, partly due to 
70 years of Soviet rule and partly because of the country‘s indigenous religious 
culture. Traditionally, Turkmen express Islam more through rituals associated 
with birth, marriage, death and through pilgrimage to the tombs of Saints, 
rather than through regular attendance at a mosque.
101 
Though there is no state 
religion, the government has incorporated some aspects of Islamic tradition 
with a view to redefine a national identity. In order to ensure that foreign 
Islamic movements do not spread into the country, the government exercises 
strict control and restricts access to Islamic education since 1997, and mosque 
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based Imams are restricted to teach Islam.
102
 Criticizing the expansion of the 
network of Islamic schools, president Niyazov ordered in June, 2001, the 
closure of Zamakshri Madrasas in Dashoguaz,
103 
leaving the theological 
faculty at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat as the only remaining 
government centre for Islamic education but there remained no religious 
instruction in public schools.
104
 Moreover, it was mandatory for all the children 
in the public schools and institutions of higher learning to study Ruhnama 
(president Niyazov‘s spiritual guide book which is still taught there), on 
Turkmen culture heritage. 
 
The government stresses its secular nature and support of freedom of religious 
belief as embodied in the 1991 Law, on freedom of conscience, on religious 
organizations in Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and institutionalized the 
same in 1992 constitution. That document guarantees the separation of church 
and state; it also removes any legal basis for Islam to play a role in political life 
by prohibiting the dissemination of ―unofficial‖ religious literature, 
discrimination based on religion, and the formation of religious political 
parties. In addition, the government reserves the right to appoint and dismiss 
anyone who teaches religious matters or who is a member of clergy.
105
 The 
serious mistreatment of some minority religious members continued which 
began in 2003 and was extended to the Muslim community. In March 2004, 
Turkmenistan‘s popular and respected Mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, was 
secretly tied and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment, reportedly for his alleged 
role in a failed 2002 coup plot. He has been dismissed as Mufti in 2003, 
reportedly for his refusal to teach the president‘s book, Ruhnama, as a sacred 
text. Since independence, the Islamic leadership in Turkmenistan has been 
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more assertive but in large part, it responds to government control.
106
 The 
official governing body of religious judges gave its official support to president 
Niyazov in June 1992 elections. 
 
On the other hand, some Muslim leaders are opposed to the secular concept of 
government and especially to a government controlled by former communists. 
Some official leaders and teachers working outside the official structure have 
vowed to increase the knowledge of Islam, to increase Islam‘s role in society, 
and broaden adherence to its tenets. Alarmed that such activism may aggravate 
tensions between Sunnis and Shiites and especially alienate Orthodox slaves; 
the government has drawn up plans to elevate the council of religious affairs to 
ministry status and regulate religious activities more tightly. In the beginning of 
1998, the Turkmen government expelled almost all missionaries and all 
religious activities have been highly repressed. House meetings of any kind are 
prohibited and people found attending secret religious meetings risk losing 
their job and home too. The Turkmen intelligence services carefully watch 
those known to be believers as well as foreigners.
107 
Turkmenistan has one of 
the most oppressive regimes of the world. The former president instituted a 
bizarre personality cult.
108
 He erected gold plated statues of himself all over the 
country and his portrait hung in every public room and on every public 
building. He wrote a book called Ruhnama, which rules much of the daily life. 
Consequently, an entire generation has undergone extensive brain washing.
109 
The new president, Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, has promised to continue 
Niyazov‘s political heritage. Schoolchildren are still required to memorize 
portions of the former president‘s book, Ruhnama. There is no critical voice or 
opposition allowed in the country, the government continues to control all 
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media.
110
 Islam in Central Asia in general, and Turkmenistan in particular has 
to confront different stages in the process of its development. Earlier during the 
Soviets Islam as a religion was marginalized in so far its role and influence on 
common masses was concerned. After independence, it was expected, Islam 
with its whole system will re-emerge on the scenario of Turkmenistan. 
Niyazov, the president of the country initially proved all-liberal by providing 
administrative support regarding the teaching of Islamic principles at school, 
establishing Mosques at large scale in the region, however being a former 
communist leader, with the passage of time he pursued the footsteps of his 
predecessors.
 
Methodology  
In order to have a meaningful discourse on the subject, interdisciplinary 
approach has been followed taking insight from history, geography, cultural 
anthropology, economics, political science and philosophy. The comparative 
methods were also employed for the understanding of different issues related to 
the subject. Since the study is based on theoretical and historical study as such 
all sources of information, books, official records, journals, periodicals, 
newspapers etc. were taken into account. Although enough of literature on the 
nature of State and Islam in Turkmenistan is not available, an attempt has been 
made to evaluate the available data with an objective analysis. Hardly any 
compact research work has been carried out on the history of Islam in 
Turkmenistan both in Soviet and in Post Soviet period, even the little studies 
related to Turkmenistan cover only disjointed and limited areas touching 
mainly general information. The present study therefore aims to fill up the gaps 
and present an objective analysis of the State and Islam in Turkmenistan (1991-
2001).  
 
Objectives 
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Keeping in view the importance and significance of the assigned work, 
following objectives have been formulated to ensure the objectivity and 
impartiality in the work: 
 To look into the details that led to the independent character of 
Turkmenistan, record the religiosity of the region, and the role of socio-
religious institutions in strengthening the mutual bonds and relations. 
 To evaluate socio-political conditions of the region with special reference 
to the Soviet‘s attitude towards Islam till the collapse of USSR. 
 To study the nature and pattern of government in Turkmenistan before 
and after the independence of the country. 
 To highlight the government and state policies in the promotion of 
religious knowledge and institutions in the region. 
 To work out the constitutional pattern with special reference to religion, 
freedom of expression, education, and health care, etc. Besides, the role of 
prominent political parties and the scope of Islamic parties in the formation of 
government would be also dealt in the chapter. 
 
Chapter Scheme 
In order to complete, the assigned work in an objective and analytical manner, 
the Dissertation has been divided into three chapters besides introduction and 
conclusion.  
 
The Introductory part of the dissertation throws light on geographical features 
and ethnic composition of Turkmenistan which include Uzbeks, Russians and 
other smaller minorities like Kazakhs, Azeris, Armenians, Ukrainians, 
Balochis, Koreans and Tatars for the general comprehension and understanding 
of the region. Since several Empires ruled Turkmenistan which begins with 
Achaemenid Empire of ancient Persia up to Mikhail Gorbachev. The chapter 
therefore is an attempt to highlight the historicity of the region with regard to 
the different rulers. After independence, Niyazov became the first president and 
ruled throughout his life. The chapter therefore is a humble beginning to spell 
out the contribution Niyazov made in different stratas of society. Islam was 
first introduced into Transoxiana (modern Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) in the 
2
nd
 half of the seventh century AD. Chapter therefore is an attempt to highlight 
the history of Islam in Central Asia in general and Turkmenistan in particular 
with a brief preface on the position of Islam and Muslims during the Soviet 
regime. Since Soviets had negative attitude towards Islam, religious institutions 
and Muslims who had to bear the brunt of religious persecution , right up to the 
collapse of USSR, as such the chapter has been analytically studied which 
include the description and pattern of government in Turkmenistan even after 
Independence. 
 
Chapter 2
nd
 of the Dissertation deals with the socio-religious milieu of 
Turkmenistan. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to highlight the Socio-
religious conditions of the region with special reference to Socio-cultural 
conditions, religion, customs and traditions of the area. This chapter also 
throws light on education, economy and social events. Prior to Soviet rule, the 
extended family was the basic and most important social and economic unit 
among the Turkmen. Although soviet power brought about fundamental 
changes in the family structure but many traditional aspects remain alive. 
Turkmen society is basically patriarchal in which the authority belongs to 
eldest male of the extended family. Therefore, attention has been paid to 
identify the status of family, as an institution that includes gender issues, 
elder‘s role, role of women, marriage and divorce. With regard to religion, a 
brief description of all religions and a detailed account of Islam and its 
practices are also included in the chapter. Villages and communities are ruled 
by Majilis or council made up of male leaders of prominent families. Local 
Mullah‘s (community heads) have a prominent role to play in resolving the 
women‘s issues. Their admonishes and word of advice resolve the family 
disputes by adhering to the path of mutual trust and reconciliation to make 
married life more comfortable. Turkmen people practice monogamy and large 
families spanning several generations live under one roof. To Turkmen 
breaking up the family and living apart is beyond ones imagination and such 
would be considered a disaster. The chapter as such would identify the status of 
family as an institution and its impact on the socio-cultural developments of the 
region. The chapter as such would identify the status of family as an institution 
and its impact on the socio-cultural developments of the region. The society in 
Turkmenistan presented a gloomy picture during the Soviet occupation of the 
country. Majority of the population predominantly Muslim had to bear the 
brunt of the communist rule. Contrary to their religious beliefs and social ethos 
women had to be the worst sufferer of the dictates of the Soviet Union 
subjugated by the men folk and religious leaders alike and were treated as 
chattel‘s and forced into hellish marriages living lives of virtual slavery. 
Although the Muslim in Turkmenistan continued and practiced their traditional 
faith the Soviet regime sharply restricted the practice of Islam under Stalin and 
Khrushchev, launched campaigns to destroy the age old faith of the people. 
Scores of Ulama were arrested, religious books were destroyed, schools and 
local Maktabas were closed as a result of which children continued their 
education at their respective homes. Mosques and other holly places were 
closed. Role of religion in the upliftment of socio-cultural conditions has been 
dealt in the chapter as well. The seventh century witnessed glaring change with 
the coming of Islam in the region. The Arabs brought Islam, the pre-dominant 
religion of Central Asia to the region in the 7
th
 century. Since then Islam has 
become an integral part of Turkmen culture .Although Soviet efforts to 
secularize society were largely successful, the post–Soviet era has been a 
marked increase in religious practices. With the end of Soviet power, the world 
witnessed a resurgence of Islam in Central Asian Republics. The rising 
influence of Islam on Turkmen society can be seen from the substantial 
increase in the performance of religious rituals and practices. People in general 
follow strict Islamic rules in marriage, circumcision, burial etc. The chapter as 
such would give an account of the religiosity of the region after Turkmenistan 
became an independent country. While the languages of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all have Turkic roots. 
Turkmenistan is the only former Soviet republic with Turkic language. In a 
move towards greater sovereignty under the Soviet system, the government of 
Turkmenistan declared Turkic to be the official language in 1989 and called for 
a gradual transition back to the Arabic alphabet in 1992. With the rise of the 
neo-Soviet government, this change was never implemented. From 1994, sole 
official language is Russian and is widely used in government and business 
dealings. However, 77% of the country is rural who speak mostly Turkic. The 
chapter therefore would bring into lime light the role of languages in 
identifying the identity of the Turkmenistan. Since the customs and traditions 
of a particular society reflect its socio-cultural history, in Turkmenistan many 
popular customs and traditions have not only been retained but also glorified. 
Since the customs and traditions of a particular community reflects the socio 
cultural pattern of the said society. As such, an attempt has been made to 
address to this vital component of social life in the chapter. In order to 
understand the socio-religious ethos, of any region, demographic composition 
and structure constitutes one of the most significant components of the study.  
Chapter therefore, would bring into limelight the demographic composition and 
structure of Turkmenistan in order to understand the position of Islam. 
 
Chapter 3
nd
 of the Dissertation is an effort to highlight the state and Islam in the 
region. Since the downfall of the Russian Empire gave birth to the 
establishment of Soviet Union. Chapter gives an account of the reasons 
responsible for the Russian collapse and the formation of Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union was a federation of 15 national union republics. Legally, all union 
republics had equal status with the same degree of self-government and 
dependence on the federal power, having uniform systems of governing bodies 
and political institutions and being subordinate to those of the Soviet Union. 
The chapter therefore would provide an account of the state with special 
reference to nature of the state: state policies, social and political life. In fact, 
the chapter is an attempt to study the religion in Soviet Union in its entirety. 
Islam was severely persecuted and its infrastructure destroyed. However, the 
Soviet Union had only about 500 working Islamic mosques, a fraction of the 
mosques in prerevolutionary Russia, and Soviet law forbade Islamic religious 
activity outside working mosques and Islamic schools. Four ―spiritual 
directorates‖ which were established by soviet authorities to provide 
governmental control supervised all working mosques, religious schools, and 
Islamic publications. As a result of this an attempt has been made to analyze 
the socio-religious activities with special reference to the establishment of 
official and unofficial Islam, Islamic Parties, suppression of Islam under 
communism, soviets attitude towards Islam, and the revival of Islam in the 
country.  
Before an in-depth study of the Religion and the nature of the state of post-
soviet Turkmenistan visa vis its role in the establishment and promotion of 
religious Institutions, is made, one has to be abreast of the fact that 
Turkmenistan was ruled by Greeks, Romans, Seljuks, Turks and finally 
annexed by Russia between 1865 and 1885, It became a Soviet republic in 
1925. The Soviet Union was a federation of 15 national union republics. 
Legally, all union republics had equal status with the same degree of self-
government and dependence on the federal power, having uniform systems of 
governing bodies, political institutions and being subordinate to those of the 
Soviet Union. The formal governing body in each republic has its own 
popularly elected legislature, the Supreme Soviet, which met twice a year. 
Since the soviet doctrine did not accept the concept of the separation of powers, 
the Supreme Soviet elected its chairman, designated as the formal head of the 
republic. It also appointed a prime minister and other members of the cabinet, 
who, according to their positions, were awarded with parliamentary seats. 
However, the real decision making authority in the republic was the central 
committee of the republic‘s communist party. Following this constitutional 
principle, the secretaries of the central committee provided guidelines to all 
agencies and institutions of the republics, monitored their daily activities, made 
all key appointment in state institutions and organized the work of the lower-
level (provincial and district) committees, which were in-charge of governing 
their respective territories. Being part of the Union, each republic had 
individual representation in federal authorities. Formerly, each republic of the 
Soviet Union was a Sovereign State with its own constitution and symbols of 
sovereignty such as Flag, Coat of Arms, and National anthem. The USSR 
constitution and constitutions of each republic-, which were largely identical 
and were passed in 1937 and 1978. The Soviet constitution provided for three 
types of jurisdiction: all-union, mixed union-republican, where local authorities 
could exercise some degree of autonomy. Defense, national security, and 
foreign relations were always the exclusive jurisdiction of federal authorities. 
Agriculture, health, education; public order, social security, and justice were 
under the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and republics. Republics were largely 
responsible for control over local industries, communal economies, services, 
and road construction. Constitution of all five Central Asian republics 
proclaimed basic human rights- specially those of women- and they contained 
statements about struggles with old customs, which excluded women from 
participating in social, economic, and political events. Unlike all other 
constitutions, the constitution of Turkmenistan specified that contract 
marriages, bride purchases restricted choice of husbands, and the resistance to 
drawing women into study or work were punishable by laws. While the 
republics were part of the Soviet Union, Russian was the common language for 
interethnic communications and one of two official language of each republic. 
All official documents issued by republican authorities were published in two 
languages- Russian and the native language of the respective republic. All 
important personnel decisions were made in Moscow according to the principle 
of dual leadership. Under this principle, a leader of the republic was a native 
person but always had a reliable Russian assistant to supervise and provide 
reports to Moscow, where ethnic Russians occupied most of the key positions. 
During Soviet rule, Central Asia experienced huge success in different areas of 
activity. The main features of economic development were total nationalization 
of the economy and establishment of a state monopoly in all areas of 
technological development, including small local individual enterprises, which 
were united into state-controlled cooperatives. As soon as the Soviet power was 
established, all religious holidays were cancelled and it was prohibited to take 
off from work any day except Wednesday, because the Bolshevik revolution of 
October 25, 1917, had occurred on Wednesday. The communist, party 
monopolized all aspects of social and political life in the Soviet Union and 
cultural development was subjected to Communist ideology. Historical roots 
and national specifics were declared signs of backwardness. Russification 
became primary element of policies applied by Moscow toward the union 
republics.  Social and cultural reforms started with changes in social policy. 
The cornerstones of this policy were the opening of new schools; mandatory 
elementary education for all pupils; the elimination of illiteracy; the expansion 
of publications in native languages; and the establishment of national theaters, 
universities and research institutions. However, all these developments were 
coordinated with the ideologists in Moscow and were subject to censorship. In 
1926, the government initiated school reform and started to issue permits for 
opening local private schools. Not ready to prohibit Islam entirely, the 
government did not openly ban the teaching of religion and required basic 
sciences be taught as well. Students under the age of eight were not admitted. 
Corporal punishment was forbidden, and the teaching of arithmetic, natural 
science, and native languages was obligatory. Students under the age ten were 
permitted to study only for four hours a day, with breaks every forty minutes, 
while older students could study up to six hours. It was not permitted for 
teachers to use students‘ labor for their personal needs. The students from the 
Soviet schools were not allowed to attend religious schools. Later, only 
children ages fourteen and above were allowed to enroll in religious classes 
because the government hoped that antireligious propaganda would make them 
immune from Islamic influences. To restrict religious education even further, in 
1920, the government limited the religious instruction of children to groups of 
three students. In 1929, such groups were recognized as small religious schools 
in secret form and were prohibited completely. Teaching religion in any 
government, social or private school forbidden. The language reform was 
initiated in Turkistan in 1926. The Latin alphabet and a unified mode of 
transcription replaced Arabic script. The reform was not completed before 
1935, when the second reform changed Latin letters to the Cyrillic (Russian) 
alphabet. It was during the post soviet era that the reform moment reached its 
zenith. The main purposes of the reform were the further Russification of 
central Asia, penetration of national languages by the Russian language, and 
the facilitation of the study of the Russian language by the natives. The reform 
helped to establish closer cultural ties between Russia and central Asia and 
performed an ideological function of making all previously published books, 
mostly of religious and anti-Soviet content, obsolete and not available to the 
masses. This effect of the language reform coincided (agreed) with the goals of 
antireligious campaigns that were constantly conducted during Soviet era. 
According to Keller, the Soviet government attacked religion because its 
Marxist-Leninist theory dictated an atheist society and because it could not 
tolerate any rival for power. In 1927, a total attack on religion began. Usually, 
antireligious campaign were carried by the secret police; the campaigns 
physically eliminated most of the clergy and imposed strict punishments on 
believers. Most of the mosques were closed, so the buildings could be used for 
other purposes- such as warehouses, sport club, or concert halls. The religious 
Organizations Act of 1929 allowed for the construction of new houses of 
prayer if general technical requirements were observed; however, special 
conditions set up by police and not specified in the law were almost impossible 
to meet. This law prohibited all charitable activities of religious groups and 
introduced the direct supervision of religious activities by a person from a 
nearest police unit, village soviet, or city council assigned to attend all 
meetings of the believers. The agent was an observer with no right to 
participate in discussions or activities; however, he could close meetings and 
was obligated to do so in case of an outbreak of violence, deviation from the 
approved program, illegal activities, or upon the request of the meeting 
participants. Often, closed mosques were used as court chambers. Muslim 
courts were not abolished until 1927, although their jurisdiction was gradually 
narrowed. In February 1924, they were banned from hearing criminal or 
important civil cases; two years later, they were prohibited from hearing 
divorce cases, and the people‘s Commissariat of justice declared them to be 
part of strictly voluntary judicial system. The eradication of Islamic courts did 
not mean the elimination of Islamic judges who proceeded from religious 
courts to the people‘s court. Because judges were often unfamiliar with the 
adopted laws and statues, they made legal mistakes and applied the traditional 
Islamic Shariah laws. The liberation of women was one of the principle goals 
of antireligious campaigns aimed at eliminating traditional practices of veiling, 
polygamy, bride payments, and prearranged child marriages. In Central Asia, 
the emancipation of women contrasted with the norms of traditional society. 
The position of women significantly improved during the Soviet rule. When 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the government‘s anti-Islamic policy 
intensified. Later Gorbachev‘s reforms brought the first relaxation to the 
religions of Soviet Muslims: the restoration of mosques was allowed, and the 
first political rise of Islamic self-consciousness was tolerated. In the late 1980s, 
the idea of sovereign state development became especially popular among 
national elites and intellectuals. In 1989 and 1990, all five republics adopted 
laws regulating the status of national languages, which were recognized as 
official state languages. The study of native languages was initiated and, 
together with the publication of previously prohibited Books of national 
authors, it became a factor in the growing national self-consciousness. Since 
Islam was not destroyed by repressions, Rashidov, Kunaev, and other local 
leaders assured federal authorities that Central Asian Islam presented no danger 
to Bolshevik rule. In reality, local elites were actively involved in destroying 
Islam, seeing its representatives as potential contenders (candidates) to local 
political power. The local party elite replaced the regular clergy with local 
clergy who were willing to follow the directives of local party committees and 
the secret police. Although most of the population avoided any alliance 
(coalition) with the discredited clergy, these people were viewed with some 
respected by the people of Central Asia because they knew Arabic, could read 
the Quran, and pilgrimaged. While travelling throughout the Muslim 
community abroad, they promoted a positive image of Soviet Union. The 
parallel existence of official and unofficial (underground) Islam in Central Asia 
continued to the end of 1980s.  The chapter therefore is an effort to highlight 
nature and structure of the state. An effort has been made to study the Islam in 
Soviet period in its totality and Soviet policies towards Islam. Moreover, role 
of Sufi brotherhood in spreading and preserving Islam and Soviet measures 
against Sufism. 
 
Chapter 4
th
 constitutes the most significant component of the present study that 
throws light on the formation of the state. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
gives birth to the establishment of independent Turkmenistan. Chapter gives an 
account of the reasons responsible for the soviet collapse and the task to be 
under taken by Turkmenistan after its independence. When Turkmenistan 
achieved its independence, the new government did not bring freedom to the 
country but established an authoritarian regime. The chapter therefore would 
provide an account of the state with special reference to nature of the state: 
State Policies (Niyazov‘s Legacy), , Separation of Politics and Religion, 
Society of Turkmenistan, Education, Health Care, Human Rights, and 
Economy. In fact, the chapter is an attempt to study the religion in 
Turkmenistan in its entirety, especially on the eve of Independence. The Soviet 
Union disintegrated suddenly, without warning or preparation, at the end of 
1991. In Central Asia, Islam was still largely a marker of a cultural identity. 
The vast majority of the population still had very little knowledge of the 
doctrines and practices of faith. As a result of this an attempt has been made to 
analyze the socio-religious activities with special reference to the establishment 
of Mosques as well as Madrasas as centre of higher religious learning and 
knowledge, Post Soviet Islamization, Recreating an Islamic Infrastructure, 
Muslim Missionaries and also Islam and the State. Moreover, the attitude of the 
government towards Islam and these centers has also been taken into 
consideration with special reference to Religion and Cult of Personality, Laws 
on Religion, and Religious Intolerance in Turkmenistan. It is seen that after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, former Communist Party Saparmurat Niyazov 
became the country‘s first President; Turkmenistan is governed under the 
constitution of 1992.  The president, who is both head of state and head of 
government, is elected by popular vote for a five-year term.  There are two 
legislative bodies. A law adopted in 2003 effectively makes the president the 
head of both the executive and legislative branches of government. According 
to the constitution, Turkmenistan is a secular democratic and presidential 
republic.  The government has three branches: Executive - President and the 
Council of Ministers, Legislative - Mejlis (Parliament), and Judicial - 
Supreme Court.  The legal system is based on the civil law system. There is 
only one party, which is allowed to work i.e. Democratic Party of 
Turkmenistan. Despite the unopposed establishment of Saparmurat Niyazov as 
president for life, formal opposition parties are outlawed. Turkmenistan has a 
regime under which very little NGO activity is possible.  There is no NGO law 
and it is very difficult to register an organization because after independence 
the Turkmenistan government uses its laws to deny NGO registration in order 
to control the NGO sector. He ruled Turkmenistan with an iron fist until 9 
December 2006. His legacy is a regime of totalitarian control, paranoid 
dictatorship and an absence of basic freedom and human rights for the citizens 
of Turkmenistan. During the rule, the new independent Turkmen state under 
the leadership of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi did not bring freedom to the 
country but instead established one of the most isolated and authoritarian 
regimes of the contemporary world characterized by extremities and 
contradictions.  The state, claiming to be the agent of revival, authenticity and 
emancipation against the notorious Soviet legacy; was indeed a political and 
structural continuation of the Turkmen SSR and was most of the time 
reproductive of Soviet-style socio-political modalities of public control and 
suppression, particularly regarding its authoritarianism, isolationism and 
intensive propaganda campaigns.  The president of this state, claiming to be the 
father of the Turkmen; was not only among the most authoritarian leaders of 
the century but was also ignorant of the real social and economic needs of his 
people. His government gutted the country‘s educational system and destroyed 
the medical system. He erected gold plated statues of himself all over the 
country and his portrait hung in every public room and on every public 
building.  He also built enormous government buildings at the expense of 
ordinary citizens, most of whom lived in extreme poverty, and systematically 
isolated Turkmenistan by outlawing foreign publications, maintaining full 
control over the Internet, and censoring all media.  Freedom of association was 
extremely limited and he maintained full control over the political system, 
outlawing opposition and suppressing all forms of expression. Moreover, all 
missionaries were expelled and all religious activities have been highly 
repressed. He created an unrivalled cult of personality, even renaming the 
months of the year after members of his family and decreeing that the 
Ruhnama, a spiritual guide he allegedly wrote, be taught in schools throughout 
the country and, often, be recited from memory as a precondition to obtain  
jobs. The state has been governed neither by the Quran nor by the Sunnah but 
only by the president‘s book, Ruhnama. Consequently, an entire generation has 
undergone extensive brain washing. Following Niyazov‘s death in December 
2006, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who had been serving as the Minister 
of Health and Deputy Prime Minister under Niyazov, was appointed acting 
President until he was elected in February 2007. The new president, 
Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, has promised to continue Niyazov‘s political 
heritage. Schoolchildren are still required to memorize portions of the former 
president‘s book, Ruhnama. There is no critical voice or opposition allowed in 
the country and the government continues to control all media. 
Islam came to Turkmen primarily through the activities of Sufi Sheikhs rather 
than the mosque and the "high" written tradition of sedentary culture. During 
the Soviet rule, all religious beliefs were attacked by the communist authorities 
as superstition and ―vestiges of the past‖. Most religious schooling and 
religious observances were banned, thousands of mosques were closed, and 
many signs of the Muslim religion were made illegal. An official Muslim 
Board of Central Asia, with headquarter in Tashkent, was established during 
the II World War to supervise Islam in Central Asia. For the most part, the 
Muslim Board functioned as an instrument of propaganda whose activities did 
little to enhance the Muslim cause. Atheist introduction muffled the religious 
development and contributed to the isolation of Turkmen from the international 
Muslim community.  
 
Some religious customs such as, burial and male circumcision continued to be 
practiced throughout the Soviet period but most of the religious beliefs, 
knowledge and customs were preserved only in rural areas in ―folk from‖ as a 
kind of "unofficial Islam" which was not sanctioned by the state. By 1960s, the 
Soviet regime realized that Islam could not be entirely eradicated from Central 
Asia for domestic as well as political reasons, Moscow established ―official 
Islam‖ allowing the functioning of a handful of state-controlled mosques and 
religious schools. Similarly, the regime permitted a small number of Muslims 
to make the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Makah.  
 
Even before Soviet occupation of Central Asian lands, the population was 
accustomed to being oppressed and tortured by the Amirs but at least they were 
left alone to practice their age-old customs and religion. While radical Islam 
spread elsewhere in the Arab World, Central Asia was kept out of its influence 
by the Iron curtain. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 
that most of the Central Asian people became aware of these ideas and 
ideologies because the most widely practiced form of Islam in Central Asia was 
traditional Sufism, which placed stress on mysticism, music, poetry, tolerance 
and did not subject women to severe constraints. Thus, even under Soviet rule 
in Central Asia, adherence to Islam continued as a covert activity with local 
Communist party chiefs deliberately ignoring private observance of Islam. 
After Independence, the authoritarian, Niyazov, assumed the title 
―Turkameabashi”, or “Leader of all Turkmen”, but was accused of developing 
a totalitarian cult of personality. His opus, the Ruhnama, is a mandatory 
reading in Turkmenistan‘s schools and months of the calendar have been 
renamed after members of his family. This in fact, demonstrates his concern for 
Islam and Islamic literature. Besides, opposition parties are banned in 
Turkmenistan and the government controls all sources of information. The 
leaders of Central Asian states differ on how to govern their traumatized 
people, coming from the old communist system, but they were of the same 
kind; having authoritative, and with little tolerance to democracy. Over the 
years, leaders like Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenistan), Islam Karimov 
(Uzbekistan), Nursultan Nazarbeyey (Kazakhstan), have turned out to be 
power-hungry politicians who have bestowed upon themselves vast powers, 
intolerant to criticism and opposition. After assuming power, the first secretary 
of communist party of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, disbanded the 
party and changed its name to Turkmenistan Democratic Party (TDP), became 
a democrat and proclaimed Turkmenistan a secular state. The current 
government oversees official Islam through a structure inherited from the 
Soviet period. Turkmenistan Muslim Religious Board, together with that of 
Uzbekistan, constitutes the Religious Board of Mavarannahr situated in 
Tashkant exerts considerable influence in appointments of religious leaders in 
Turkmenistan. The governing body of Islamic judges (Qaziat) is registered 
with the Turkmenistan ministry of justice, a council of religious affairs under 
the cabinet ministers monitor activities of clergy. Those who wish to become 
members of the official clergy are required to attend official religious 
institutions; a few, however, may prove their qualification simply by taking an 
examination. Although the great majority of Turkmen readily identify 
themselves as Muslim and acknowledge Islam as an integral part of their 
cultural heritage, many are non-believers and support revival of the religion as 
an element of national revival. They do not attend mosque services or 
demonstrate their religious adherence publicly, except through participation in 
officially sanctioned national traditions associated with Islam on a popular 
level.  Since 1990, efforts have been made to regain some of the cultural 
heritage lost under Soviet rule President Niyazov has ordered that basic Islamic 
principles be taught in public schools. A good number of religious institutions 
including religious schools and mosques have been established with the active 
support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. As a practice of Abbasid regime, 
religious classes are held in both the schools and mosques and the subjects like 
Quran, Hadith and the history of Islam are being taught on regular basis. With 
a view to satisfy the wishes of the population, Turkmenistan government has 
allowed a modest, state-sponsored and tightly controlled revival of Islam since 
independence. As against four mosques operating during the Soviet era, now 
there are an estimated 318 mosques open for Muslims. Nevertheless, mosque-
based Islam does not play a dominant role in the society, partly due to 70 years 
of Soviet rule and partly because of the country‘s indigenous religious culture. 
Traditionally, Turkmen express Islam more through rituals associated with 
birth, marriage, death and through pilgrimage to the tombs of Saints, rather 
than through regular attendance at a mosque. Though there is no state religion, 
the government however, has incorporated some aspects of Islamic tradition 
with a view to redefine a national identity. These Islamic traditions have been 
confirmed and in order to ensure that foreign Islamic movements do not spread 
into the country, the government exercises strict control and restricts access to 
Islamic education since 1997, and mosque based Imams are restricted to teach 
Islam. Criticizing the expansion of the network of Islamic schools, president 
Niyazov ordered in June, 2001, the closure of Zamakshri Madrasa in 
Dashoguaz, leaving the theological faculty at Turkmen State University in 
Ashgabat as the only remaining government centre for Islamic education but 
there remain no religious instruction in public schools.  The government 
stresses its secular nature and support of freedom of religious belief as 
embodied in the 1991 Law on freedom of conscience, on religious 
organizations in Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and institutionalized the 
same in 1992 constitution. The document guarantees the separation of church 
and state; it also removes any legal basis for Islam to play a role in political life 
by prohibiting distribution of ―unofficial‖ religious literature, discrimination 
based on religion, and the formation of religious political parties. In addition, 
the government reserves the right to appoint and dismiss anyone who teaches 
religious matters or who is a member of clergy. The serious mistreatment of 
some minority religious members continued which began in 2003 and was 
extended to the Muslim community. In March 2004, Turkmenistan‘s popular 
and respected Mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, was secretly tied and sentenced 
to 22 years in prison, reportedly for his alleged role in a failed 2002 coup plot. 
He has been dismissed as Mufti in 2003, reportedly for his refusal to teach the 
president‘s book, Ruhnama, as a sacred text. Since independence, the Islamic 
leadership in Turkmenistan has been more assertive but in large part, it 
responds to government control. The official governing body of religious 
judges gave its official support to president Niyazov in June 1992 elections. In 
the backdrop of this situation, some Muslim leaders are opposed to the secular 
concept of government and especially to a government controlled by former 
communists. Some official leaders and teachers working outside the official 
structure have vowed to increase the knowledge of Islam, to increase Islam‘s 
role in society, and broaden adherence to its tenets. Alarmed that such activism 
may aggravate tensions, the government has drawn up plans to elevate the 
council of religious affairs to ministry status and regulate religious activities 
more tightly. In the beginning of 1998, the Turkmen government expelled 
almost all missionaries and all religious activities have been highly repressed. 
The Turkmen intelligence services carefully watch those known to be believers 
as well as foreigners. Turkmenistan has one of the most oppressive regimes of 
the world. The chapter therefore throws light on the nature, formation and 
structure of the state. In fact, the present chapter is an attempt to study the 
religion in Turkmenistan in its entirety, especially, after its disintegration from 
USSR.  
 
Finally, in the concluding part of the dissertation an attempt has been made to 
the results drawn from this study. It is a humble effort to provide suggestions, 
necessary steps that can be taken by the authorities to improve the condition of 
Turkmenistan. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - 2 
SOCIAL-RELIGIOUS 
MILIEU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Society 
Turkmenistan is a tribal society with a stratified social structure. The tribes 
claim a common mythical ancestor, Oghuz Khan, from whom they are 
descended. The genealogical connection within each group is so strong that 
each tribe considers itself as the true representative of ―Turkmen.‖111 Each 
large tribe is identifiable based on carpet pattern, clothing, and headgear.
112
 
There are also groups with deep roots in Turkmenistan that do not trace their 
ancestry back to Oghuz Khan. Instead, they appear to be descended from other 
Turks and Persian settlers. In addition, there are ethnic minorities such as 
Uzbeks and Tajiks who live inside the borders of Turkmenistan.
113
 
 
The Turkmen people have traditionally been nomads, horsemen, and even 
today after the fall of the USSR attempts to urbanize the Turkmens have not 
been very successful.  They never really formed a coherent nation or ethnic 
group until forged into one by Joseph Stalin in the 1930s.  Turkmen are divided 
into clans, and each clan has its own dialect and style of dress.
114
 The 
Turkmens are mostly Sunni Muslims and adhere to Islam rather loosely and 
combine Islam with pre-Islamic traditions. Having their inclination towards 
Sufi version of Islam. They never advocated fundamentalism as a means to 
propagate Islam in the region. The Turkmen were mainly nomadic people for 
most of their history and they were not settled in cities and towns until the 
advent of the Soviet system of government, which severely restricted freedom 
of movement and collectivized nomadic herdsmen by the 1930s.  Many pre-
Soviet cultural traits have survived in Turkmen society and have recently 
undergone a kind of revival.  
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114 Turkmens are famous for making gillams, mistakenly called Bukhara rugs in the West.  These are 
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Customs and Traditions 
Turkmen lifestyle was heavily invested in horsemanship and as a prominent 
horse culture; Turkmen horse breeding was an age-old tradition.  In spite of 
changes prompted by the Soviet period, a tribe in southern Turkmenistan has 
been known for its horses, the Akhal-Teke desert horse - and the horse 
breeding tradition has returned to its previous prominence in recent years.
115
 
Turkmen are also famous for their excellent carpets, embroidery, women‘s 
dress, and jewellery. Many tribal customs still survive among modern 
Turkmen.  Unique to Turkmen culture is kalim, which is a groom's ―dowry,‖ 
that can be quite expensive and often results in the widely practiced tradition of 
bridal kidnapping
116
 In something of a modern parallel, President Saparmurat 
Niyazov introduced a state enforced ―kalim,‖ wherein all foreigners are 
required to pay a sum of no less than $50,000 to marry a Turkmen woman. 
Other customs include the consultation of tribal elders, whose advice is often 
eagerly sought and respected.  Many Turkmen still live in extended families 
where multiple generations still live under single roof, especially in rural 
areas.
117 
They have a rich musical and literary tradition.  The most famous 
Turkmen poet is Magtymguly, who is the 18th-century author of many 
nationalist and lyric poems.
118
 The five traditional carpet designs that form 
motifs in the country's state emblem and flag represent the five major tribes,
119
 
and the Islamic crescent moon. As an emblematic color of Islam, the green 
background emphasizes the nation's Muslim heritage. The traditional Turkmen 
dwelling is a felt tent called a gara oy (black house) or a ―yurt‖ in Western 
literature.
120
 Today most Turkmen live in modern housing, and gara oys are 
only used for summer recreation and holidays. In rural areas, most people live 
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to allow smoke to escape. The frame is collapsible so that the tent can be dismantled quickly for travel. 
in one-story houses made of clay and straw. Often these houses are located 
within a walled courtyard with an agricultural plot and livestock. In the cities of 
Turkmenistan, high-rise apartment dwellings are also common. Furniture was 
borrowed from the West and its use varies. Some homes were furnitured 
whereas others were not. The traditional bedding consists of padded mats that 
are laid on the floor at bedtime. In the morning, they are folded and placed in a 
designated corner with the blankets and pillows. This allows sleeping space to 
be used for other purposes during the day. Some families, primarily in the 
cities, have a worktable in the kitchen area, but most Turkmen eat sitting on the 
floor. They spread a large cloth on the floor, with food and dishes placed on top 
of it. Guests occupy the place of honor, which is made soft with pillows or 
quilts. Turkmen traditionally have a toilet outside of the main living space, 
although some rural families use outhouses.
121
 In the cities, where most people 
live in apartments or small houses, there is no space for this arrangement, but 
many households separate the toilet by locating it in one room and placing the 
sink and shower in a nearby room. Cooking is done in a separate space; some 
homes have a small building for preparing food, dying yarn, and storing 
utensils. This is the domain of women, and it is unusual for neighbours or 
relatives to arrive uninvited to lend a hand or to bring their own chores so that 
they can work and socialize at the same time. Moreover, outside Cooking 
(roasting meat and popping corn) is handled by men and often becomes a social 
activity, with neighbours and friends forming a small crowd. 
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 Fig 1: (Flag) 
 Source: “File: Flag of Turkmenistan (1997-2001).svg”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Turkmenistan_%281992-1997%29.svg 
 
 
 
Fig 2: (Yurt) 
Source: http://www.internetrugs.com/blog/come-and-see-our-turkmen-yurt/ 
 
The diet shows a Russian influence and imported items are available at a high 
price, but Turkmen food generally remains traditional. Hot green tea (gok cay) 
is a part of every meal, even in the hottest days, and round flatbread is a staple 
throughout Central Asia.  Turkmen drink hot tea year round from shallow 
bowl-like cups called kases. A good host will not fill the guest's cup to the brim 
to demonstrate that she is being attentive, and will pour many times if she 
wishes the guest to stay. Turkmen eat a lot of meat, primarily from sheep and 
cows but also from camels, goats, chicken, and despite the Muslim tradition, 
pigs. Most meat dishes are baked or boiled.  They also use milk from these 
animals. Manty is a popular version, eaten with yogurt on top.  One favorite 
Turkmen dish is dograma
122
, which is usually served with meat or noodles and 
may be eaten for breakfast when relatives or guests visit; the food is spread out 
on plates and dishes on a large cloth on the floor.  Guests and family members 
sit and have their meal around this cloth covered with food (called a sachak).  
A typical Turkmen sachak will include a variety of fruits, vegetables, nuts, 
sweets, tea and other breads, as well as butters and creams—all this before the 
main meal. Bread is eaten at every meal. Russian-style loaves can be bought 
cheaply, and traditional flatbread (corek) is often made at home in a tamdyr
123
. 
In the cities, several apartment buildings may share a single tamdyr. Turkmen 
also drink black tea, seltzer water, and imported sodas. Despite the ban on 
alcohol among some Muslim people, Turkmen drink wine, liquor and Turkmen 
wine has won international competitions.  
 
 
Fig:3 (Tamdyr) 
Source:http://www.turkmenistaninfo.ru/?page_id=6&type=article&elem_id=page_6/magazine_10/83
&lang_id=en&layout=print 
 
The separation of space with regard to gender is an aspect of life that varies 
greatly. Men and women may sit and eat together, or may remain in separate 
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rooms during a social event. Some women continue the tradition of wearing a 
yasmak in the first year of marriage. The bride holds the corner of her scarf 
between her teeth to serve as a symbolic barrier between her and any male 
visitors who are not familiar or to show deference to her in-laws; the scarf also 
prevents her from speaking. A woman may stop wearing a yasmak after one 
year of marriage, after the birth of a child, as result of an agreement within the 
family. Moreover, they are conscientious about keeping living spaces clean. 
They never wear shoes in the house but wear and provide guests with slippers. 
Acts of personal hygiene such as cutting the hair and nails are done in the bath 
area, never in the main living space. Almost every available space in a home, 
except the washroom and kitchen, is covered with carpets. Floors are covered 
with multiple carpets, chairs are draped with a medium-sized rug or a square 
seat covering, and the walls display large and often valuable carpets.  
 
The most prominent feature of traditional Turkmen male clothing is the telpek, 
a high sheepskin hat.  It may be brown, black, or white and is typically very 
shaggy.  Men who wear the telpek usually wear a skullcap beneath it and shave 
their heads.  Long, deep-red robes with wide sleeves are also common in 
traditional settings.
124
 In the cities; the clothing of the Turkmen male differs 
little from that of men in the West.  A suit jacket (without a tie) and pants are 
the norm, and no hat is worn. Turkmen women, both urban and rural, typically 
wear more traditional clothing than men do.  The main features are a long dress 
over narrow trousers (the pants are trimmed with a band of embroidery at the 
ankle), a long headscarf, and a cloak-type red robe called a kurte.
125
  Most 
Turkmen women consider Western-style clothing too immodest-Slacks, skirts, 
Tank tops, shorts etc.  They only sew a special type of embroidery called 
keshde, which adorns the collars and fringes of their clothing.  Female 
headdresses usually consist of silver jewellery.  Bracelets and brooches are set 
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with semi-precious stones Young women with two braids and a small scarf are 
unmarried; those with one braid and a big kerchief have been wed. 
 
Fig: 4 (Telpek) 
Source: http://www.travelblog.org/Photos/1643237 
 
Social Events 
Weddings 
Two main events highlight the cycle of life that begins with birth. They are 
marriage and death. Marriage often begins with a young man‘s mother seeking 
a kelin or bride for her son. When a suitable virgin has been found and discreet 
inquiries made about her character and her family, a delegation from the 
groom‘s family makes a visit to the house of the kelin. Sweets are exchanged 
and, over tea, an offer of marriage is made on the groom‘s behalf. The kelin 
may decline or accept and if she accepts, serious preparations begin. The 
patirtoy, a ceremony at which both families share flaked bread, signals the first 
of the formalities that culminate weeks later in the actual marriage. The 
groom‘s mother tenders the bride price or dowry, which was agreed to in early 
negotiations, to the bride‘s family. The groom‘s mother also presents the kelin 
a large bag of groceries every Sunday for several weeks before the wedding 
ceremony. Other gifts like jewellery and bridal dresses are presented as well. 
Finally, on the eve of wedding, females on both sides perform the hennayoka, 
decorating hands, feet and sometimes the face and ears with intricate designs in 
dark amber henna. At the groom‘s house, a rowdy bachelor party takes place 
the same evening with musicians and dancers. On the morning of the wedding 
ceremony, the bride, groom, and important relatives visit the local registry 
office to record their marriage in an official registry book. Following this, the 
couple part and return to their individual houses. When they next meet a few 
hours later, it is at the groom‘s house where the kelin salam or greeting of the 
bride takes place. The bride‘s parents do not attend the feast at the groom‘s 
house. Dressed in white with braided hair and covered with a white gauze veil, 
the bride bows to the groom and guests in a sign of submission to her marital 
duties. Feasting and celebration in the presence of the extended family, friends, 
and neighbours continues throughout the day and into the evening. Late in the 
evening, the newly wedded couple retires to their room or to a bridal yurt 
erected for the occasion.
126
 
 
 
Fig 5: (Kelin) 
Source: http://www.noi.peetahvw.com/Turkmenistan.html 
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Funerals 
Turkmen perform burial ceremonies according to Islamic law, and did so, even 
under communism. Women do not attend funerals, but do participate in the 
commemoratory feasts held at seven days, forty days, and one year after a 
death. Turkmen prefer to use the term "to pass on" (aradan cykmak), rather than 
"to die" (olmek). The sound of wailing alerts the neighborhood to a death in the 
family. Because Islamic tradition requires a speedy burial, the same day or 
within twenty-four hours if possible, events proceed rather quickly. An 
undertaker of the same gender as the deceased is summoned and together with 
relatives of the deceased, the body is washed. The jaw is tied shut and the 
ankles are bound. The body is then wrapped in a white shroud several meters 
long. While the male relatives are preparing the gravesite, the kelin of the 
house makes a plate of rice and each mourner in the house takes one grain. She 
also bakes nine loaves of corek bread to give to funeral guests. Male relatives 
gather on benches outside the house as a mullah chants verses from the Quran. 
When the tomb has been prepared, the body is placed in a simple wooden 
coffin and carried from the house. On leaving, the coffin is knocked three times 
against the doorpost of the house as a final goodbye. Females remain at home 
while male relatives bear the coffin to the tomb. A janazah, or funeral prayer, 
is recited at the gravesite and the body is removed from the wooden coffin and 
placed in the tomb with the head pointing in the direction of Mecca. The period 
of mourning lasts forty days, with men wearing a black skullcap and women a 
white headscarf. During the period of mourning, the grieving family will 
observe no festivities.
127
 It is very unlikely that a foreigner would be invited to 
participate in a funeral in Turkmenistan.  
 
The Evil Eye 
The concept of the ―evil eye‖ is an important aspect in Turkmenistan. Bazaars 
are full of goods marketed to ward off the evil eye. Most of the accidents, 
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which do not have an obvious cause, are attributed to the powers of the evil 
eye. As a precaution, Turkmen hang a shrub with spherical twigs over their 
doorways that are thought to have the power to ward off the effects of this 
unwelcome spirit. The belief in the ―evil eye‖ as a destructive force is mixture 
of pre Islamic superstition and Islamic faith, which lived undiminished through 
the Soviet era. Belief in the evil eye is alive and well throughout 
Turkmenistan‘s society. The destructive gaze, intentional or accidental, of 
people with a ―hard gaze‖, transmits the evil eye. Most often, it is by an older 
woman, envious of wealth or beauty. However, it can be unwittingly passed on 
through idle compliments or praise. Those most vulnerable to the effects of the 
evil eye are infants in the first forty days of life, handsome children, and brides 
preparing for marriage. No one however is immune. Human conduct can help 
ward off the ―eye.‖ One can avoid ostentatious displays of wealth or beauty or 
idle compliments concerning children or valuable objects belonging to others. 
Artisans sometimes intentionally build flaws into their crafts to divert the 
glance of the eye, noting that only God is capable of perfect workmanship. 
There is a long list of practical things that can be done to drive away the eye. 
Quranic verses are displayed on the walls of houses or sealed inside triangular 
silver pendants worn about a woman‘s neck to afford protection. Phials of salt, 
dried chili peppers or ram‘s horns are suspended above the front door of a 
house. Spitting on the ground three times and uttering a quick incantation will 
also remove the evil eye. The camel is thought to be a powerful ally in the fight 
against evil and camel hair bracelets or colourful weaves suspended from a 
car‘s rear view mirror are conspicuous talismans. One of the most potent and 
immediate antidotes is the fumes of a burning Isfand herb, which fumigates a 
room and renders it free of the evil eye. 
128
  
 
Naming Conventions 
In Turkmenistan, the grandparents usually name children during the first week 
of life. Often a mullah or holy man is invited to say prayers after which he will 
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recite the child‘s name three times into each ear along with the sura fathiha  
(opening chapter of the Quran). In accordance with Sunni Muslim practice, 
children can be named by selecting a first name that commemorates some 
Islamic hero or includes an amalgam of ―abd‖ (servant of) plus one of the 
ninety nine divine Quranic attributes, e.g., ―Abd-el-Jelil‖ (Servant of the 
Exalted). A long list of Quranic and genteel names for girls exists as well. 
Children also carry their patronymic name (father‘s name) as a middle or 
second name. Family names remain unchanged and women take on their 
husband‘s surname. Occasionally, a child may be named according to its place 
in the family or to particular circumstances surrounding its birth. For example, 
a sickly child might be named Umid (hope) or a child born after previous 
miscarriages could be called Toxtajan (stop). 
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Family Celebrations  
In addition to marriages, births, and deaths, other rituals have grown up around 
life cycle events in Turkmenistan. Each festival is preceded by elaborate 
planning and preparation. The first such celebration is the beshik or wooden 
cradle ritual. A child is placed into a wooden cradle in the first days of life and 
spends its first year of life in the covered wooden ark, safe from the evil eye. 
The sunnet is the ceremony of circumcision for male children between the ages 
of five and seven. Girls who have been selected to be brides are honoured in 
the kelin or bridal shower celebration. Later in life, men and women who have 
reached the age of sixty-three are treated to a special birthday celebration. The 
number 63 is significant because it commemorates the longevity of the prophet 
Muhammad. All of these celebrations are the occasion for music, dance, festive 
costumes, and kitchen delicacies. Friends, relatives, neighbours, and visiting 
dignitaries are invited to join the festivities.
130
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Secular Celebrations 
June is the only month that does not have an official state holiday. The country 
follows a western calendar and the first bank holiday is 1
st
 January, New Year. 
On 12
th
 January the nation observes a Remembrance Day as a day of solemnity. 
Flag Day is 19
th
 February, a day for parades and nationalistic speeches by 
politicians. On this day in 1992, the country‘s new flag was adopted. On 8th 
March, the country honours women by observing International Women‘s Day. 
During the same month, the ancient Persian spring festival, Novruz, is 
celebrated on three successive days: 20
th
, 21
st
, 22
nd
 March. It is the most 
ancient of Central Asian festivals and a time of festive meals, music, and 
regional fairs. 6
th
 April is celebrated, as a Drop of Water Is a Grain Gold Day 
and the last Sunday in April is a rodeo day for southern Turkmenistan. On this 
day, the famous local breed of cavalry mount, the Akhal Teke horses, are put 
on show. Victory Day on 9 May was added by the Soviets following the 
Second World War. It memorializes the collective victory of allied and socialist 
forces over the fascist forces of Mussolini, Hitler, and the Japanese. On 
Constitution Day, 18
th
 May, Turkmen observe the ratification of their post-
independence constitution in 1992 and 25
th
 May is the Carpet Day. The Day of 
the First Election of the President is marked on 21
st
 June. The third Sunday of 
July, Harvest Day, was also introduced during the Soviet era to recognize 
wheat production record. Melon Day, on the other hand, is a farmer‘s festival. 
It is celebrated on the 2
nd
 Sunday in August. The 2
nd
 Saturday in September, 
Singers‘ Day, is a day on which the poets and singers of Turkmenistan are 
honoured. The victims of the devastating earthquake of 1948 that demolished 
the city of Ashgabat and killed 100,000 are remembered on Earthquake Day, 
6
th
 October. 17
th 
November (Student Youth Holiday). Although true 
independence came after the fall of the Soviet Union and the ratification of the 
constitution, 27
th
 November is remembered as the day when Turkmenistan 
declared itself an autonomous republic in 1990.
131 
7
th
 December (Good 
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Neighbourliness Day) and the last official bank holiday of the year, Neutrality 
Day on 12
th
 December, reaffirms Turkmenistan‘s decision to remain neutral in 
regional and global conflict issues. The United Nations officially recognized 
this status in 1995. 
132 
 
Economy 
 
Turkmenistan's economy is predominantly agricultural. Agriculture accounts 
for almost half of the GDP and more than two-fifths of total employment, 
whereas industry accounts for about one-fifth of GDP and slightly more than 
one-tenth of total employment. In 1988, the per capita NMP output was 61 % 
of the Soviet average, fourth lowest of the Soviet republics.
133
 In 1991, 17.2 
%of the work force was engaged in private-sector occupations such as farming, 
individual endeavors, and employment on agreement; 0.7 % worked in rented 
enterprises, and the rest worked for state enterprises, social organizations, and 
collective farms.
134
 Historically, land and water were held in common by 
villages and nomadic groups. Under the Soviet system all land and property 
was under government control. The new government has been moving slowly 
toward privatization and redistribution of collective farmland. In 1995, the 
government restructured farms into peasant associations so that individuals, 
preferably groups, could lease land.
26 
The administration also revived the 
traditional position of mirab (the post responsible for overseeing water 
distribution and teaching irrigation management). Legalities for foreign 
ownership of land and buildings are in the process of being settled.
135
 
Agriculture is the basis of the economy, especially cotton farming. Many 
Soviet-era state and collective farms still operate, producing grains, melons, 
grapes, and silk as well as cotton. Livestock raising is a time-honoured 
occupation, and the milk, skins, and wool from cattle, sheep, camels, and goats 
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generate other enterprises. While many manufactured goods are imported or 
bought on trips abroad to places like the United Arab Emirates or Turkey, 
textiles are still produced for daily use. Turkmen carpets are known worldwide 
for their beauty and quality. Many individuals make carpets at home, but the 
Turkmenistan Carpet Production Association oversees carpet factories, 
operates the only carpet store, and controls exports by requiring its seal of 
approval on carpets leaving the country. It is illegal to export national treasures 
such as antique carpets.
 136
 The oil and gas industries occupy an important 
space in Turkmenistan‘s current economic development as well as in its vision 
for the future. Attracting foreign investors and constructing pipelines have been 
at the top of the government's agenda since 1992 when they began holding 
international conferences to gather oil companies and promote international 
competition for investment. To encourage such capital investments, efforts 
have been made to improve the banking industry and tax codes. 
Turkmenistan‘s commitment to these industries also influences its foreign 
policy as it nurtures relationships with many potential investors and customers 
as well as neighbors like Iran that may be in a position to host a gas or oil 
pipeline. The Petro-chemical industry has been developing slowly but 
consistently. Two refineries, one in Turkmenbaşy and one in Çharjew 
(Turkmenabad), have an annual capacity to process 7.7 million tons of oil. A 
facility to produce poly-ethane was opened in 1997. Chemical facilities have 
been established to produce artificial fertilizers, sulphuric acid, and ammonia 
detergents. A super-phosphate factory, a sulphur factory, iodine and bromine 
factories have been erected in different regions including Charjew, Gowurdak, 
and Cheleken. Imports include processed food and nonfood products for the 
consumer market, industrial chemicals such as fertilizers, farm machinery, and 
metalwork for the agricultural industry. Exports include cotton, natural gas, and 
oil products. Turkmenistan has vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and 
arrangements to export gas and oil through pipelines are primary concerns of 
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the government and foreign investors.
137
 Turkmenistan's economic situation 
has deteriorated somewhat since 1990. It has experienced severe economic 
problems like Poverty, crime, unemployment, and drug abuse has raised 
sharply among young male Turkmens even then the overall standard of living 
has not dropped as dramatically as it has in other former Soviet republics. 
Turkmenistan's low industrial and manufacturing production has led to a high 
reliance on imported foodstuffs and consumer goods.  Economic reforms have 
been modest, and the majority of businesses remain state-owned.  Government 
provides subsidies on basic food products so that people can afford to survive 
despite inflation.
138
  One of the most important modifications in economic 
policy took effect in early 1993 when President Niyazov decreed that natural 
gas, water, and electricity would be supplied virtually free of charge to all 
homes in Turkmenistan for an indefinite period.  Gasoline and other fuels also 
remain cheap, relative to neighbouring republics.  Such economic stability has 
been possible because Turkmenistan has a comparatively small population and 
it is rich in important resources such as natural gas and oil. A recent study by 
the United Nations revealed that cultural norms in Turkmenistan, regarding 
employment appropriate for men or women, have not changed dramatically 
since independence.
139
 Women still identify nursing, education, art, and culture 
as jobs suitable for themselves, if they choose to work outside the home. 
Women are very unlikely to pursue employment in areas dominated by men: 
petroleum industry and energy production, transportation, and communications. 
There is a latent expectation that women will continue to opt for the role of 
homemaker and housekeeper, in lieu of work outside family roles.
 
 
Education 
Most of the Central Asian population was illiterate. A religious Muslim 
education for boys from rich families was the only known form of education 
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Local ethnic and religious communities ran their own schools, which provided 
basic elementary-mostly religious-education, similar to other pre-modern 
Muslim societies. Education was conducted in formal schools associated with 
mosques or in private houses of educated or wealthy residents; there were no 
formal requirements for teachers. Usually a school was attended by about a 
dozen children. Teachers did not receive a regular salary but were supported by 
gifts from parents in the form of weekly donations of food and money. 
Additionally, the teachers received gifts of clothes when a child finished a 
book. Education was aimed at the transmission of basic literacy and proper 
models of behavior. The educational process was characterized by a rigorous 
discipline based on severe corporal punishment and rote memorization of texts. 
The education of a Central Asian boy began when his father took him to a 
teacher and left him behind with ritual phrase common throughout the Islamic 
world, ―You can beat him as long as you don‘t kill him; the meat is yours but 
the bones are ours.‖ The schools had no formal division of classes or 
examinations. After memorizing the alphabet, the students were introduced to 
selected verses of the Quran. All instruction was oral. Rarely, students stayed 
in school for the duration because families could not afford to remove their 
boys from productive agricultural labor for a long period. Schools for girls in 
many ways parallel those for boys. A similar kind of instruction was provided 
by the Imams‘ wives and daughters.140 The pupils acquired knowledge of the 
basic elements of culture through into action with learned old man. Practical 
knowledge and skills were received in the context of work. Artisans were 
trained in craft guilds. The master usually took an apprentice at age 12 and 
taught him the secrets of the trade during the next several years. The master 
was also responsible for teaching the child rules of proper behavior and 
knowledge about Muslim Law and mysticism if he was literate. Good behavior 
meant that the apprentice was not rude to his master, did not walk in front of 
him, sit down without out his permission, nor address him by his name. 
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Education in religious schools was attended to produce a certain understanding 
of Islam. Students did not have access to the sources and never studied the 
Quran, the traditions of the prophet, nor even the jurisprudence. Instructions 
were based on commentaries produced by scholars and approved by the rulers, 
publishing existed on a low level, and Islamic education was in an even worse 
state.   
 
After Independence, the literacy rate of Turkmenistan is 99.7%.
141 
According to 
Soviet government statistics, literacy in Turkmenistan was nearly universal in 
1991. Experts considered the overall level of education to be comparable to the 
average for the Soviet republics. According to the 1989 census, 65.1% of the 
population aged fifteen and older had completed secondary school, compared 
with 45.6 % in 1979. In the same period, the percentage of citizens who had 
completed a higher education rose from 6.4 to 8.3 %. Education is free of 
charge. Formal schooling begins with kindergarten (bagcha) and primary 
school (mekdep)
142 
From the eighth grade students are tested and directed into 
technical, continuing, and discontinuing tracks. Some students adjust to the 
workforce after completing the tenth grade, while others leave in the ninth 
grade to enter a trade or technical school. Although the education system in 
Turkmenistan retains the centralized structural framework of the Soviet system, 
significant modifications are underway, partly as a response to national 
redefinition, but mainly because of the government's attempts to produce a 
highly skilled work force to promote Turkmenistan's participation in 
international commercial activities.  Reforms also include cultural goals such 
as the writing of a new history of Turkmenistan, the training of multilingual 
cadres able to function in Turkmen, English, Russian, and the implementation 
of alphabet reform in schools. Turkmenistan's educational establishment is 
funded and administered by the state.
143
 The Ministry of Education is 
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responsible for secondary education and supervises about 1,800 schools. 
Secondary schools have 66,192 teachers who serve 831,000 students.  Thirty-
six secondary schools specialize in topics relevant to their ministerial 
affiliation. The primary and secondary systems are being restructured 
according to Western models, including shorter curricula, more vocational 
training, and human resource development. Even then, in Niyazov‘s period the 
education system is in a shambles. Funding has been dramatically reduced, as 
has the length of study, and curricula are increasingly dominated by ideology. 
Thirteen years of ruinous ―reforms‖ leave the country facing a bleak future, as 
few students have been educated to a useful level. In December 2005, Niyazov 
suggested that all educational institutes should be funded by local, not central 
governments, a disastrous step given the dismal state of most local 
economies.
144
 According to the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR), 
the number of schools has fallen since independence from 1,800 to 1,705, 
while the number of pupils has grown from 700,000 to one million. At the 
same time, institutes of higher education have increased from seven to sixteen, 
though students studying in university in 2006 – not counting those engaged in 
the required two years of ―practical work‖ – are one sixth of the number in 
1993.
145
 Specialized schools have also been hard hit. The Technical College in 
Turkmenbashy shut down in 1994, and medical schools in Mary, Turkmenabat 
and Nebitdag admitted their last students in 2003. The three-year agricultural 
schools are being replaced by one-year schools.
146
 Ideological education based 
on the Ruhnama is all pervasive in the curriculum.
147
 University education has 
been reduced from five years to two, plus the requirement that students spend 
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two years working in the private sector before receiving a diploma.
148
 On 6 
July 2003, Niyazov ordained that only those students who could submit proof 
of two-years prior work experience could be admitted to university. Part-time 
study and evening classes have been abolished.
149
 Fourteen privately funded 
Turkish lycees offer a much higher level of education but their tuition fees are a 
problem for many. Ashgabat has a single Turkmen-Russian school, with 600 
places, whose curriculum is based on that of the Russian Ministry of 
Education.
150
 Some turn to study abroad to escape the suffocating ideology and 
acquire genuine knowledge and skills, with the U.S., Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, and 
especially Russia, popular destinations. Yet, those who opt for this alternative 
face hurdles. Costs can be prohibitively high. While some exchange programs 
provide financial support, participants may experience difficulties getting re-
admitted to local educational institutions once they return.
151 
Moreover, in 
2004, all foreign-earned degrees were declared invalid;
152
 consequently, many 
qualified graduates stay away. Still, study abroad remains popular. ―What‘s the 
option?‖, a former aid worker asked. ―You either send your children abroad to 
get a halfway decent education, or you just let them rot in the system‖.153 A 
local alternative is offered by small, private, commercial training organizations, 
which have sprung up in cities all over the country. With certificates from the 
ministry of education, these centers offer supplementary training in such fields 
as English and computer skills. At relatively affordable prices – usually around 
$50 for a ten-week course – they have become a popular choice for parents 
seeking to boost their children‘s education.154 Nevertheless, there are only 
limited opportunities for escape from Turkmenistan‘s stultifying official 
education system, the long-term consequences of which could be dire for the 
country. As a former aid worker put it, ―a lot of time in the universities is just 
                                                 
148 Crisis Group interview, April 2006, Cited in “Turkmenistan after Niyazov” International Crisis Group 12 
February, 2007, www.crisisgroup.org   
149 “Education”, TIHR, op. cit., p.8. 
150 “Turkmenistan: Learning the Turkish Way”, IWPR, 11 July 2005, www.iwpr.net; “Education”, TIHR, op. 
cit., pp.6-7. 
151 Crisis Group interview, August 2006, op cit. 
152 “Education”, TIHR, op. cit., p.19. 
153 Crisis Group interview, August 2006, op cit. 
154 Ibid. 
spent preparing for holidays and festivals. The students come out with no 
knowledge at all they‘re just used to dancing and putting up bunting‖.155 
 
The Family 
Prior to Soviet rule, the extended family was the basic and most important 
social and economic unit among the Turkmen. Grouped according to clan, 
small bands of Turkmen families lived as nomads in their traditional regions 
and consolidated only in time of war or celebration.  In most cases, the families 
were entirely self-sufficient, subsisting on their livestock and at times on 
modest agricultural production.  For some groups, raiding sedentary 
populations, especially the Iranians to the south, was an important economic 
activity. Although Soviet power brought about fundamental changes in the 
Turkmen family structure, many traditional aspects remain.  Families continue 
to be close-knit and often raise more than five children.  Although no longer 
nomadic, families in rural areas are grouped according to clan or tribe, and it is 
the rule rather than the exception for the inhabitants of a village to be of one 
lineage.  Here, it is common for sons to remain with their parents after marriage 
and to live in an extended one-story clay structure with a courtyard and an 
agricultural plot.
156
 
 
In both rural and urban areas, respect for elders is great.  
Whereas homes for the elderly do exist in Turkmenistan, Turkmen are 
conspicuously absent from them and it is almost unheard of for a Turkmen to 
commit his or her parent to such an institution because grandparents are 
considered integral family members, sources of wisdom and spirituality.  They 
are intensely attached to their families, and their parents exercise an enormous 
amount of control over their children‘s lives.  Families are very close-knit, and 
siblings share clothing, use each other‘s things, and are constantly in each 
other‘s private space.  Sons will usually live near their parents for their entire 
lives.  Arranged weddings are still quite common, and parental control extends 
far beyond childhood for many Turkmen.  Relatives assist one another 
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emotionally as well as materially and their assistance is expected to extend 
corruption or nepotism in the workplace.  Time off is often spent with the 
family, and people without families or who live away from home are viewed as 
unfortunate.  A Turkmen well-known proverb is ―He who leaves his country 
will weep for seven years.  He who leaves his tribe will weep for a lifetime.‖ 
 
The extended family is the central social unit of Turkmenistan‘s society. 
Turkmen culture is traditionally patriarchal.
157
 This reflects the Islamic 
influence which assigns a leadership role in the family to fathers and elder male 
figures. Women, on the other hand, are under the authority of a husband or 
father and are expected to maintain the household. This includes food 
preparation, childcare, and spinning, dying, and weaving of wool. Within the 
household, parents are strict disciplinarians. Women leave their families to live 
with their husband‘s family in his father‘s household. Although the women 
leave, their brothers act as the link to their birth families after they marry and 
become members of another household. It is common for brothers to be the 
only family members who visit, as they are the ones responsible for the safety 
of their sisters. Large families are considered a blessing and female infertility 
would be a reason for divorce. Turkmen custom in this case is for a man to 
marry another woman and leave the first wife. When a man is in his 30s, he 
leaves his father‘s household with his wife and children and forms a household 
of his own. He takes with him part of his father‘s wealth and establishes his 
own independent livelihood.
158
 
 
If he is the youngest male in his family, he will 
have the honour and responsibility for taking care of his parents when they are 
old. 
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Role and Status of Elders 
In Turkmenistan, as in other Central Asian countries, respect for elder persons 
in or outside the family is profound. Elder care facilities do exist in 
Turkmenistan, but Turkmen are conspicuously absent from them. It would be 
disgraceful for a Turkmen family to commit its elders to a nursing or elder 
home. Grandparents are considered integral family members, sources of 
wisdom and spirituality. Turkmen children are expected to show unconditional 
obedience to their parents who are presumed to know best. Unruly or 
disobedient children bring shame to the family.
159
 Moreover, the elected elder 
in a rural district is the mayor. He presides over the gengesh or village council 
that is also an elected body. Among his duties are the:1) regulation of all 
enterprises in the area; 2) maintenance of economic, social, and cultural 
relations in the area; and 3) management of human resources in the area. Police 
and security officials operating in a rural area are likely to coordinate with the 
office of the archyn (a village elder who functions as a mayor), since he is 
usually acquainted with the history of each family in his area. Likewise, a 
stranger who is looking for assistance is likely to be referred to this elected 
official for help. 
 
Gender Issues 
Male children are welcomed in the family with great fanfare, as they will be the 
ones their parents rely on once they advance into old age and are too old to 
work. Girls, by contrast, are viewed as temporary members of the family whose 
place will be the household into which they marry. Long-standing taboos 
against male–female socialization mean that for girls, their brothers are the 
only male peers with whom they will have close contact until they marry. Male 
children have greater freedom to move about the community as they grow up; 
girls are to stick close to their mothers. As they mature sexually, they are 
expected to guard their virginity. In this, they are assisted by the family, which 
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shelters them from conduct with males outside the family that might 
compromise their honour.
160
 They should understand that body language could 
be interpreted differently in Turkmenistan than back home.  Women in general 
are expected to be shy and non-confrontational, and to avoid making eye 
contact with men, especially in rural areas. Men should understand that being 
alone with a Turkmen woman, visiting her at her home, or showing any kind of 
affection towards her in public could damage her reputation and marriage 
ability.  Walking together is a major form of courting in Turkmenistan, so they 
are very careful to whom they are seen on the street with. In Turkmenistan, the 
lines that separate the sexes are much clearer than they are in the west, and 
there is no such thing as ―dating‖ in the western sense of things.  Mixed 
activities are always in groups, and even in urban areas, a girl who goes out 
alone with a young man is very much in danger of losing her reputation as a 
―good girl.‖ It is common at even large gatherings for groups of men and 
women to sit in separate sections of the room. It is also fact that the patriarchal 
nature of Turkmen culture is more obvious than in rural areas. Yet, in spite of 
the leadership role of men, the role of women in rural Turkmenistan is different 
from that of other Islamic societies. Women tend to embrace a traditional 
female role, clearly separate from that of men, including childcare, cooking, 
cleaning, care of cows and sheep, spinning, dying, and weaving of wool. 
Therefore, women frequently miss out opportunities for education that would 
permit them to enter the job market.
161
 During the summer, the world of men 
and women come together in the cotton fields where the entire family including 
children help to bring in the annual harvest. However, the traditional nomadic 
lifestyle demanded a strict division of labor. Men hunted, tended the herds, and 
kept the horses, while women cooked, tended the home, and made the textiles. 
Today, women usually tend the house and men have more free time, but 
employment is not restricted by gender. Women work as teachers, academics, 
librarians, authors, administrators, scientists, linguists, and salespeople, and 
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there are nine female members of the Majlis. Textiles are made primarily by 
women, while heavy industry is male-oriented, as are the livestock industries 
and transportation. Even then, Women are expected to be reserved and non-
confrontational, but have never been subjected to seclusion or required to wear 
face veils.
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Marriage 
Turkmen usually marry in their early twenties, although some delay marriage 
to begin a career. The traditional expectation is to have a baby within the first 
year of marriage, and the groom's parents can demand a divorce if they suspect 
that the bride is infertile.  The marriage celebration, together with other life-
cycle events, possesses great importance in Turkmen society. In rural areas 
especially, special matchmakers (sawcholar) often arrange marriages.  Aside 
from finding the right match in terms of social status, education, and other 
qualities, the matchmakers invariably must find couples of the same clan and 
locale.  Most couples have known each other beforehand and freely consent to 
the marriage arrangement but the preference is given to the elders. Since 
marriages are usually arranged, bride selection and planning may begin earlier. 
President Niyazov in 2005 scrapped his 2001 edict imposing a USD 50,000 
penalty on foreigners who married native Turkmenistani women outside 
Turkmenistan. The decree was originally meant to stem the tide of cross-border 
elopement and kidnapping, i.e., men living in ethnic enclaves in border 
countries like Uzbekistan who enticed women across the border for marriage, 
thereby avoiding payment of a dowry.
163 
 
Divorce  
Divorce among Turkmen is relatively rare.  One important custom still 
practiced in Turkmenistan is the bride price (kalong).  Depending on region 
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and a family's wealth, the bride's family may demand huge sums of money 
from the groom in return for the bride's hand in marriage. Article 25 of the 
Turkmenistan Constitution of 1992, which provides guidance on marriage, 
families, and children, only speaks of men and women who ―reach the age of 
marriage.‖ In practice, this has come to mean the old Soviet era standard of 16 
years for females and 18 for males. However, since marriages are usually 
arranged, bride selection and planning may begin earlier. President Niyazov in 
2005 scrapped his 2001 edict imposing a USD 50,000 penalty on foreigners 
who married native Turkmenistani women outside Turkmenistan. The decree 
was originally meant to stem the tide of cross-border elopement and 
kidnapping, i.e., men living in ethnic enclaves in border countries like 
Uzbekistan who enticed women across the border for marriage, thereby 
avoiding payment of a dowry. Generally, the material investment that a man‘s 
family contributes to the marriage of a son insures abiding family concern for 
the success of the marriage. In addition, the scrutiny given to the character of 
the bride or groom and to their individual families aims at eliminating future 
impediments to the well-being of the new family. Although divorce is rare in 
Turkmenistan, the constitution does guarantee the right of divorce to men and 
women. This is often not a realistic recourse for women simply because they 
are usually economically dependent on their husbands. A woman could 
theoretically allege spousal abuse on the part of her husband. However, she 
would do so, if she were well educated and had the means to support herself 
and her minor children. Two possible grounds for divorce initiated by a man 
would be infertility or infidelity on the part of the wife. In a divorce of this sort, 
the husband would retain custody of the children. Divorce proceedings brought 
by either partner are permissible under Islamic tradition and old Turkmen tribal 
law. There are no reliable judicial statistics on the number or nature of divorces 
in Turkmenistan.
164
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Role and Status of Women 
The role of women in Turkmen society has never conformed to Western 
stereotypes about "Muslim women." Although a division of labor has existed 
and women usually were not visible actors in political affairs outside the home, 
Turkmen women never wore the veil or practiced strict seclusion.
165
 They 
generally possessed a host of highly specialized skills and crafts, especially 
those connected with the household and its maintenance. During the Soviet 
period, women assumed responsibility for the observance of some Muslim rites 
to protect their husbands' careers. Many women entered the work force out of 
economic necessity, a factor that disrupted some traditional family practices 
and increased the incidence of divorce. At the same time, educated urban 
women entered professional services and careers with the result a new 
surprising trend among Turkmen women in urban centers is seen. They feel 
compelled to have children but not a husband as they cannot find a man to 
whom they think would make a good husband and prefer to be without one. 
Polygamy was never common among the Turkmen. The Turkmen government 
established civil laws of inheritance; however, they prefer to follow Adat 
(custom) when possible, even over Sarigat (Islamic law).
166 
Traditionally the 
youngest son would remain with his parents inheriting the home upon their 
deaths; daughters would marry and move into their husband's home. Mothers 
and other female family members play an important role in a child's life. Male 
babies are circumcised in a special ceremony led by a mullah, usually attended 
only by close family members.
167
 Child rearing is primarily the responsibility 
of women, but elders and older siblings have authority over children. Fathers 
tend to take more responsibility for raising boys and teaching them about labor, 
ethics, and etiquette. Mothers oversee girls' education in homemaking. A young 
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girl spends a great deal of time preparing the items necessary for marriage and 
practices cooking, sewing, embroidery, and textile making.
168 
Historically 
women were considered equitable partners. The last independent Turkmen 
leader was a woman, Guljamal Hatun, who succeeded her husband Nurberdi 
Han. Under the Soviet system, women began to work outside the home and it 
became more common for women to attain higher education. Women have 
retained the right to education and work. In fact, many of the students who 
have taken part in programs in Turkey and the West have been female.
169 
There 
are unacknowledged inequalities which are difficult to document. The 
traditional role of homemaker and caregiver prevents some women from 
seeking roles outside of the home. There are anecdotal reports of domestic 
violence, but it is not spoken of publicly.  
 
Religion 
Long before monotheistic Islam became the religion of the land, inhabitants of 
the area were practicing shamanism.
170
 Around 300 B.C.E., Persian Parthian 
invaders brought Zoroastrianism.
171
  Artifact such as excavated Chinese coins 
and rock carvings show that the ancient city of Merv (present day Mary) in 
southern Turkmenistan had become a centre of West Asian Buddhist activity 
by the 3rd century C.E.
172
 Elements of early faiths such as ancestor worship 
and attachment to talismans and amulets later made their way into local Islamic 
tradition. Arab explorers during the 8
th
 and 9
th
  centuries note that the people of 
Turkmenistan were worshipers of lunar divinities as well. Islam in 
Turkmenistan was not well established until the 10
th
 century. In spite of Shi‘a 
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Persia next door, the only form of Islam to take hold in Central Asia was Sunni 
Islam.
173 
In Turkmenistan; Islam has incorporated elements of ancestor and 
saint worship as well as Sufi
174
 practices. Shrine frequent visits to the graves of 
venerated ancestors and saint-like figures called gombashy
175
 are very common 
in rural areas throughout the country. Pilgrims can be seen offering votive 
prayers surrounding the shrines, often in the presence of children or infirm 
relatives in need of cures or fertility. The gombashy are usually members of 
non-Turkmen groups or vlat (ovlat)
176
 that are said to have descended directly 
from early Arab caliphs. Present day members of vlat are still esteemed among 
rural Turkmen and their members are frequently invited to lend blessings to a 
communal celebration.
177 
They have long been regarded as practicing a form of 
―folk Islam‖178 rather than the strict variant observed in Middle Eastern 
countries. This determination is based partly on the number of rituals Turkmen 
perform which do not have their origins in Islam. Shrine or holy site worship 
remains an important part of daily life despite the fact that veneration of saints 
(in the place of God) is not permitted according to Islamic teaching. Many 
Turkmen, particularly residents of rural areas, continue to pray for miracles at 
shrines through appeals to its patron saint.
179
 
 
Places of Worship 
The list of great Turkmen mosques of the past and present is long. Among the 
monuments to the Islamic past are the 15
th
 century mosque of Sayid Jamalu din 
in Anau, and the Mausoleum of the 13
th
 century mystic Najmeddin Kubra, 
which has become a destination for pilgrims and the holiest shrine in Kunya 
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Urgench. Modernity has brought two famous mosques, both of which may be 
visited by non-Muslims. They are the Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque outside 
Ashgabat, built by President Niyazov to commemorate victims of the great 
1948 earthquake, and the Geokdepe Saparmurat Haji Mosque west of 
Ashgabat.
180
 Many, but not all, places of worship in Turkmenistan may be 
visited.  As a rule, Russian Orthodox churches may be visited by practicing 
Christians. Islamic shrines, often found inside cemeteries, are among places 
that would be off limits to non-Muslim travelers. In any case, those wanting to 
visit a mosque should inquire in advance when it might be visited. A few rules 
of etiquette apply to visit religious places like mosques. First, they should not 
be visited during prayer times. All visitors should be modestly dressed. For 
men this means clean, pressed trousers and long sleeve shirts; for women, long 
skirts and long sleeve blouses with a head cover or scarf. When entering a 
mosque the shoes, but not the socks, should be removed. Inside a mosque, 
visitors should not touch any ceremonial objects or copies of the Quran. There 
is no photography, loud talking, laughing, eating, or smoking in any place of 
worship. Finally, one should never walk in front of an individual who is 
praying since it invalidates his prayer. 
 
Fig 6: (Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque) 
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/davidstanleytravel/5731109818/ 
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Fig 7: Geokdepe Saparmurat Haji Mosque 
Source: http://www.trekearth.com/gallery/Asia/Turkmenistan/West/Ahal/Ashgabat/photo577833.htm 
 
Religion and Government 
Although the constitution of Turkmenistan identifies the country as a secular 
state, President Niyazov during his long tenure tended to define the national 
heritage of the country as Islamic. His successor, Berdimuhammedov, has not 
altered this stance and he, too, continues to refer to religious freedoms gained 
following independence. To support his claim of religious freedom, the 
President can point to the construction of 398 mosques since 1991, all built 
with government subsidy. Nonetheless, the fear of radical or political Islam has 
driven the government to establish the Council of Religious Affairs, which 
reports directly to the President. All Islamic seminaries or madrassas must be 
registered and their clerics licensed by the government. In a show of 
governmental control of religious bodies, institutions such as the Theological 
Faculty of Ashgabat have been downgraded and the number of their faculty 
members and students has been reduced.
181
 To demonstrate national 
compliance with international Islamic practice, the government routinely 
sanctions one plane, containing 188 pilgrims, to attend the annual hajj 
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pilgrimage to Mecca in spite of the quota of 4,500 set by authorities in Saudi 
Arabia.
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The first non-Islamic faith to be recognized was Turkmenistan‘s largest 
minority religion, Russian Orthodox Christianity. Other smaller minorities have 
had considerable difficulty in attaining official recognition. This is because the 
Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, last amended in 
1996, requires all non-Islamic congregations to be officially registered. 
Registration requires a membership of 500 in any given sub district. Minorities 
other than the Russian Orthodox have had difficulty attaining congregation 
status. For this reason, followers of the Baha‘i faith have been particularly 
affected, as have Jehovah‘s Witnesses and Georgian Armenian Christians. All 
had applied for recognition in the 1990s. In May 2005, they were registered 
with several other minority faiths. The small Jewish community opted for a 
different route. They never applied for official registry and their religious 
activities have never been questioned.
183
 
 
Religion in Daily Life 
In the 70 years of Soviet rule, the focus of religious activity shifted from the 
mosque to the home. Turkmens traditionally have no strong tradition of 
mosque attendance, preferring instead to pray at home or at shrines. Although 
Islam is an integral part of their cultural heritage, not many are fully aware of 
the elements of their faith. Some are even nonbelievers who support religious 
revival only as a part of national revival. The impressive mosques that have 
been built since independence have come about through government 
endowments and not through the finances of local congregations.
184
 Turkmens 
who do believe and practice their faith are obligated to the five pillars of 
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Islam.
185
 Muslims observe congregational prayers at noon on Friday and that 
day tends to be somewhat like a Sunday for Christians.
186 
So far as personal life 
is concerned, Whether personal faith is weak or strong, Islamic traditions still 
shape Turkmen social interaction and family life. In terms of male and female 
interactions, this means a girl guards her virginity and remains with her family 
until she marries. There is no dating before marriage, and unmarried females 
avoid being seen in the company of males outside their families, lest their 
honour be questioned. 
 
Religious demography 
Having an area of 188,457 square miles (488,100 km
2
), Turkmenistan has a 
population of five million.  As per the Government's most recent census report 
of 1995, ethnic Turkmen constitute 77% of the population.  Minority ethnic 
populations include Uzbeks (9.2%), Russians (6.7%), and Kazakhs (2%).  
Armenians, Azeris, and other ethnic groups comprise the remaining 5.1%. The 
major religion is Islam, and Russian Orthodox Christians constitute the largest 
religious minority. Since independence, there has been a tightly controlled 
revival of Islam. During the Soviet era, there were only four mosques, which 
are subsequently raised to 398 in the contemporary times. Ethnic Turkmen, 
Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Baloch living in Mary province are predominantly Sunni 
Muslim. There are small pockets of Shi'a Muslims, many of whom are ethnic 
Iranians, Azeris, or Kurds living along the border with Iran and in 
Turkmenbashy (Krasnovodsk). Restrictive government control, indigenous 
Islamic culture, and 70 years of Soviet rule have meant that traditional mosque-
based Islam does not play a dominant role in society.  Local interpretations of 
Islam place a heavy premium on rituals associated with birth, marriage, and 
death (―sadakas‖), featuring music and dancing that more traditional Muslims 
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view as unorthodox.  Together with shrine pilgrimage, such rituals play a 
significant role in local Muslim expression of Islam than regular prayer at 
mosques. 
 
While the 1995 census indicated that ethnic Russians comprised almost 7% of 
the population, their subsequent emigration to Russia and elsewhere has 
reduced considerably this proportion. Most ethnic Russians and Armenians are 
Christian.  Practicing Russian Christians are generally members of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC). There are 13 Russian Orthodox churches, three of 
which are in Ashgabat.  A priest resident in Ashgabat leads the ROC within the 
country, serving under the religious jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox 
Archbishop in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. There are no Russian Orthodox 
seminaries. Ethnic Russians and Armenians also comprise a significant 
percentage of members of unregistered religious congregations; ethnic 
Turkmen appear to be increasingly represented among these groups as well.  
There are small communities of the following unregistered denominations: the 
Roman Catholic Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, and several evangelical 
Christian groups including "Separate" Baptists, charismatic groups, and an 
unaffiliated, nondenominational group. Small communities of Baha'is, Baptists, 
Seventh-day Adventists, and the Hindus (Society for Krishna Consciousness) 
were registered with the Government, but immediately all these religions were 
abolished because in 1994 Turkmenistan elected its own National Spiritual 
Assembly however, laws passed in 1995 in Turkmenistan required 500 adult 
religious adherents in each locality for registration and no Baha'i community 
and others  could meet this requirement. As of 2007, the religions had still 
failed to reach the minimum number of adherents to register and individuals 
have had their homes raided for Baha'i literature. In May 2005 the Greater 
Grace Church of Turkmenistan, the International Church of Christ, the New 
Apostolic Church of Turkmenistan, and two groups of Pentecostal Christians 
were able to register. A very small community of ethnic Germans, most of 
whom live in and around the city of Saragt, reportedly included practicing 
Lutherans.  Approximately one thousand ethnic Poles living in the country 
have been largely absorbed into the Russian community and consider 
themselves Russian Orthodox.  According to an estimate, one thousand Jews 
live in the country. Most are members of such families who came from Ukraine 
during World War II.  There are some Jewish families living in Turkmenabat, 
on the border with Uzbekistan, who are known as Bukharan Jews, referring to 
the Uzbek city of Bukhara. There were no synagogues or rabbis, and Jews 
continued to emigrate to Israel, Russia, and Germany; however, the Jewish 
population remained relatively constant.
187
  
 
Religious Beliefs 
The Turkmen state is secular. While independence inaugurated a mild surge of 
interest in religion, it seems mostly related to the fact that Turkmen feel their 
Islamic heritage to be a fundamental aspect of their identity, rather than to a 
widespread affinity for piety. When Arab and Persian invasions brought Islam 
to Central Asia (seventh–eighth centuries), all the Turkic groups convert 
neither at the same time nor to the same degree. Conversion to Islam depended 
on time and place. For example, urban centers were more likely to participate 
in formal rituals whereas nomadic Turks (like Turkmen) mixed aspects of 
Islam with elements from other practices (like the celebration of Nowruz which 
came from Zoroastranism) and retained much of their pre-Islamic heritage 
(retaining the name of the sky god Gok for the words blue and green). Turkmen 
began to convert around the tenth century. While their practices still reflect this 
early syncretism, even non-practicing Turkmens call themselves Muslim and 
see this as an integral part of their cultural identity. Religious leaders called 
mullas, or isan in the mystical Sufi orders, and Qazis interpret Islamic law but 
do not act as clergy. The oldest man leads the group in prayer.
188
 In 1992; the 
government sanctioned the establishment of the Qaziat as the highest religious 
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authority. In divorcing itself from the Central Asian Muftiyat, the Turkmen 
leadership declared its interest in promoting Islam as an aspect of national 
culture. The Committee (Genes) for Religious Affairs‘ attachment to the Office 
of President affords the state oversight of religious affairs in the new state.  
 
Religious Holidays 
There are two religious holidays in the Islamic calendar: Seker Bayramy and 
Kurban Bayramy (also called Gurbanlyk). Seker Bayramy corresponds to Eid 
ul-fitr in the Arabic speaking Muslim world. This feast, three days in duration, 
marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. Muslims abstain from all drink 
and food as well as smoking and sexual contact from dawn to sunset during 
Ramadan. For the non-Muslim visitor this also means no smoking, drinking, or 
eating in public places during daylight hours. Most international hotels will 
provide travelers with meals and beverages that may be consumed at 
designated areas inside the hotel or in guest rooms. Muslims make up for the 
austerity of daylight hours by having late evening festivities and entertainment. 
To permit late night activities, the 11pm evening curfew is suspended during 
the month of Ramadan. Colourful festivities, kitchen specialties, music, and 
dance characterize the Seker Bayramy. Kurban Bayramy is known to Arabs as 
Eid ul-Adha. This festival of sacrifice coincide with the high holy days of the 
Month of Pilgrimages, Hajj, is more solemn. It commemorates Ibrahim‘s (a.s) 
readiness to sacrifice his son, Isaac (a.s). Muslims view the sacrificed sheep of 
Kurban Bayramy as symbolic of the sheep that God substituted for the boy, 
Isaac (a.s). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - 3 
STATE AND ISLAM IN 
SOVIET PERIOD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Birth and Formation of Soviet Union 
For centuries, tsars ruled Russia. This period ended during the Russian 
revolution of 1917. The events changed Russia completely and brought the 
people new forms of government.
189
 Russian people were treated very badly 
during the rule of the tsars. At the end of the 19
th
 century, many people in the 
countryside were peasants. They had little food to eat and lived in poverty. 
They did not have any power either. As society changed, more and more 
people started living in cities. They became factory workers and turned into a 
new middle class.
190
 They did not like the tsar and wanted more power from 
him. After a small rebellion in 1905 Tsar Nicholas II created a kind of 
parliament called the Duma.
191
 However, the tsar himself was not willing to 
give up his power and he dissolved the Duma after a few months.
192
 During 
World War I Russia‘s army lost many soldiers in their fight against the 
Germans.
193
 The winter of 1916/17 was very harsh and many people had little 
food to eat and not very much fuel to heat their houses. They wanted Russia to 
stop the war.
194
 Finally, in February 1917 large demonstrations against the tsar 
started in Petrograd (today‘s St. Petersburg). The Russian army joined the 
demonstrators and turned against him. Nicholas II was forced to give up.
195
 
After the tsar had stepped down from power the Duma set up a new 
government, but it could not manage the problems that Russia had. At the same 
time, groups of workers set up so-called ―Soviets‖. They were first organized in 
St. Petersburg but quickly spread throughout the country. As the Duma‘s 
government became weaker, the power of the Soviets became stronger. Many 
different political groups in these Soviets fought for power. In the end, the 
Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, took over control. Most of the population 
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liked the Bolsheviks because they promised the people ―peace, land, and 
bread‖.  In October 1917, the Bolsheviks took over the government in Russia 
and Lenin became the most powerful man in the country. All other political 
parties were forbidden. Under the Bolsheviks, all land was put under the 
control of the state. The tsar and the Russian church lost a lot of their land. The 
new party introduced an eight-hour workday and gave workers more control 
over the factories. Soldiers entered in the new Red Army. Lenin quickly pulled 
Russia out of World War I. He signed a treaty with the Germans at Brest-
Litovsk in early 1918. Under this treaty, Russia lost about a fourth of its 
territory. Georgia, Ukraine and Finland became independent countries. Poland 
and the Baltic states fell under German control. Soon, the Bolsheviks changed 
their name to the Communist Party.
196
 Shortly, after the end of the First World 
War, civil war broke out between the Bolsheviks and anti-Communist forces 
who wanted to have the tsar back again. These tsarist troops were called 
―White Russians‖. They received help from some foreign countries, like 
France, Great Britain and the USA. After three years, the Red Army won the 
war, the revolution that had begun a few years earlier was over.
197
 Nicholas II, 
and his family were taken prisoners and murdered by the Communists in 1918. 
In 1922, Russia officially became the Soviet Union.
198
 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 caused the downfall of the Russian Empire. 
Following the Russian Revolution, there was a struggle for power between the 
Bolshevik party, led by Vladimir Lenin, and the anti-communist White 
movement. In December 1922, the Bolsheviks won the civil war, and the 
Soviet Union was formed with the amalgamation of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet 
Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet 
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Socialist Republic.
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There was general agreement that there should be a 
centralized government. None of the separate Republics had the right to depart 
from the central government dictates. However, Stalin, as People‘s Commissar 
for Nationalities, wanted to reincorporate all the republics within the RSFSR. 
Lenin opposed the plan because it was imperialistic. He wanted a federation of 
all Soviet republics as a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The 
disagreements became acrimonious over the summer of 1922,
200
 but there was 
little real difference between their proposals. Both wanted a centralized state. 
The sensitivity of the nationalities issue was illustrated when a senior party 
official, a Tartar called Mirza Said Sultan Galiev, was arrested in 1923 for 
advocating the formation of a pan-Turkic socialist state incorporating all 
Muslim peoples.
201
 The central authorities sought to govern by dividing the 
nations. They also used the Cheka, which after 1923 became the United Main 
Political Administration (the OGPU) to arrest dissidents. Finally, the Red Army 
could be called upon to intervene.
202
 The Soviet authorities encouraged native 
language instruction.
 
One problem was that the vast majority of rank-and-file 
members of the Party were ethnic Russians. The Party tried to foster policies to 
induce non-ethnic Russians to join the party - the policy was known as 
korenizatsiya - "the planting down of roots".
203
 Lenin was successful in his 
campaign to create a federation known as the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).
204 
Russia that is the RSFSR, was given its own boundaries 
within a larger state. The significance of this only emerged in the late 1980s 
when Boris Yeltsin became Russian president in advance of the collapse of the 
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USSR. The constitution of the USSR was ratified by the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviets on 31st December, 1922.
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Soviet Nation Building 
After defeating foreign intervention in 1921 to 1923 and failing to spark social 
revolutions in Europe, the Soviet communists switched their attention to 
socialist developments in the East. The power and unity of a centralized Soviet 
government was seen by the Moscow Bolsheviks as a necessity, and the Red 
Army was considered as a proper tool to bring indigenous governments on the 
territory of the former empire in conformity with the Soviet doctrine.
206
 The 
Bolsheviks waned to consolidate all of Turkistan under Soviet control by 
ordering an economic union of the three republics. For this purpose, two 
parallel institutions were created to rule the region. The Central Asian Bureau, 
which worked as an intermediary between the central committee and the 
regional parties, supervised the political parties of Bokhara, Turkistan, and 
Khorezm and communicated conditions in the field to Moscow. The powerful 
Central Asian Economic Council was the Central Bureau‘s companion agency. 
The council distributed cash, credit, and access to industries for new republics 
and spent most of 1922 -1923 unifying the economies of the people‘s republics 
of Khorezm and Bokhara with that of Soviet Turkistan – although, formally , 
these republics  remained  outside of the Soviet state. At the end of 1923, the 
economies of the three Central Asian republics were merged, and the Soviet 
authorities prepared for the complete dissolution of the three Turkistani 
republics and the incorporation of new Soviet Socialist Republics of 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan into the Soviet Union. The efforts to install 
identical Soviet legal systems, school, land relations, and government 
structures in khorezm and Bokhara were all intended to smooth the way for a 
complete incorporation. For this purpose, the Bolsheviks placed trusted local 
people in high- level offices. Following major communist principles, the 
authorities established a state monopoly on the cotton trade, closed farmers 
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markets and bazaars, prohibited individual trade, and introduced numerous 
labour duties. 
 
The idea to divide Turkistan into a number of autonomous republics according 
to language and ethnicity was based on the assumption that the separation 
would help to prevent nationalist conflicts in the future and eliminate the 
inequality in the development of the native people .The drawing of borders was 
done largely by central Asian communists and reflected their senses of 
divergent national identities. Stalin and the commissariat of nationalities
207
 
favored the idea of a national territorial autonomy granted to clearly defined 
national groups rather than to the broad mixed territories.  
 
The soviet administrative structure created in 1924 was aimed at providing 
each major ethnic group in the region with a separate administration. On 
October 14, 1924, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee passed a 
resolution on the creation of national states for the people of Central Asia. 
Initially, only two major union republics were created. Uzbekistan received the 
central part of the formed Bokhara emirate, the southern part of the old Khiva, 
and the regions of Samarkand, Fergana, Amu Darya, and Syr Darya, formerly 
included in the Russian Turkistan. The territory of Turkmenistan included 
Turkmen regions of Western Bokhara, Khorezm, and the former Transcaspian 
region. All other parts of Central Asia were established as constituent 
components of the Soviet republics with different degrees of autonomy. Lands 
traditionally occupied by the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were defined as an 
autonomous republic within Russia, and the Tajiks received mountainous 
regions of formed Bokhara with an Iranian-speaking population. The name of 
Turkistan was a symbol of unification one of the reasons that this word 
disappeared from the map.
208
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 During the Soviet era, researchers thought that the creation of five separate 
republics in Central Asia reflected a divide-and-rule policy in response to the 
danger of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Recently, historians recognized that 
the delimitation was based largely on dogmatic visions of  Lenin and Stalin, 
who believed that all people had to go through a national stage of development 
before they could reach the socialist stage.
209
 Among other reasons for creating 
these ethnically based political units, the specialists name the necessity to 
administer the fractious and economically backward region, and they cite 
economic resources and there management as a factor in the delimitation.
210
 In 
February 1925, the first all-Uzbek congress of Soviet Socialist in Bokhara 
passed the Declaration on creating the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics and 
formed its highest authorities. Faizulla Khodjaev became the chairman of the 
Republic‘s government, and a peasant from the Fergana Valley was elected to 
oversee the Central Executive Committee (formal head of state). Samarkand 
was chosen to be the Capital city, and the newly created Uzbek republic 
immediately submitted its application to join Soviet Union, which was granted 
soon thereafter. On March 25, 1925, the Tajik ASSR was created within the 
Uzbek SSR. The formation of Tajik and Uzbek Republics was done on the 
bases of ethnic, economic, and administrative considerations-although the 
primary difference between the Tajik and Uzbeks was linguistic, because there 
were no clear territorial lines where the different languages were spoken. The 
newly created Central Asian states received a certain degree of cultural and 
linguistic autonomy but were deprived of political and economic independence. 
The main goal of the state-building process in the region was to replace a 
unified Central Asia with smaller national republics. After turbulent years of 
revolutions, in 1925, Central Asia found itself again under the control of the 
Russian Empire-although this time the empire was ideologically driven and its 
name was the Soviet Union.   
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Nature of the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union was a federation of fifteen national union republics. Legally, 
all union republics had equal status with the same degree of self-government 
and dependence on the federal power, having uniform systems of governing 
bodies and political institutions and being subordinate to those of the Soviet 
Union. The formal governing body in each republic was its own popularly 
elected legislature, the Supreme Soviet, which met twice a year for 3-day 
sessions to enact bills prepared between sessions by staffers. Because the 
Soviet doctrine did not accept the concept of the separation of powers, the 
Supreme Soviet elected its chairman, who was the formal head of the republic. 
It also appointed a prime minister and other members of the cabinet, who, 
according to their positions, were awarded with parliamentary seats. The 
government together with the staff of the Supreme Soviet influenced the 
formation and work of the provincial soviets and their executive committees, a 
kind of provincial government. The heads of these committees were the 
provincial soviet chairperson simultaneously. However, the real decision 
making authority in the republic was the central committee of the republic‘s 
communist party. The USSR constitution provided for the communist party‘s 
leading and directing role. Following this constitutional principle, the 
secretaries of the central committee provided guidelines to all agencies and 
institutions of the republics, monitored their daily activities, defined who would 
be elected to the soviet positions, made all key appointment in state institutions, 
and organized the work of the lower-level (provincial and district) party 
committees, which were in charge of governing their respective territories. A 
union republic enjoyed special rights, even if these rights were granted only 
theoretically. Being part of the Union, each republic had individual 
representation in federal authorities. All chairmen of republics‘ Supreme Soviet 
were simultaneously deputies of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviets. 
First secretaries of the communist party central communities in the republics 
had a seat in highest political organs and one of the federal legislature‘s 
chambers-the council of Nationalities-represented national units by a fixed 
number of delegates per unit: union republic had 25 seats each, autonomous 
republics had 11 seats, and autonomous provinces had 5. Formerly, each 
republic of the Soviet Union was a Sovereign State with its own constitution 
and symbols of sovereignty such as Flag, Coat of Arms, and National anthem. 
The USSR constitution and constitutions of each republic- that were largely 
identical and were passed in 1937 and 1978, following changes in the federal 
constitution–retained the right of free secession from the union by the republic. 
Usually, constitution of the republics elaborated major principles declared by 
the USSR constitution and customized them according to local conditions. 
Central USSR authorities controlled the conformity of republics‘ laws with the 
USSR legislation, whose superior role over the laws of the republics was 
secured by the constitution. The Soviet constitution provided for three types of 
jurisdiction: all union, mixed union-republican and exclusive republican, where 
local authorities could exercise some degree of autonomy. From time to time, 
the federal government transferred particular areas of industry and culture from 
one jurisdiction to another. For example, defense, national security, and foreign 
relations were always the exclusive jurisdiction of federal authorities.
211
 
Agriculture, health, education; public order, social security, and justice were 
under the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and republics. Republics were largely 
responsible for control over local industries, communal economies, services, 
and road construction. 
 
Constitution of all five Central Asian republics proclaimed basic human rights- 
specifically those of women- and they contained statements about struggles 
with old customs, which excluded women from participating in social, 
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economic, and political events. Unlike all other constitutions, the constitution 
of Turkmenistan specified the contract marriages, bride purchases, restricted 
choice of husbands, and the resistances to drawing women into study or work 
were punishable by laws. Constitutional provisions were implemented and 
national laws were adopted by the republics‘ Supreme Soviets. Varying in only 
minor details, they were based on the same principle provided by federal 
legislation. National codes in the area of criminal, civil, and procedural laws 
were issued in the late 1950s and early 1960s for the first time; before that, the 
RSFSR codes were applicable in the Central Asian states. 
 
Uzbekistan was the first of all union republics to adopt a new judiciary law, 
criminal code, and criminal procedure code. The main features of criminal code 
of Uzbekistan, passed on May 29, 1959, was the decriminalization of minor 
offenses- such as minor theft of public property by employees- and the transfer 
of such cases into the jurisdiction of courts of peers, which could discipline and 
reprimand the defendant. Decriminalization of minor offenses was a response 
to Stalin‘s past policy of severe prosecution of all violations. On the other 
hand, new offenses, such as violations of an individual‘s freedom and 
interference with the privacy of home and postal communications, have been 
included in the code. Similar provisions were added to the codes of other 
Central Asian republics.
212  
These provisions were never upheld, because it was 
impossible to sue the government-the only possible violator of privacy rights 
during the Soviet era- and they can be viewed as propaganda. Among other 
regional specifics included in the code were violations of the equal status of 
women, forcing women to enter a marriage, interference with the obligatory 
education of all children (presumably taking girls out of schools), and 
damaging cotton plants. This last provision was intended to increase the 
general sanctions against malicious damage of this especially important crop 
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and criminalize harm done even by mere negligence in that particular section of 
agriculture. 
 
Despite the fact that all republics were legally equal, federal treatment 
depended on the loyalty of the republic and its geopolitical and industrial 
status. This status defined the amount of federal investments allocated to each 
republic, access to international context, and the rank of the republic‘s leaders 
in the highest Soviet athourities.
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 sometimes, different geographical and 
cultural regions within the same republic received different treatments 
depending on party strength, which historically varied from one nationality to 
another. While the republics were part of the Soviet Union, Russian was the 
common language for interethnic communications and one of two official 
language of each republic. Russian was taught to children starting with the first 
grade; professional education was conducted in Russian language as well. All 
official documents issued by republican authorities were published in two 
languages- Russian and the native language of the respective republic. Local 
authorities avoided Russian and used the native language as a rule. At the end 
of the Soviet rule, almost half of the Kazakhs and Uzbeks reported fluency in 
Russian. In Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, which were less 
industrially developed, one-third of the population spoke Russian in their daily 
life. Moreover all important personnel decisions were made in Moscow 
according to the principle of dual leadership. Under this principle, a leader of 
the republic was a native person but always had a reliable Russian assistant to 
supervise and provide reports to Moscow, where most of the key positions 
were occupied by ethnic Russians and other Slavic people. A similar scheme 
was exercised at all other levels of government. In 1962, Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev introduced the short-led Central Asian Bureau of the Communist 
party Central Committee. The bureau worked as a political economic 
coordinator of four Central Asian republics and one province of northern 
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Kazakhstan. The agency restricted the authority of the republican institutions 
and served as an intermediary between Moscow and the republics. Soon after 
Khrushchev‘s dismissal, the bureau was closed in order to establish direct 
relation between the federal Center and the republics. Moscow authorities did 
not interfere deeply in internal affairs of the union republics as long as local 
leaders met planned requirements for taxation and production supply and 
behaved according to the rules accepted by the party. The local communist elite 
knew how to deal with Moscow and assured central authorities that everything 
in the republics was under control. The situation continued until the end of the 
1980s. With some insignificant variations (depending on the political priorities 
of Moscow‘s leaders during the Soviet period), all five republics were 
subjected to the relatively same industrial agricultural, and social policies.  
 
Socio-political Milieu 
The communist party monopolized all aspects of social and political life in the 
Soviet Union, and cultural development was subjected to Communist ideology. 
Historical roots and national specifics were declared signs of backwardness. 
Russification became primary element of policies applied by Moscow toward 
the union republics. Michael Rywkin calls Stain‘s nationality policy in the 
region the ―teacher –pupil relationship‖, because, in 1929, one of the Soviet 
leaders explained the aims of the Soviet policy in central Asia as ―teaching the 
people of Kyrgyz Steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower, and the Turkmen 
gardener the ideals of the Russian worker.‖214. Native communists were 
required to monitor and secure ideological and political conformity, and make 
sure that the small Uzbek cotton growers joined the collective farm, their sons 
went to work in the city, their daughters took off the veil and some of their 
opportunistic relatives joined the communist party. Native activists were 
supervising their own people while the Russian communists helped them and 
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resolved more important questions, such as the fight against 
counterrevolutionaries.
215
   
 
Social and cultural reforms started with changes in school policy. The 
cornerstones of this policy were the opening of new schools; mandatory 
elementary education for all pupils; the elimination of illiteracy; the expansion 
of publications in native languages; and the establishment of national theaters, 
universities and research institutions. However, all these developments were 
coordinated with the ideologists in Moscow and were subject to censorship. In 
1926, the government initiated school reform and started to issue permits for 
opening local private schools. Not ready to prohibit Islam entirely, the 
government did not explicitly ban the teaching of religion and required that 
basic sciences be taught as well. The schools were funded by the parents and 
were supposed to be located in warm, dry and airy buildings with sufficient 
amounts of desks. Students under the age of eight were not admitted. Corporal 
punishment was forbidden, and the teaching of arithmetic, natural science, and 
native languages was obligatory. Students under the age ten were permitted to 
study only for four hours a day, with breaks every forty minutes, while older 
students could study up to six hours. It was not permitted for teachers to use 
students‘ labor for their personal needs. The students from the Soviet schools 
were not allowed to attend religious schools. Later, only children ages fourteen 
and above were allowed to enroll in religious classes because the government 
hoped that antireligious propaganda would make them immune from Islamic 
influences. To restrict religious education even further, in 1920, the 
government limited the religious instruction of children to groups of three 
students. In 1929, such groups were recognized as small religious schools in 
secret form and were prohibited completely. Teaching religion in any 
government, social or private school forbidden. 
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The language reform was initiated in Turkistan in 1926. The Latin alphabet and 
a unified mode of transcription replaced Arabic script. The reform was not 
completed before 1935, when the second reform changed Latin letters to the 
Cyrillic (Russian) alphabet. According to official explanation, the 26 letters of 
the Latin alphabet could not represent all 38 Turkic sounds, and the 33-letter 
Russian alphabet was better suited for this purpose. However, the main 
purposes of the reform were the further Russification of Central Asia, 
penetration of national languages by the Russian language, and the facilitation 
of the study of the Russian language by the natives. During the first decade 
after the reform, the percentage of the Russian vocabulary in the languages of 
central Asian people rose from 2 to 15%.
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 Subsequently, the number of words 
of Arabic or Persian origin decreased significantly.
217 
The reform helped to 
establish closer cultural ties between Russia and central Asia and performed an 
ideological function of making all previously published books, mostly of 
religious and anti-Soviet content, obsolete and not available to the masses. This 
effect of the language reform coincided with the goals of antireligious 
campaigns that were constantly conducted during Soviet era. According to 
Keller, the Soviet government attacked religion because its Marxist-Leninist 
theory dictated an atheist society and could not tolerate any rival for power.
218
 
In 1927, a total attack on religion began. Usually, antireligious campaign was 
carried by the secret police; the campaigns physically eliminated most of the 
clergy and imposed strict punishments on believers. Most of the mosques were 
closed, so the buildings could be used for other purposes- such as warehouses, 
sport club, or concert halls- or they were disassembled for the building 
materials. The religious Organizations Act of 1929 allowed for the construction 
of new houses of prayer if general technical requirements were observed; 
however, special conditions set up by police and not specified in the law were 
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almost impossible to meet. This law prohibited all charitable activities of 
religious groups and introduced the direct supervision of religious activities by 
a person from a nearest police unit, village soviet, or city council assigned to 
attend all meetings of the believers. The agent was an observer with no right to 
participate in discussions or activities; however, he could close meetings and 
was obligated to do so in case of an outbreak of violence, deviation from the 
approved program, illegal activities, or upon the request of the meeting 
participants. 
 
Often, closed mosques were used as court chambers. Muslim courts were not 
abolished until 1927, although their jurisdiction was gradually narrowed. In 
February 1924, they were barred from hearing criminal or important civil 
cases; two years later, they were prohibited from hearing divorce cases, and the 
people‘s Commissariat of justice declared them to be part of strictly voluntary 
judicial system. The eradication of Islamic courts did not mean the elimination 
of Islamic judges who proceeded from religious courts to the people‘s courts. 
Because judges were often unfamiliar with the adopted laws and statues, they 
made legal mistakes and applied the traditional Islamic Shariah laws. The 
liberation of women was one of the principle goals of antireligious campaigns 
aimed at eliminating traditional practices of veiling, polygamy, bride payments, 
and prearranged child marriages. In Central Asia, the emancipation of women 
contrasted with the norms of traditional society. Women were veiled and 
secluded from all aspects of social, political, and economic life and were 
treated as everything from humans to chattel, depending on how their families 
and villages and they themselves interpreted religious and social traditions.
219
 
  
 
Although the Islamic reformist movement has promoted the adoption of 
European family structures since the early twentieth century, the veil was one 
of the most important symbols for Central Asian women. The position of 
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women significantly improved during the Soviet rule. At the end of the Soviet 
era, 99 % of women in the region were literate, and women accounted for 
almost half of all students in higher and secondary professional educational 
establishments. Women made up approximately 45 % of all government and 
party officials. However, this static did not reflect the fact that most of the 
native women were employed in predominantly unskilled positions. The 
disparity between men and women was great in the field of science. Over one-
third of the researchers were women, but women formed only one-tenth of the 
professors, Ph.D holders and high-ranking academicians.
220 
However, these 
figures do not imply discrimination. For many women, low skilled jobs were a 
matter of preference because such positions provided the opportunities to have 
a shortened working day and to work near their houses in order to have ample 
time for domestic chores. Paradoxically, despite all the policies implemented, 
women in Central Asia remained the most conservative, religious, and 
tradition-bound component of the society.
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As child marriages or the practice of older men marrying pubescent or 
prepubescent girls (often as second or third wives) was an important local 
tradition, the Bolsheviks strongly enforced child protection laws and imposed 
severe punishments on violations. As compensation for the restrictions on 
women, it became acceptable in Central Asia for the adolescent boys to take on 
the role of public sexual objects for men. These boys would dance suggestively 
in public gathering places and were sometimes acquired by wealthy patrons for 
sexual services. After the total Sovietization of Central Asia, this practice was 
criminalized and eventually banned. In 1927, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
started to regulate private sexual behavior in compliance with the new Russian 
Family and Marriage Code. Such activities as sexual relations with a minor, 
compulsion of a person to enter sexual relations, and even bride payments were 
criminalized. Because of the deep roots of local customs, polygamy was not 
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considered a crime in Uzbekistan until 1931, although it was outlawed by the 
Russian Criminal Code in 1928, which was applicable in Uzbekistan. 
 
The fight against Islam in Central Asia coincided with a cultural revolution 
aimed at freeing people from superstition and making them believe in the 
power of science and ability of the Soviet state and Communist Party to lead 
the citizenry toward higher stages of economic and cultural development. For 
this purpose, pilots took peasants on airplane rides to prove that there was no 
God in the sky, while doctors used modern pharmaceuticals to demonstrate that 
germs caused diseases. The provision of biomedical services was one of the 
principal elements of Stalin‘s cultural policy, because it kept industrial workers 
healthy.
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Between 1927 and 1937, in Kazakhstan, the number of physicians 
grew from 452 or 1,571, and the number of hospital beds increased from 3,767 
to 16,290.
222 
The effectiveness of government efforts to undermine Islam was 
minimal. Forced mosque closing created outrage, the unveiling campaign 
injured or killed more women than it helped, and sending activists to the 
mosques on Muslim holidays occasionally resulted in murders followed by the 
state reprisals. A secular society in Central Asia was created by modern 
development, industrial building, and the opening of universities and other 
educational institutions, which opened new opportunities for local people. 
Those who wanted to succeed had to play according to the rules of the 
twentieth-century industrial and widely non-religious society. Non-religious 
and bilingual urban elites were created in all five Soviet Central Asian 
republics. In the rural areas, which were much less affected by economic and 
social development, the enforcement of soviet values was weaker and Islamic 
traditions were stronger. All over the region, Islam provided the population 
with the organizational, ideological, and institutional help to preserve the 
national culture, identity and traditional way of life. The Central Asian party 
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members who worked against Islamic institutions were probably motivated 
more by power politics than communist ideology and remembered Islamic 
traditions learnt in their childhood. The next generations of officials did not 
have personal negative associations with the clergy but dependent on the 
communist system, the expressed at least superficial support to anti Islamic 
campaigns. Behavior of those officials was dualistic, and those who closed 
down a mosque one day might hire a mullah to perform the funeral of a relative 
the next.
 
 
Stalin was afraid that national traditions hid opposition to the Soviet Union, 
and he accused native leaders who preserved national traditions of opposing 
Communist policies, which was a crime punishable by death. Despite the fact 
that almost all former Central Asian nationalists switched to the soviet regime, 
almost all of them were accused of anti-Soviet activities and executed, while 
their family members were sent to prison camps in Siberia. Approximately 
110,000 people were murdered in Central Asia between 1929 and 1953. In 
Kazakhstan, 17% of all party members were purged and eventually sentenced 
to imprisonment. In Uzbekistan, during the period of 1937 to 1953, almost 
100,000 people were tried, and 13,000 of them were executed. Arrests affected 
all levels of the society, especially the nation‘s clerisy and people who received 
their education abroad or who participated in revolutionary movements outside 
of the Bolshevik Party. In February 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, 
who was trying to distance himself from the mass terror of the Stalin era, 
accused Stalin of political crimes and initiated the rehabilitation of individuals 
illegally, prosecuted during Stalin‘s show trials. In Uzbekistan, in October 
1956, the first secretary of the Communist Party, Nuriddin Muhitdinov, took 
the first step toward the rehabilitation of the purged Uzbek intellectual elites 
and announced the rehabilitation of some Uzbek writers. Muhitdinov stated 
that only certain Uzbek writers and Poets, such as Abdulla Quirky, who had 
few ideological ―mistakes and shortcoming‖ should be rehabilitated by the 
republication of what he called their ―most valuable works‖. He thus excluded 
those Uzbek writers and poets who had ―hostile intentions‖ and had been 
against the Soviet government during the early Soviet period.
223
 since 
Muhitdinov failed to mention any other Jadid writers by name besides Qodiriy; 
local neo-Stalinists ignored this proposal of rehabilitation. The full 
rehabilitation started only in the late 1980‘s, when Soviet president Mikhail 
Gorbachev announced his policy of glasnost. On March 14, 1969, Sharaf 
Rasihdov was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Uzbekistan Communist Party, the highest post in the republic and one he held 
until his death in 1983. Later he turned his appointment into an unrestricted 
personal rule synonymous to lawlessness and exploitation of the people. 
Rashidov in Uzbekistan and his Kazakh counterpart, Dinmukhamed Kunaev 
who was at the top of Kazakh authorities since 1942 until his dismissal in 1986 
proved that the extreme centralization and uniformity of the Soviet system was 
largely a myth in regard to the implementation of policies in some Central 
Asian republics and in the areas where the center chose not to exert its power. 
Reports of confusion and non-implementation of federal legislation in these 
republics often appeared in mass media. Communist bosses in their practical 
activities used traditional methods of feudal and tribal relationships. While 
these traditional relations were blessed by Islamic doctrine, the most 
outrageous forms of corruption, lawlessness, and oppression in Central Asia 
were carried out by local authorities disguised as Islamic traditionalists. 
Adylov, one of the leading figures in the cotton scandal, explained his cruelty 
by saying that he was a descendant of Timurlane. As Islam was not destroyed 
by repressions, Rashido Kunaev and other local leaders assured federal 
authorities that Central Asian Islam presented no danger to Bolshevik rule. In 
reality, local elites were actively involved in destroying Islam, seeing its 
representatives as potential contenders to local political power. The local party 
elite replaced the regular clergy with local clergy who were willing to follow 
the directives of local party committees and the secret police. Although most of 
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the population avoided any alliance with the discredited clergy, these people 
were viewed with some respect by the people of the Central Asia because they 
knew Arabic, could read the Quran, and pilgrimaged. While traveling 
throughout the Muslim community abroad, they promoted a positive image of 
the Soviet Union. The parallel existence of official and underground Islam in 
Central Asia continued to the end of the 1980‘s. In March 1985, Mikhail 
Gorbachev became the secretary general of the communist part of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) central committee, immediately initiating the unprecedented 
program of reforms that became known as perestroika (rebuilding) and 
glasnost (openness). The goals of the reforms were to speed up the country‘s 
development and convert the ideas of socialism with basic principles of the 
market economy and social democracy. Without any real competition and a 
democratic political system, all changes remained illusionary, and the reforms 
did not bring the expected results. Because of the campaign against heavy 
drinking and the ongoing economic crisis, the federal budget shrunk and the 
GDP of the Central Asian countries decreased in 1989 by 1-1.5 % compared to 
1985. The freedom of mass media provoked public discussions about the future 
of the socialist society, ideological pluralism, and the national rebirth of the 
union republics. In Central Asia, local elites no longer feared Moscow‘s 
comrades and came forth to defend their national heritage and remind Russia of 
its colonial conquest and domination. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to 
power, the government‘s anti-Islamic policy intensified. In November 1986, 
Gorbechev met with the members of the Central Committee of the Uzbek 
communist party, and according to witnesses‘ accounts, he expressed so much 
hostility towards Islam in his instructions to local communists that his speech 
was not reported in Soviet news papers.
224
 later, Gorbachev‘s reforms brought 
the first relaxation to religious lives of Soviet Muslims; the restoration of 
mosques was allowed, and the first political rise of Islamic self-consciousness 
was tolerated. In the late 1980‘s the ideas of sovereign state development 
became especially popular among national elites and intellectuals. In 1989 and 
                                                 
224 James Jackson, “What Really Happened in Alma-Ata”, Time, March 2, 1986, p.17. 
1990, all five republics adopted laws regulating the status of the national 
languages, which were recognized as official state languages. The study of 
native languages was initiated and, together with the publications of previously 
prohibited books of the national authors, it became a factor in the growing 
national self-consciousness. Informal social, political, and religious 
organizations were established. At first national, these nongovernmental 
organizations focused on studying national traditions, culture, history, and 
environmental concerns, but many of them had openly nationalist agendas. 
Later, these groups were transformed into political parties, which continue to 
roles in political processes today. 
 
Islam in the Soviet Era 
Islam was severely persecuted and its infrastructure almost totally destroyed. 
During the Second World War, a small, state-controlled, Muslim hierarchy was 
re-established and some of the formal elements of religious observance were 
permitted to reappear. Yet there was no abatement of the campaign to 
secularize society and to replace religious belief by ‗scientific atheism‘. The 
result was that by the 1980s Islam had become more a marker of cultural and 
ethnic identity than an active spiritual commitment for most Central Asians. 
The chief manifestations of allegiance to the faith at this period were the 
celebration of religious ceremonies connected with rites of passage, such as 
(male) circumcision, marriage and burial.
225
 In addition, there was widespread 
observance of folk traditions, such as pilgrimages to the graves of holy men 
and the performance of associated rituals to secure divine assistance and 
protection. In popular understanding, such practices were considered to be in 
keeping with Muslim belief, but in fact were syncretic accretions. Knowledge 
of Islamic doctrine, of prayers, and even of the basic Muslim profession of 
faith (‗There is no God but Allah and Muhammad (s.a.w) is His Prophet‘) was 
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limited to a small number of predominantly elderly individuals.
226
 In the Soviet 
era, all religious beliefs were attacked by the communist authorities as 
superstition and ―vestiges of the past.‖ Most religious schooling and religious 
observance were banned, and the vast majority of mosques were closed. An 
official Muslim Board of Central Asia with headquarters in Tashkent was 
established during World War II to supervise Islam in Central Asia. For the 
most part, the Muslim Board functioned as an instrument of propaganda whose 
activities did little to enhance the Muslim cause. Atheist indoctrination stifled 
religious development and contributed to the isolation of the Turkmen from the 
international Muslim community. Some religious customs, such as Muslim 
burial and male circumcision, continued to be practiced throughout the Soviet 
period, but most religious belief, knowledge, and customs were preserved only 
in rural areas in ―folk form‖ as a kind of unofficial Islam not sanctioned by the 
state-run Spiritual Directorate. It is estimated that in the late 1980s, Islam had 
the second largest number of believers in the Soviet Union, among them 45 and 
50 million people identifying themselves as Muslims. However, the Soviet 
Union had only about 500 working Islamic mosques, a fraction of the mosques 
in prerevolutionary Russia, and Soviet law forbade Islamic religious activity 
outside working mosques and Islamic schools. All working mosques, religious 
schools, and Islamic publications were supervised by four ―spiritual 
directorates‖ established by Soviet authorities to provide governmental control. 
The Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Spiritual 
Directorate for the European Soviet Union and Siberia, and the Spiritual 
Directorate for the Northern Caucasus and Dagestan oversaw the religious life 
of Sunni Muslims. The Spiritual Directorate for Transcaucasia dealt with both 
Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. The overwhelming majority of the Muslims 
were Sunnis.
227 
Soviet Muslims also differed linguistically and culturally from 
each other. Among them, they spoke about fifteen Turkic languages, ten 
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Iranian languages, and thirty Caucasian languages. Hence, communication 
between different Muslim groups had been difficult. Although in 1989 Russian 
often served as a lingua franca among some educated Muslims, the number of 
Muslims fluent in Russian was low. Culturally, some Muslim groups had 
highly developed urban traditions, whereas others were recently nomadic. 
Some lived in industrialized environments; others resided in isolated 
mountainous regions. In sum, Muslims were not a homogeneous group with a 
common national identity and heritage, although they shared the same religion 
and the same country. Unofficial Muslim congregations, meeting in teahouses 
and private homes with their own mullahs,
228
  greatly outnumbered those in the 
officially sanctioned mosques. The mullahs in unofficial Islam were either self-
taught or were informally trained by other mullahs. In the late 1980s, unofficial 
Islam appeared to split into fundamentalist congregations and groups that 
emphasized Sufism
229
. However, the government only approved official Islam 
through Spiritual Directorate, as it is the puppet in the hands of government.
230
 
 
Official Islam 
―Official Islam‖ meant the Muslim Spiritual Directorates and the legally 
sanctioned body of ulma. It was observed in 1950s, when the administrative 
structure of Soviet Islam was sketched out. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
greater attention was paid to the functioning of the Directorates in the USSR as 
a whole and in the Muslim regions. The Spiritual Directorates established 
during the Second World War were unique in the Muslim world.
231 
In many 
respects, however, the Muslim administration resembled such a body, with a 
ranked hierarchy, a recognized and a regulated body of servants of the cult and 
designated places of worship, a situation that ‗has no parallel in the rest of the 
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Muslim world‘.232 While alien to the Muslim tradition the new organizational 
structure imposed upon Soviet Islam a structure which was obviously devised 
for much more institutionalized, ‗churchly‘ religions, like Orthodoxy, and was 
clearly designed to facilitate central state control over Muslim religious 
activities, by having them centralized and entrusted to the hierarchically 
organized, professional ‗clergy.‘233 This situation arose as a result of the unique 
conditions prevailing in the USSR: The Soviet state, due to its ideology, does 
not recognize the existence of individual believers. It allows a religious life to 
these believers, and for this reason institutions, the Muftiates [exist].
234
 As the 
permitted channel for the expression of Islam, the Directorates regulated the 
affairs of believers and represented their interests to the government through 
the council of Religious Affairs, a body within the USSR council of Ministers 
which had branches within each republic. ‗These Directorates not only provide 
a channel for discussions with the Soviet government but, more importantly, 
they are the instrument for organizing the religious life of the believers.
‘235
 The 
Directorate performs only a few of the traditional functions of the Muslim 
clergy,
236
 as there were no waqf lands or sharia courts to administer. The four 
spiritual directorates are empowered by the soviet government to control the 
religious life of all Muslim believers. All the ‗working‘ mosques, madrasas, 
and religious publications are placed under their strict supervision. Under 
Soviet legislation, any kind of religious activity outside the working mosques is 
illegal and strictly forbidden. All Muslim clerics must be registered with the 
directorates as well as with the council for Religious Affairs of the Republic 
and are paid and nominated by them. The directorates and their registered 
clerics alone are entitled to represent Islam vis-a-vis the Soviet authorities.
237 
The Directorate was represented in each republic by a single Qazi or a Qaziyat 
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(delegation). Senior staff were formally elected by the ulma and confirmed in 
their posts by the Council of Religious Affairs. Below the Directorate, Islam at 
mosque level was organized differently, and to read from the available Western 
sources, confusingly. The basic principle was local democracy. According to 
Bennigsen, ‗A Muslim parish (mutwali), compared to its pre-revolutionary 
predecessor is a curiously democratic body.‘238 Mosques were registered on the 
request of at least twenty believers. The mosque was administered by a group 
called the mutawalliyat or ‗a committee of parishioners which deals not only 
with the financial and administrative business of the parish, but also, with the 
purely intellectual and spiritual problems which might arise.‘239 The 
mutawalliyat is responsible for the maintenance of the mosque and is 
empowered to represent the community of believers in matters involving 
dealings with state organizations or other group of Muslims.
240
 They also had  
authority to employ the Imam or to expel him, who was responsible to it, in 
finding his teaching uncongenial.
241
 The Imam, or Imam-Khatib as he was 
known, was ‗no more than a technician, a paid employee‘.242 This seemingly 
democratic system had its limits, because only an aalim accredited by the 
Spiritual Directrorate and the Council of Religious Affairs was legally entitled 
to seek the post of Imam-Khatib. Candidates had to conform to the demands of 
the Directorate. Thus, the Soviet political principle of ‗democratic centralism‘ 
was preserved in the realm. Although formally democratic, Islam faced the 
same restrictions as other spheres of Soviet society. Moreover, the Directorate 
comprised a Council of ulma that issued fatwas on matters of importance to 
Soviet Muslim, and an International Department responsible for organizing 
Hajj. They also provided religious training for all Soviet ulma irrespective of 
rite. Bennigsen stated that ‗the so-called four spiritual directions are not 
spiritual but purely administrative institution.‘243 The Directorates represented 
the only institution available to Muslims, beyond the federal government and 
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the party, which transcended republican and ethnic boundaries. The ulma were, 
therefore, instrumental in preserving Soviet Muslims identity. They were made 
it possible to lessen the points of the conflicts between Islam and State‘s 
demands by reinterpreting some of the ritual demands of the religion. For 
instance, in place of prayer five times daily, once was acceptable. Various 
people were exempted from Ramadan fast, and those who were to observe it 
were not required to do so for the entire month. Reinterpreting doctrine made 
the anti-Islamic drive weaker, since this had been directed against many of the 
traditional aspects of the religion that were being played down, or rejected, by 
the ulma: Such statements as the one issued by Velizade Sharif, the Mufti of 
Transcaucasia: ‗It is high time for us to understand that many things in the 
shariat have become obsolete and even rebuke believers‘, were politically 
irreproachable-and helped people stick to Islam.
244
 
 
The ulma ensured that Islam was able to survive. There was, however, a price 
to pay in terms of co-operation with the government: The Muslim Spiritual 
Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent is thus the party‗s 
instrument for control of religious life in the republic. It is known that the 
Directorate is closely supervised by the KGB through the council for Religious 
Affairs (staffed largely by retired KGB officers). It is not surprising therefore 
that the official clergy are politically loyal and faithfully support Soviet official 
policies, the price that had to be paid for their very existence. The official 
Muslim hierarchy is perfectly loyal and obedient to the Soviet regime. It is 
certainly the most obedient of all ecclesiastical administrations in the USSR.
245 
Ulma loyalty, although recognized as essential to the preservation of the 
institution of Islam and regarded as, in the main, more beneficial to the 
government than to the Muslims, had its advantages. State control over the 
ulma, the dilution of the teachings of Islam to avoid conflict with the state, and 
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unswerving support for the state‗s action made it possible to present the ulma 
as puppets of the state and not representative of the wider Islamic community: 
‗well-educated, sincere Muslims who nevertheless are not spokesman for the 
real Islam.
‘246 More serious than the ulma‘s role as a spokesmen for official 
policy was their small number. Although the number of mosques was not an 
accurate way of determining the strength of Islam because Islam could only 
legally be practiced in mosques, but since mosques were the ‗workplace‘ of 
ulma, such a count, in the Soviet context, could serve as a measure of the 
ulma‗s strength. There are probably less than 1,000 ―registered clerics‖ who are 
paid and controlled by muftiats-too few to satisfy the religious needs of the 
population.
247
 It is obvious that official Islam alone could not maintain 
religious feeling among masses of believers. There are too few mosques left, 
and too few ‗registered‘ clerics to satisfy the spiritual needs of the believers 
and to perform the necessary rites.
248 
However, Islam is a non-sacerdotal 
religion. The shortage of ulma did not make it impossible to practice the faith. 
The void was filled by practitioners of ‗unofficial‘, ‗out of mosque‘ or ‗parallel 
Islam: It should be noted that the four spiritual Muslim administrations in the 
USSR are actually legal in character and can be by-passed by the devout 
Muslim. The ‗official Islam‘, which these administrations claim to represent 
thus, fails to satisfy the important proportion of the Muslim that still, adhere to 
Islam. It should not be surprising that a ‗non-official Islam‘ has arisen to 
challenge the ‗official hierarchy.249 As the official clerics placed under the 
control of the Four Spiritual Directions, do not suffice for the religious needs of 
the Muslim population, are supplemented by unofficial mullahs, who escape all 
control of the official hierarchy.
250
 ‗Parallel‘, or ‗unofficial‘, Islam was seen as 
more vibrant, more widespread, more ‗authentic‘ and more of a challenge to 
the Soviet authorities than ‗official Islam‘ could ever be. 
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Unofficial Islam/Parallel Islam 
The term ‗parallel Islam‘/‗Unofficial Islam‘ designates those activities of 
Soviet Muslims that take place outside of the control of the four Spiritual 
Directorates. Most of the activities that are considered Islam seem to be just 
basic Islamic ceremonies such as prayers, fast, hajj, etc.
251 
Since Islam has no 
priesthood. Anyone can perform its rites, but ‗unofficial Islam‘ was conceived 
as having a distinct organization that made it possible to talk of a religious 
moment in parallel to the ulma. It appeared as a surrogate of official Islam, 
almost the universal character of religious rites and customs in the family social 
life of Central Asian Muslims requires the daily presence of clergyman, which 
cannot be provided by the pitifully few registered ‗servants of cult‘. The need 
for a vast network of ‗unofficial Islam‘ clergy is therefore manifest and its 
existence, albeit illegal, is acknowledged in Soviet sources.
252 
It is supported in 
all regions of the Soviet Muslim world by the constant activity of ‗unregistered 
clerics.
253
 Almost anyone with some knowledge of Islamic tradition can 
conduct the prescribed rituals (birth, burial, circumcision, and so on). Parallel 
Islam, which is condemned by the official Soviet authorities and by the official 
Soviet Muslim, provides these services to the millions of practicing and non-
practicing Muslims in the USSR who find it impossible to have their spiritual 
and cultural requirements satisfied at one of the officially sanctioned mosques 
or by clerics licensed by the Soviet state. For millions, a parallel network of 
itinerant clerics replaces these servants of the state-approved Muslim 
organization. And the Sheikh of the organizations were known as Ishans who 
concentrated on folk beliefs family rites.
254 
While the performance of 
ceremonies not organized by the Directorate was illegal, it followed that 
parallel Islam was a clandestine phenomenon: ‗Parallel Islam is, essentially, 
underground Islam.
‘255 ‗It has its own clandestine organization.‘256 These 
                                                 
251 Kocaoglu, (1983), Nationality identity in Soviet Central Asian literature: Kazakh and Uzbek prose fiction of 
the post-Stalin period, Columbia University, p.147.  
252 Rakowska-Harmstone, (1983), op. cit., p.53. 
253 Bennigsen and Wimbush, (1985a), op. cit., pp.85-6. 
254 Wimbush (1986), Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A Guide, London & Bloomington, Ind., 1986, p.223. 
255 Ibid., p.223. 
256 Bennigsen and Wimbush, (1975), op. cit., p.139. 
organizations were associated with Sufis therefore, ―non-official‖ Islam is 
based on the Sufi brotherhoods.
257 The dynamic ―Parallel‖ or non-official Islam 
is more powerful than official Islam.
258 
This represented a new development, 
which at its most basic meant such activity as private prayer at home, and 
‗Sufism‘ was often used interchangeably.259 Alternatively, ‗Soviet Islam has 
been split into an official religion, represented by sanctioned and co-operative 
administrations, and an unofficial one grouped around the Tariqats‘.260 Sufi 
groups, described as ‗underground‘,261 were seen as being secret or semi-secret 
mass organisation.
262
 ‗The Sufi orders are not small ―chapels‖ but mass 
organizations (despite their clandestine character).
263 
Group secrecy, which 
prevented infiltration by the KGB, was maintained by several means. One was 
limiting membership to specific cleans, resulting in a position in which ‗adepts 
are subject to the loyalties of brotherhood and clan‘.264 The same solidarity 
could be achieved through craft guilds like those mentioned by Snesarev. ‗Sufi 
orders control the surviving Muslim guilds and new guilds organized along 
traditional lines. Religious community rituals connected with traditional crafts 
also apparently survive‘.265 Sufi organizations usually consist of bodies of 
disciples grouped around a teacher, whose prescriptions regarding spiritual or 
physical exercises are followed strictly. In Rakows-Harmstone‘s words, ‗Each 
ishan (or Sheikh) formed the nucleus of a group of followers known as murids, 
bound to the master by intricate rites, blind obedience and a dance like ritual 
known as zikr.
266 
The discipline imposed by the teacher-pupil relationship was 
among the Sufis‘ greatest asset: Sufi Tariqas are tightly knit religious 
organizations with a strong leadership and a disciplined apparatus they are 
well-suited to clandestine activity have survived all attempts by the Soviet 
                                                 
257 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay,C. (1978), op. cit., p.155. 
258 Bennigsen and Wimbush, (1985b), op. cit., p.21. 
259 Broxup, M. (1983), ‘Recent developments in Soviet Islam’, Religion in Communist Lands, 11, I: 31-6, p.35. 
260 Rywkin, M. op. cit., p.88. 
261 Wimbush (1986), op.cit., p.228; Rakowska-Harmstone, (1983), op. cit., p.55; Bociurkiw, (1980), op. cit., 
p.19. 
262 Bennigsen, (1981), ‘Official Islam and Sufi brotherhood in the Soviet Union today’in Cudsi, H. and 
Dessouki, A, (eds), Islam and Power, London: Croom Helm, p.100.  
263 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay,C. (1978), op. cit., p.156. 
264 Ibid., p.157. 
265 Rakowska-Harmstone, (1983), op. cit., p.53. 
266 Ibid., p.54. 
regime to infiltrate them, to win them over or to destroy them.
267
 The Tariqa 
represent perfectly structured hierarchical organizations, endowed an iron 
discipline which is certainly stronger than that of the Communist Party.
268
 Sufi 
groups in certain ways resembled the ‗cells‘ of the Communist Party, like their 
aptitude for clandestine activity, discipline, team spirit, and capacity to 
organize a parallel clergy, are rendered them  ‗dangerous‘. Since their tight-knit 
groups meant that they were ‗easily transformed into commandos‘.269 Sufis 
were held responsible for maintaining a network of unregistered institutions, 
notably thousands of underground mosques and madrasas.
270 
The existence of 
unofficial mullahs also means the existence of unofficial mosques, and it is 
well documented that many such mosques exist, particularly in rural areas.
271 
These include redundant mosques illegally reopened;  ‗prayer houses‘ usually 
in a cemetery or near a shrine; ‗private‘ clandestine prayer- houses‘ open to all 
believers, which are located in the homes of Sufi Sheikhs‘; and secret meeting 
places used only by Sufi adepts.
272
 
 
As well as performing religious rites, Sufis 
propagated Islam by means of two main media. The first was the underground 
school in which Arabic was taught. This was essential for the maintenance of 
the cult, since Arabic could otherwise be studied only in university and 
religious instruction only obtained at the two colleges in Bokhara and 
Tashkent, which had a low intake capacity and a high entry requirement. Since 
religious instruction is forbidden in Soviet school, parallel Islam has quite 
naturally come to assume an educational as well as a religious role. 
 
Sufis are 
identified openly as being responsible for the establishment of religious and 
Quranic schools.
273 
Another medium for propagation of Islam was the custom 
of pilgrimage. Soviet government sent only 18 to 20 people out of 50 million 
Soviet Muslims annually to Mecca,
274 
because Pilgrimage to a holy place 
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within Central Asia was an alternative to Hajj. A number of holy places 
existed, usually associated with the tombs of saints, clan ancestors, biblical 
figures, or mythical and pre-Islamic figures. Sufi activity was supposed to be 
centered on these sites. Mazars usually have a guardian in most cases an 
unofficial mullah or ishan, an influential member of a local community who 
dispenses religious ―propaganda‖.275 Sufi in the Soviet Union control and 
maintain holy places.  The location of holy places in the territory of the Muslim 
republics represents a kind of religious geography of nationalism that can be 
charted according to the location of Sufi brotherhoods. Today more than ever, 
Muslim holy places controlled by Sufi brotherhoods are the spiritual centers of 
Islam.
276 
The cult of saints and its associated custom of pilgrimage was 
‗probably the most important element of popular Islam/folk Islam in Central 
Asia‘277 Because of this it provided the principle location for the dissemination 
of religious teaching by Sufis. Holy places were ‗an excellent forum for the 
brotherhoods to influence the Muslim masses.
278 
It is because of this strategic 
position, Sufis have unique and unlimited access to non-adepts who observe the 
cult of saints. They stand therefore at the critical juncture where popular belief 
meets clandestine organization, where ordinary Muslims come across with the 
highly motivated and rigidly disciplined Sufis. Soviet sources agree that during 
a pilgrimage, the holy place is the main contact place between the ‗Sufi 
fanatics‘ and the population- believers and unbelievers alike.279 Because of this 
direct contact with the Muslim masses, whatever the content of their teaching, 
continued to be felt by the people as closer to their worries and needs than the 
ulema.
280
 Sufis had deep roots in the community and they enjoy solid support 
from the Muslim masses.
281 
It is clear in areas where Tariqats exist, they hold 
the actual authority over the social group and exercise a deep influence on 
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public opinion.
282
 Their teachings were of great importance.
 
Although religious 
observance did not necessarily imply opposition to the Soviet regime, but co-
operation with the state involved making a number of religious compromises. 
The Sufis were thought unwilling to do: ‗the goal of the secret organizations is 
to maintain the true faith.
‘283
 ‗They are struggling to build a world which is 
sanctified by faith, in which Islam penetrates every aspect of public and private 
life.
284
 This brought Sufis into direct conflict with the state. The Tariqats are in 
fact mass organizations utterly estranged from the ideology of the Soviet 
system.
285
 The Sufi brotherhoods appear to have no other ‗ideology‘ apart  
from a very conservative form of Islam; and their goals are those of the 
traditional jihad, or Holy War‘, which fights sin, the infidel rulers and the ‗bad 
Muslims‘ who serve them.286 Their ideology, a legacy of Shamil‘s  jihad, is a 
vague but powerful appeal to build a world entirely sanctified by faith, which 
implies, of course, the expulsion of the Russian infidels.
287 
Sufism was 
presented as inherently anti-Russian, a situation which some saw as a natural 
feature of this branch of Islam. Sufism has always played a big role in anti-
colonialist movements‘288 many shrines were the tombs of leaders of 
nineteenth-century resistance to the Russians. Whereas previously the anti-
Russian revolts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the 
Basmachi movement, were depicted as being of nationalist inspiration, these 
were now interpreted as religious revolts:
 
All movements of armed resistance to 
the Russian conquerors from the late eighteen century to the last Chechen 
uprising in 1942-43 have been led or supported by Sufi brotherhoods:
289
 These 
movements had been inspired, by the Naqshbandiyya, an order that remained 
strong in the region and ‗which from the eighteenth century has represented the 
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hard core of Muslim resistance to Russian conquest‘.290 Other groups, notably 
the Hairy Ishans, had developed, which also evinced an antipathy to the 
Soviets.
291 
The Sufis alone can offer clandestine organizations, whose followers 
are characterized by their zealous commitment to Islam and their rigid 
discipline, to the Soviet Islamic dissident. In times of crises, the brotherhoods 
have been the catalysts for potent anti-Russian and anti-Soviet movements, and 
they could become so again.
292 
Sufism preserved Central Asian distinctiveness 
by encouraging and facilitating behavior patterns linked to Islam, and was itself 
an integral part of Central Asian culture. 
 
Soviet Religious Policy 
Soviet policy towards religion was based on the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism, which made atheism the official doctrine of the Communist Party. 
However, ―the Soviet law and administrative practice through most of the 
1920‘s extended some tolerance to religion and forbade the arbitrary closing or 
destruction of some functioning churches‖,293 while each successive Soviet 
constitution granted freedom of belief. As the founder of the Soviet state, Lenin 
put it:
 
 
Religion is the opium of the people: this saying of Marx is the cornerstone of 
the entire ideology of Marxism about religion. All modern religions and 
churches, all and of every kind of religious organizations are always 
considered by Marxism as the organs of bourgeois reaction, used for the 
protection of the exploitation and the stupefaction of the working class.
294
 
 
Marxism-Leninism has advocated for the suppression, and, ultimately, the 
disappearance of religious beliefs, considering them ―unscientific‖ and 
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―superstitious‖. In the 1920s and 1930s, such organizations as the League of 
the Militant Godless were active in anti-religious propaganda. Atheism was the 
norm in schools, communist organizations (such as the Young Pioneer 
Organization), and the media. 
 
The regime‘s efforts to eradicate religion in the Soviet Union, however, varied 
over the years with respect to particular religions and have been affected by 
higher state interests. Official policies and practices not only varied with time 
but also differed in their application from one nationality to another and from 
one religion to another. In 1929, with the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 
Soviet Union and an upsurge of radical militancy in the Party and Komsomol, a 
powerful ―hard line‖ in favour of mass closing of churches and arrests of 
priests became dominant and evidently won Stalin's approval. Secret ―hard 
line‖ instructions were issued to local party organizations, but not published.295 
When the anti-religious drive inflamed the anger of the rural population, not to 
mention that of the Pope and other Western church spokesmen, the regime was 
able to back off from a policy that it had never publicly endorsed anyway.
296
 
Although all Soviet leaders had the same long-range goal of developing a 
cohesive Soviet people, they pursued different policies to achieve it. For the 
Soviet regime, the questions of nationality and religion were always closely 
linked. Not surprisingly, therefore, the attitude toward religion also varied from 
a total ban on some religions to official support of others. 
 
Soviet anti-religious legislation 
The Soviet Union had the elimination of religion and its replacement with state 
atheism
297
 as a fundamental ideological goal of the state.
298
 While religion was 
never officially made illegal, the state yet made great efforts towards the goal 
of eliminating religion. To this end throughout its history is engaged in anti-
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religious persecutions of varying intensity and methodology. Believers were 
never officially attacked for being believers, but they were officially attacked 
for perceived or invented resistance to the state and its policies.
299
 These 
attacks, however, in the broader ideological context were ultimately meant to 
serve the ultimate goal of eliminating religion and replacing it with atheism, 
and the perceived resistance acted as a legal pretext to carry this out. Through 
this method believers were effectively widely attacked for being believers and 
promoting religion, but officially they were only attacked for disobedience to 
the state.
300
 As part of these persecutions, the state enacted a significant body of 
legislation that regulated and curtailed religious practices. This, along with 
much secret instructions that were not published, formed the official legal 
position of the Soviet state against religion. It was designed in order to hurt and 
hamper religious activities, and the state often vigilantly watched religious 
believers for their breaking of these laws to justify arresting them; volunteer 
neighbourhood committees called public commissions for control over 
observance on the laws about religious cults‘ watched their religious 
neighbours and reported violations of the law to the appropriate authorities.
301
 
The state sought to control religious bodies through such laws with the 
intention of making these bodies disappear.
302
 These laws often carried many 
ambiguities that allowed the state to abuse them in order to persecute believers.  
 
Soviet Policies towards Islam  
Soviet policies towards Islam went through several phases. The main priority in 
the early period was to win the loyalty of the masses. This required a certain 
degree of accommodation towards the ulma, since no matter how corrupt 
individual clerics might have been; they were nevertheless important and 
respected members of the community. Soon, however, measures were 
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introduced that aimed at dismantling the social, legal and economic basis of 
Islamic institutions. These were systematically replaced by Soviet bodies. The 
Arabic script, which had been used in Central Asia since the introduction of 
Islam, was abolished in favour of the Latin script at the end of the 1920s (in 
turn to be replaced by the Cyrillic in 1940). The campaign for the emancipation 
of women was likewise used to undermine Islam by portraying the religion as a 
source of ignorance, oppression and social injustice. Atheistic propaganda was 
intensified and in the early 1930s, arbitrary arrests and executions were used to 
eliminate Muslim leaders who refused to co-operate with the authorities. All 
the madrasas were closed and religious literature confiscated. Zakat was 
banned,
303
 the annual hajj was suspended and contacts with foreign Muslims 
virtually ceased. A hundred or so mosques remained open - out of the many 
thousands that had existed during the Tsarist period. During the Second World 
War, a more conciliatory attitude was adopted towards the Muslim community. 
The tiny body of ulma that had survived the purges of the 1930s was co-opted 
by the state authorities. In a personal capacity they may have been devout 
(some undoubtedly were), but in their formal capacity they were primarily 
Soviet officials. An administrative body, the Muslim Board for Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan (MBCAK) was established in Tashkent, under the 
chairmanship of a Mufti. In 1944, the hajj was officially reinstated, though 
only a very small, carefully vetted group of clerics was able to benefit from 
this. The following year, a single madrasa was reopened (the only official 
Muslim educational establishment in the entire Soviet Union). In 1971, a 
second madrasa was established. The number of functioning mosques gradually 
increased, and the public celebration of religious ceremonies became a little 
easier. In addition, a few religious publications began to appear, and promising 
madrasa students were sent to Islamic universities in Egypt and other Arab 
countries to complete their Quranic studies. The motivation for this change of 
policy was not so much a greater degree of tolerance towards Islam, but rather 
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a desire to present the Soviet Union in a favourable light to the developing 
world, particularly the oil-rich Arab countries of the Middle East. This entailed 
creating at least a facade of acceptance of Soviet Islam.
304
 The effects of 
secularization, however, were by now deeply entrenched and the great majority 
of the Central Asian Muslims were unable to recite even the basic attestation of 
faith (―There is no God but Allah and prophet Muhammad s.a.w is His 
messenger‖). 
 
Islam under Communism 
Islam was highly repressed under communism though it had the second largest 
number of believers in the Soviet Union, among them 45 and 50 million people 
identifying themselves as Muslims. However, the religious institutions of the 
organized Muslim community in the Soviet Union were subject to decades of 
anti-religious policies and restrictions imposed by the Soviet government on all 
religious activity. After the October 1917 revolution, the foundation for an anti-
Islamic strategy was laid out as the Bolshevik government implemented a 
radical programme separating religion from the state, and launched violent 
campaigns against all religious institutions in general. The rationale behind this 
strategy was derived from the Marxist belief that religion was an obstacle to 
modernization and social development. The Muslims felt the blow of this 
policy when mosques, Sharia courts and religious schools were closed down, 
members of the clergy were persecuted, and religious endowment lands (waqf) 
were confiscated. One of the most serious consequences of this campaign was 
the Basmachi revolt that began in 1918. The revolt involved the Mujahidin 
Sufis who fought fiercely to resist the establishment of Soviet rule that would 
exclude the native Muslim population from power. By 1924, the revolt had 
weakened but continued in the Pamirs until 1928. Lenin‘s policies were 
reversed once again in 1924 when some prominent Muslim-turned Communists 
advised him to rethink his tactics. The anti-Islamic campaign was put on hold 
and an attempt was made to restore trust among the Muslims by returning waqf 
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property, reopening mosques and Islamic schools, and resuming the practice of 
the Sharia law.
305
 When a relative degree of support and trust was achieved, 
Lenin reverted to his long-term anti-Islamic strategy. Between 1925 and 1927, 
a number of decrees were issued to curb the influence of the Sharia courts by 
prohibiting the establishment of new courts and cutting off financial aid 
disbursed to them by the local government. Nationalization of parts of the waqf 
property was initiated in 1925, depriving religious and educational institutions 
of material support. Much of the Muslim religious officialdom was dispersed 
through relocation, exile, imprisonment and assassination. All Islamic schools 
were banned and the Latin script replaced teaching and publishing in Arabic.
306 
The harsh treatment of Muslims continued into the 1930s when mosques 
continued to function and clerics continued to preach, but in vastly reduced 
numbers and under conditions of persistent persecution. Under Stalin, the 
elimination of the outward attributes of Islam was important, thus, three of the 
five pillars of Islam—the payment of the zakat (alms), the hajj (pilgrimage) to 
Mecca, and the observance of the fast of Ramadan were outlawed.
307
 Soviet 
efforts to undermine all religions continued until World War II, when the 
repression of religion and the clergy almost ceased. During the war years, the 
Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) 
were created. With the Mufti at its head, it was charged with regulating the 
registration of mosques, appointing imams to lead local congregations and even 
dictating the content of sermons and the nature of ‗proper‘ Islamic practice. 
The official Muslim was co-opted by and took its cues from the communist 
party leadership. The Muftiate was essentially designed as Oliver Roy puts it: 
‗to undermine and even attempt to destroy popular Islam, particularly the 
connections between national and religious identities, and to create a token, 
regulated, officially appointed clergy in order to manage the few remaining 
religious institutions , and after 1955, to improve relations with friendly 
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Muslim countries‘.308 The easing of pressure on the Muslims had to do with the 
need for Muslim contribution to the war effort, the Soviet Union‘s subsequent 
rise in global status and its foreign policy that attempted to widen its sphere of 
influence in the Muslim Middle East. This strategy was pursued until the mid-
1950s when the effects of the war had been overcome and Soviet authorities no 
longer needed religious support. The anti-religious campaign was once again 
reinvigorated as the Communist Party leadership began attacking religion. 
Khrushchev maintained that: ‗Communist education proposes the liberation of 
consciousness from the religious prejudices and superstitions which still 
hamper some Soviet people from full demonstration of their creative powers‘. 
He issued a decree entitled, ‗On the strict observance of the laws on religious 
cults‘ in March 1961, a threefold strategy. First, an attack was to be launched 
against the clergy. Second, the existing anti-religious laws were to be 
thoroughly implemented. Third, the penalties for religious offences were made 
harsher. This was the official line taken in regard to religion, including Islam 
until the beginning of Perestroika. However, despite years of reprisal and 
persecution in the Soviet Union, Islam has managed to preserve its spirit as a 
way of life that culturally defined every facet of the believer‘s existence.309 
Sociological studies published in the Brezhnevite period document the 
astonishing persistence of both belief and practice. This was especially true of 
Islamic lifestyle rituals including, fasting, feasting, pilgrimages, polygamy and 
the handing out of alms.
310
 In retrospect, the Soviet campaign against Islam had 
proved to be only partially successful. It managed to curb Islamic activity and 
perhaps contain Islamic sentiments in the region but it was far eradicating the 
Islamic faith. 
 
When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he set out to transform Soviet society 
through his policies of perestroika (radical economic restructuring and reform) 
                                                 
308 Oliver Roy, ‘Islam in Tajikistan’, Open Society in Central Eurasia Occasional Paper Series, No 1, July 1996. 
309 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 1994), 
p.110. 
310 Malik Hafeez, Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994), p.244. 
and glasnost (policy of openness intended to ensure the success of perestroika). 
An inevitable product of this process was the gradual revival of Islam in 
Central Asia. Gorbachev had not anticipated this outcome because during the 
first years of his leadership, glasnost and perestroika encompassed neither 
Central Asia nor Islam. However, these reforms slowly found their way into the 
region. Mehrdad Haghayeghi describes two phases in the application and 
impact of perestroika and glasnost in Central Asia. He explains that the first 
phase lasted from 1985 until 1988. During this period, massive anti-corruption 
campaigns and party purges were conducted as Gorbachev attempted to 
establish tight control in the region. In fact, Gorbachev followed his 
predecessor‘s policies on religion during this phase and went so far as to blame 
Islamic culture for the socio-economic and political ills of Central Asia. 
Michael Rywkin makes an interesting point by suggesting that this policy was 
an instrument of a more generalized antinationalist and anti-Islamic strategy 
aimed at strengthening central control in the face of a Muslim population 
explosion and the dread possibility of nationalist contagion from turbulent Iran 
and Afghanistan.
311
 The second phase corresponded to the 1988–1991 period 
when there was a change in Gorbachev‘s policy orientation—glasnost was 
permitted to be practiced relatively freely on a similar scale to other republics 
in the Soviet Union.
312
 Moscow was forced to back away from its anti-Islamic 
policy because the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was visibly 
on the retreat, coming under attack by both the reformist wing of the Politburo 
leadership (led by Alexander Yakovlev) and by the ‗nationalists‘ in the Baltic 
republics communist parties. To salvage the situation and to appease the 
demands of growing nationalism in the republics, the party began to grant the 
republic leaders more control over the ideological sphere, which including 
policies covering religion.
313
 The trend towards liberalization resulted in 
quantitative changes for Islam in Central Asia. Among these changes was the 
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drive to construct new mosques. The bureaucratic obstacles that had 
traditionally impeded the operation of mosques were removed, leading to the 
reopening of old mosques and new shrines. According to some figures, by 
1992: in Uzbekistan, about 3000 mosques had been restored or built anew; in 
Tajikistan, 130 large town mosques were operating; and in Turkmenistan, 500 
mosques were functioning in densely populated areas.
314
 Publishing activities 
of the Muslim Religious Boards were expanded as well, resulting in the 
printing of more, book titles and the creation of a mass-circulation Muslim 
press. The waqf  were re-established during this period, after being nationalized 
in the 1920s; this was very significant since it provided the clergy with an 
independent source of financing. With more resources at their disposal, 
clerically led religious institutions were in a better position to mobilize the 
community around the notions of Islam. Soon, clerics began a process of 
enlightenment in every republic, by educating ordinary Muslims with the 
history and philosophy of their religion and by promoting their notions of 
distinction and integration with regard to the Muslim community. Young 
educators in various fields of the humanities, and local journalists, joined in 
these efforts. The process of enlightenment was organically intertwined with 
nationalist sentiments and the notion of national revival was intertwined with 
Islam. As enlightenment became more pronounced and, as ethnic and 
nationalistic views grew, Islamic expression grew accordingly. Initially, the 
appearance of Islamic slogans and propaganda was seen as something new in 
Soviet practice, but by 1991, the hoisting of green flags was not unusual.
315
 
Ostensibly, a new trend was growing rapidly in Central Asian Islam, namely its 
politicization and the emergence of the Muslim religion as an independent 
political force. 
 
Resurgence of Islam  
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The resurgence of Islam in Central Asia began in the early 1970s with the 
emergence of small-scale revivalist movements in Tajikistan and the Fergana 
Valley (especially the Namangan district).
316
 In these areas Islam had survived 
somewhat better than in most other parts of the region. The physical 
remoteness of these areas afforded a certain protection; so, too did the attitude 
of local officials, many of whom were less than conscientious in their attempts 
to stamp out religious practices. (Even Party members would sometimes 
observe Muslim rites, especially after retirement.) Moreover, some of the pre-
Soviet generation of Central Asian Muslim scholars had sought refuge in these 
areas. (One of the most influential of such teachers was Muhammad Hindustani 
Rustamov, known as Hajji Domla. Born in Kokand in 1892, he studied in 
Bukhara, Afghanistan and India; he eventually returned to Tajikistan and died 
in Dushanbe in 1989. Several of his disciples became influential religious 
leaders.) Secretly, they began to teach the young. Small circles of adepts 
congregated around them and networks of devout believers began to be 
established. There were reports in the press of teahouses and clubs secretly 
being used for prayer meetings, of pilgrimages to shrines, and unregistered 
clerics performing religious ceremonies.
317 
 
 
The policy of glasnost put into practice by Mikhael Gorbachev in the mid-
1980s meant that by 1988 the Soviet government relaxed its controls on Islam. 
As a result, there was a rapid religious revival, including new mosques, 
literature,
318
 and the return of private religious schooling. Many Central Asians 
were interested in the ethical and spiritual values that Islam could offer.
319
 The 
revival accelerated further following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
For many, Islam constituted a national heritage that had been repressed during 
the Soviet era. Additionally, relaxed travel restrictions under Gorbachev 
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enabled cultural exchange with other Muslim countries; Saudi Arabia, for 
example, sent copies of the Qur'an into the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 
Islam as practiced in Central Asia became much more varied in this short 
time.
320
 Furthermore, Islam was attractive because it offered alternatives and 
solutions to the myriad political and economic problems facing the republics in 
the wake of the Soviet Union‘s collapse.321 However, the governments of 
Central Asian republics were wary of Islam in the political sphere. Their fears 
of undue influence were soon justified by the outbreak of the Tajik Civil War 
in 1992, between the Tajik government and a coalition of opponents led by a 
radical Islamist group called the Islamic Renaissance Party.
322
 The civil war, 
which lasted until 1997, demonstrated to the other former Soviet republics the 
dangers posed by Islamic opposition groups. The takeover in 1996 of 
Afghanistan by the Taliban further emphasized that threat.
323
 The Islamic 
Renaissance Party was one of several similar Islamic opposition groups, 
including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which also fought against the 
Tajik government in the civil war. The IRP had its origins in underground 
Islamic groups in the Soviet Union. It was formed in 1990 in Astrakhan by a 
group consisting mostly of Tatar intellectuals, with separate branches for each 
Soviet republic. It was in fact registered as an official political party in Russia, 
but was banned by the Central Asian communist governments.
324
 Partly as a 
result of this oppression, political opposition erupted into the violence of the 
civil war in Tajikistan, in which over 50,000 people were killed out of a 
population of 6 million and another 250,000 fled the country to Afghanistan, 
Uzbekistan or elsewhere.
325
 Following the civil war, the Tajik government 
incorporated Islamic groups into the government in order to prevent future 
tensions. However, the other Central Asian republics did not follow this 
example, continuing instead to repress and persecute Islamic groups rather than 
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allow them to participate in the political process.
326
 Not all Islamic movements 
were violent like the IRP; the most popular radical Islamic movement in 
Central Asia during the 1990s was the non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir. Though it 
does not espouse the same violent methods as groups such as the IRP and IMU, 
its stated goal is to unite all Muslim countries through peaceful methods and 
replace them with a restored caliphate, due to which Central Asian 
governments consider it a threat and have outlawed it as a subversive group in 
the Central Asian republics. 
 
Another, slightly, impetus for the resurgence of Islam was that towards the end 
of the 1980s (under Gorbachev), the government adopted a more tolerant 
policy toward religion. This was happening throughout the Soviet Union, but in 
Central Asia, it acquired a special momentum as part of a strategy to combat 
―fundamentalist‖ influences from Iran and Afghanistan. There was a 
widespread belief in official circles that the most effective defence against this 
perceived threat was to strengthen a sense of pride in indigenous Islamic 
traditions.
 
This change of attitude was marked by the appointment of a new 
Mufti, Muhammad Sadyk, Muhammad Yusuf Hoja-ogli (less formally, 
Muhammad Sadyk or Mamayusupov), to head the MBCAK. In his early 
thirties, and previously Rector of the Tashkent madrasa, he was more in touch 
with the younger generation than the previous Mufti had been. He was a devout 
Muslim who genuinely believed that it was possible to liberalize the Soviet 
system. His affirmed aim was to provide every Muslim family in Central Asia 
with a copy of the Holy Quran. Like the ―Wahhabis‖ (with whom he was said 
to have close personal links) he, too, believed in the need for moral 
regeneration. He believed that by re-inculcation of Muslim values it would be 
possible to overcome social evils such as growing alcoholism and drug abuse. 
He received substantial support from the state authorities, who not only gave 
him a prominent role in public affairs, but also made several concessions to the 
Muslim community, such as permission to open more mosques, the relaxing of 
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restrictions concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the increased provision of 
religious literature. Several other young men (between 30 and 40 years of age) 
were appointed to senior positions in the Muslim establishment at this time, 
among them Akbar Turajonzade, the new head of the Tajik Qaziyat (Tajik 
branch of the Muslim Religious Board). Turajonzade, too, sought to promote 
Muslim regeneration by working within the framework of the existing law. 
Unlike some of the more radical ―Wahhabis‖, he (like other members of the 
official religious hierarchy) was adamantly opposed to the politicization of 
Islam, and rejected the idea of the creation of Islamic parties. Furthermore, he 
was firmly convinced that it was too soon to think in terms of creating an 
Islamic state in Tajikistan, since there were far too few Tajiks who had any real 
knowledge of the faith. The first task, as he saw it, was to train teachers and 
clerics that could educate the masses. Among his many achievements at this 
time was the founding of an officially registered Islamic Institute in Dushanbe 
(1990), the publication of numerous booklets on Islam and the opening of over 
a hundred community (―Friday‖) mosques. So far as Turkmenistan is 
concerned neither the state nor the people are in favour of Islamic revival. They 
are satisfied with secularism and wanted to survive folk Islam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - 4 
STATE AND ISLAM IN 
POST SOVIET PERIOD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formation of the State 
Like other Central Asian Republics, Turkmenistan wanted greater autonomy, 
but not independence until the verge of dissolution of the Soviet Union.
327 
Subsequent to the popular referendum, which resulted in 94 % of people being 
in favour of independence, Turkmenistan declared its independence on October 
27, 1991, and the Soviet Union was formally dissolved on December 31, 
1991.
328
 Following the vote for independence, the president of Turkmenistan 
SSR Saparmurat Niyazov
329
 established a new party called the ―Democratic 
Party of Turkmenistan,‖ which was composed of former Communist Party 
officials to a great extent.
330
 He declared all opposition parties illegal, and any 
politicians openly opposed to Niyazov were either silenced or forced to live in 
exile.
331
 Consequently, the independence acquired in 1991 did not result in a 
substantial change in the political structure.  Niyazov was elected as the first 
president of independent Turkmenistan in June 1992 and maintained an 
authoritarian regime based on the rule of a single party, Democratic Party of 
Turkmenistan.
332
 The centralized structure of the economy was preserved in a 
similar vein. Economic reforms were both slow and marginal, so that even the 
legalization of private property could only be achieved in 1997.
333
 Even today; 
most of the industrial production is still performed by the state-owned 
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enterprises, particularly in the essential gas, oil, and cotton industries. The 
constitution adopted in 1992 stated that Turkmenistan was a constitutional 
republic ―based on the principles of the separation of powers – legislative, 
executive, and judicial – which operate independently, checking and balancing 
one another.‖334 It also recognizes and guarantees to protect freedoms of 
speech, assembly, and religion for the individuals. However, the reality was 
very different from the constitutional rhetoric. Although there were legislative 
and judiciary bodies, the separation of powers was never put into practice but 
instead these bodies remained shadowed by the decisions of the president.  
Similarly, the individual rights stated in the constitution were either denied or 
suppressed.
335 
The constitution granted enormous powers to president Niyazov, 
who was also entitled to serve as chairman of the cabinet of ministers and the 
two parliamentary bodies of the republic.
336 
 In 1994, a referendum was 
approved cancelling the elections planned to be held in 1998 and extending 
Turkmenbashi‘s term as president until 2002.  In 1999, the parliament voted to 
make Turkmenbashi president for life.  He later stated that he would 
voluntarily step down in 2010, when he would reach age 70.
337
 The legislative 
branch of the republic consists of two parliamentary bodies: Halk Maslahaty 
(People‘s Council) and Mejlis (Parliament). Halk Maslahaty is the highest 
representative body of the new Republic of Turkmenistan as the authority to 
ratify constitutional amendments, treaties, and referendums.  The president is 
the chairman of Halk Maslahaty whose members are comprised of the cabinet 
ministers; regional, district, and city hakims (governors and mayors); 
parliamentary deputies; people‘s representatives elected by etraps (district); the 
chairmen of the Supreme Court and the Economic Court; and the general 
prosecutor.
338
 The Mejlis is the legislative body with a relatively limited 
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339
 Nevertheless, most of the 
decisions were made by president Turkmenbashi himself while both Halk 
Maslahaty and Mejlis merely reflected them.
340
  In a similar vein, 
Turkmenbashi had a great influence over the legal system due to his authority 
to appoint judges at all levels for five-year terms, which could be renewed 
indefinitely.
341
 He also appointed the Minister of Justice, who is supposed to 
oversee all judges and courts.
342
 During his rule, Turkmenbashi did not even 
pretend to adhere to the liberal principles mentioned in the constitution but 
instead ―crafted a dictatorship based on a ‗cult of the individual.‘343 He was 
demanding complete loyalty from his officials, in other words nomenclature, 
and from society at large, while encouraging the same attitude to be duplicated 
at all levels of authority and ensuring this by means of KNB
344
 to serve 
―perpetuating the culture of obedience.‖345 People appointed by Turkmenbashi 
to reinforce obedience to his absolutism also headed the Ministry of National 
Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, both being responsible for 
management of internal threats to regime.
346 
Although the constitution 
recognizes the right to express personal opinions freely; Turkmenbashi 
government severely restricted freedom of speech as well as freedom of the 
press. Political opposition was taken as personal betrayal. Questioning a 
presidential decision meant dismissal for a public officer, while dissent at all 
levels of society were punished by imprisonment, house arrest, surveillance, 
incarceration in psychiatric facilities and torture.
347
 The government also had 
complete control over radio and television, and was funding almost all print 
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media.
348
 The result was what the regime called ―stability‖: virtually no rallies, 
meetings, demonstrations, or protests.
349
 It was practically impossible to figure 
out whom, other than Turkmenbashi, had a real influence in policymaking or 
whose interests he had to accommodate.
350
 Nevertheless, it is possible to 
recognize that he was careful to appease tribal concerns and balance tribal 
aspirations.
351
 Although he was from the Tekke tribe, his experience in the state 
orphanage let him introduce himself as the ―son of the Turkmen people‖, who 
stands at an equal distance to any tribe.
352
 Furthermore, like Soviet 
governments previously did, he was trying to maintain equity among tribes in 
his political decisions, such as appointing hakims from respective local tribes 
rather than appointing outsiders.
353
  Although reproduction of the old Soviet 
patterns of relations between state and society has been a common 
characteristic of all post-communist states, Turkmenistan proved to be an 
extreme example for both the marginality of change and the amplitude of 
authoritarianism.
354
 Neither economic nor political structures were subject to a 
tangible change throughout the transition, and the authoritarianism of the state 
was preserved, if not enhanced, despite the set forth rhetoric of democracy.  A 
very basic reason underlying such an outcome was the strong tradition of 
authoritarian rule, which the Turkmen respected throughout their history and 
remained unchallenged without an alternative culture influential upon the elites 
and the society – let it be previous experiences of democracy or a civic political 
culture.
355
 The prevalence of Soviet modalities were also facilitated by the 
specific path of transition itself, which was from its very beginnings in 
Gorbachev period characterized by lack of an effective political opposition, 
decentralization of power or ongoing economic reforms to undermine the 
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control of Communist Party elites over the evolving course of transition.
356
 In 
the absence of political, structural, or economic challenges to his power, 
Turkmenbashi was able to preserve his assets and ensured his position 
throughout the transition to block both democratization and economic 
reformation of the independent Turkmen state.
357
 
 
Nation-building policy of the Turkmen state 
Turkmenistan has been in transition from dependence to independence and 
from socialism to market economy.  Its national identity is constructed within 
these unstable conditions.  Following the declaration of independence, the 
process of nation building was initiated by President Saparmurat Turkmenbashi 
to fill the identity vacuum and create a new homogenous Turkmen national 
identity.
358
 Turkmenbashi uses the term ‗national revival‘ instead of ‗nation-
building ‘.359 The latter, however, defines the current situation in Turkmenistan 
better than the former since Turkmen national identity did not occur in modern 
understanding until the foundation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 
1924.
360
 Paradoxically, the Soviet Union was the initiator of Turkmen nation 
building. Following the establishment of Turkmenistan SSR, the ‗Turkmen 
nation‘ met Stalin‘s four criteria of nationhood: unity of language, territory, 
economy, and historical culture.
361
 Turkmen nation building, however, was not 
consolidated in the Soviet era.  During that period, the Turkmen nation 
continued to be ‗a tribal confederation rather than a modern nation‘, mainly 
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because of the persistence of endogamy and dialect between tribes.
362
 One of 
the main reasons of the remaining efficacy of tribal identities vis-a-vis the 
national one was the internal contradiction of Soviet identity policies.  
Moscow, on the one hand, tried to create national identities in Central Asia to 
destroy overarching Islamic and Turkestani identities,
363
 while on the other, it 
aimed to create Homo Sovieticus (pseudo-Latin for ―Soviet Man‖) , restricting 
national identities.
364
 In this regard, Moscow promoted Russian language and 
culture in Turkmenistan instead of authentic Turkmen values and prohibited 
nationalist studies and movements. Following the declaration of independence, 
Under the direction of Turkmenbashi, the Turkmen State initiated the nation 
building policy to fill the ideological vacuum, to maintain the source of 
legitimacy for the new nation-state, and to adapt to the international system. 
The governmental nation building policy has two main goals, the unity of 
Turkmen tribes and gradual socio-cultural de-Russification of Turkmenistan. 
These goals are pursued through promoting Turkmen as the vernacular 
language, using history writing and propaganda, controlling education, and 
channeling the media to transmit symbols and narratives. The development of 
Turkmen as the vernacular language both helps to maintain national 
homogeneity as a ‗national glue‘ extinguishing differences between tribal 
dialects and to weaken the influence of the Russian culture. Tribal identities, 
especially the five biggest ones, Teke, Yomut, Ersary, Salyr, and Saryk, are 
still influential in social life.
365
 The lack of a hierarchical mechanism and 
leadership within the tribes is a historical legacy,
366
 that weakens the current 
political roles and influences of the tribes. Although Turkmenbashi is from the 
Teke tribe, his tribal loyalty is not strong since he grew up in an orphanage. He 
does not seek the dominance of the culture of Teke, the biggest tribe that was 
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politically effective during the Soviet period.
367
 Turkmenbashi‘s goal is to 
create a shared Turkmen culture. He defines the governmental policy on the 
unity of tribes as ‗national revival‘ by returning to the real history and spiritual 
sources, rather than ‗nation building‘.368 According to him, what is happening 
in Turkmenistan is only the rediscovery of the forgotten national identity: ‗by 
forming an independent and totally neutral Turkmen state,  by uniting a number 
of tribes into a whole, we did not create a new nation; what we did was to 
return its national pivot, which used to be strong and powerful but has been 
shattered by the blows of the historical fate‘.369 In Turkmenistan, a new state, 
the media, and education are crucial to the advancement of the imagination of 
national identity.  Anderson‘s explanations are significant to understand 
whether Turkmen national identity is a perennial and fixed or a socially 
constructed phenomenon.  It is necessary to analyze the role of the state in 
Turkmen nation building.  For these reasons, governmental policies in 
Turkmenistan will be analyzed through the lens of four features: the 
development of vernacular language, the media, history writing, propaganda, 
and education. 
 
The development of Turkmen as the vernacular language-of-state is the main 
pillar of Turkmen nation building.  After the declaration of independence, a 
constitutional change made Turkmen the official language, reversing the 
linguistic degeneration of the Soviet period.
370
 Although Russian is still used in 
bureaucracy and daily life, as well as in the interethnic communication, but it is 
diminishing now.
371
 Turkmenbashi criticizes the widespread use of Russian and 
encourages its limitation. In October 1999, the state radio ceased its Russian 
language news broadcast.
372
 In July 2000, Turkmenbashi declared that all 
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officials must speak Turkmen.  He also fired Boris Shikhmuradov, his foreign 
minister since 1993, criticizing his knowledge of Turkmen.
373
 It is now popular 
to replace Russian names with Turkmen alternatives.  The administrative terms, 
such as oblast (province), rayon (district or small city), and kolhoz (farmer 
union) have been replaced with velayat, etrap and dayhan birlesigi.  Official 
slogans such as garas¸syzlyk (independence), bitaraplyk (neutrality), agzybirlik 
(solidarity), galkynys¸ (development) and the names of political institutions , 
e.g. ‗Halk Maslahaty‘ and the ‗Mejlis‘, are all selected from original Turkmen 
rather than Russian.  The development of Turkmen as the vernacular language 
also results in the decrease of tribal dialects.  Turkmen, especially as a written 
language, is spread nationwide to maintain national homogeneity as a ‗national 
glue‘ extinguishing differences between tribal dialects.  The media and the 
schools play key roles in this policy. 
 
Television, radio, and newspapers are important means of governmental nation 
building policy in Turkmenistan.  They focus on the propaganda of nationalism 
and on praising the President. Turkmenbashi is accepted as the main symbol of 
nation building representing national solidarity. On the main TV news 
programme, Watan Habarlar Geples¸igi (national news), there is almost no 
news except for the President‘s declarations or activities. The programme starts 
with a good wish and prayer for Turkmenbashi. When speaking about the 
President, the TV and radio commentators use epithets, such as compassionate, 
merciful, and esteemed.  Similarly, every day, large photos of Turkmenbashi 
cover the first page of all newspapers.
374
 In addition to media propaganda, 
hundreds of places and institutions have been named or renamed 
‗Turkmenbashi‘ all around Turkmenistan. Turkmenbashi‘s posters and 
sculptures decorate the main buildings of Ashgabat.  His picture also appears 
on the national currency, manat. Turkmenbashi shows respect for other 
national symbols, e.g. he kisses the flag on some memorial days, and 
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architectural structures, such as the Neutrality Arch, the Earthquake Memorial 
and the National Museum, have been constructed as tangible symbols of 
national identity. They are shown in TV broadcasts as the symbols of 
independent, permanently neutral, and rapidly developing Turkmenistan.  The 
Turkmenbashi Palace, for instance, is regularly represented on TV 
programmes. Historical figures are also used as the symbols of nation building.  
Magtymguly (1733–1797), for instance, became one of the significant symbols.  
He was not only a pious poet, but also a wise social leader.
375
 He tried to solve 
socio-political problems integrating Turkmen tribes.  He wrote in the Turkmen 
language, in folk manner and parts of his poems about tribal unity today appear 
on large billboards on avenue of Ashgabat: 
Bir suprada tayyar kylynsa as¸lar, 
Go teriler ol ykbaly Turkmenin! 
(If dinner is prepared in a shared table, 
The good fortune for Turkmens will appear!) 
 
 
Fig 8: (Manat) 
Source: http://aes.iupui.edu/rwise/countries/turkmenistan.html 
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 Fig 9: (Neutrality Arch) 
Source: http://dlewis.net/nik-archives/neutrality-arch-of-turkmenistan/ 
 
 
Fig 10: (Earthquake Memorial) 
Source: http://www.agefotostock.com/en/Stock-Images/Rights-Managed/YB6-1420823 
 
 
 Fig 11: (National Museum) 
Source: http://www.unesco.kz/heritagenet/tm/turkm_muz/ 
 
 
 
 
Fig 12: (Turkmenbashi Palace) 
Source: http://www.galenfrysinger.com/turkmenbashi.htm 
 
Slogans are crucial in the discourse of Turkmen nation building.  TV news, for 
instance, starts with the slogan of the President: ‗The 21st century will be the 
golden age of Turkmens!‘  The most widespread official motto, ‗Halk, Watan, 
Turkmenbas¸y‘ (People, Motherland, Turkmenbashi), can be seen in many 
places.  The propaganda of the President also appears as slogans on highways, 
e.g. Presidentin¯ sozi kanundyr!  (The word of President is the law!).
376
 
Another important synthetic dimension of national identities in general is the 
narratives.
377
 Turkmen government creates narratives to promote the 
imagination of national identity.  The main narrative is baki bitaraplyk 
(permanent neutrality), the main pillar of Turkmen foreign policy, which 
provides an example of interplay between identity and foreign policy in 
Turkmenistan.  The UN accepted the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan in 
1995.  Given the neutrality status, Turkmenistan is committed to peace-loving 
principles, refusing to maintain or produce weapons of mass destruction, to 
participate into military pacts and to start or to take side in military conflicts.
378
 
Television and radio broadcasts frequently repeat this phrase: ‗The first 
country, which is accepted as permanently neutral by the UN, is our fatherland 
Turkmenistan.  All Turkmens have the right to be proud of their fatherland.  
Therefore, it is compulsory for all of us to serve our fatherland.‘ Television and 
radio broadcasts, poems, songs and speeches praise garas¸syz, baki bitarap 
(independent and permanently neutral) Turkmenistan and its merhemetli 
(merciful) President.  Despite indoctrination, few Turkmens understand the 
political meaning of neutrality.  Some of them optimistically argue that because 
of its neutrality status, Turkmenistan cannot be invaded and it could become 
the regional centre of Central Asia.
379
 
 
One of the pillars of Turkmen nation building is the writing of history, which 
focuses on the transmission of national history in schools and by the media. 
Official Soviet history emphasized the civilizing and progressive mission of the 
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‗Big brother‘, Russia, and tried to suppress Turkmen nationalism.380 After 
1991, Turkmen history writing has focused on three issues: changing the Soviet 
paradigm, emphasizing unique Turkmen national history rather than shared 
Turkic history and maintaining national solidarity by uniting the history of 
tribes and regions.  According to Anderson, national history writing aims to 
emphasize some historical events, which consolidate national unity, as well as 
to omit some others, which might threaten national solidarity.  Turkmen history 
writing seeks these two aims.  It emphasizes historical events like the Goktepe 
War as a part of common national history, while omitting the clashes between 
tribes. National history writings generally include ‗golden ages‘, which provide 
a vision for future.  The ‗golden age‘ of Turkmen history writing was the era of 
the Seljuk Empire (1040–1194).  A large museum was built in Ashgabat to 
exhibit the remains of the Seljuk Empire as well as the history of independent 
Turkmenistan.  As a part of its history policy, many places, including the 
streets and institutes in Ashgabat, have been named or renamed after historical 
figures, such as Magtymguly, Azady (the father of Magtymguly, 1700–1760), 
and Gorogly (a legendary hero). Commemorative holidays are one of the main 
ways to celebrate national identities.
381
 Turkmenistan officially accepted many 
memorial days honouring national history.
382
 On these days, the media focuses 
on national and ethical values.  The comment of the official press about 
Goktepe War‘s Memorial Day is a good example of the official policy on 
history writing: January 12 is the most sorrowful date in Turkmen history.  
That day, 118 years ago, a tragic event took place near the walls of the ancient 
citadel, Goktepe.  The outnumbering tsarist colonial troops attacked the 
fortress. Everyone rose up to defend the fortress, homeland, and the nation‘s 
honour.  All the Turkmens from Mary, Lebap, Dashkhovuz, Balkan, and Ahal 
joined the battle against the invaders.  Since then January 12 has been a sacred 
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day for the Turkmen people.  The victims of the Goktepe battle were the 
soldiers of the tsar army too, executing the imperial will of Russia. The 
Presidential Decree on establishing the Memorial Day (dated December 8, 
1990) says that neither Turkmen nor Russian and other people are guilty in the 
Goktepe tragedy.  Conquerors‘ expansion is the true reason for the bloodshed.  
Independence, gained in the century-old search for freedom, gave the Turkmen 
people the right to know it, the genuine history of Motherland, and their own 
roots, to revere the memory of heroic ancestors.
383
 
 
This comment emphasizes several aspects of national history writing in 
Turkmenistan.  First, during the Soviet period, historical truth was hidden and, 
after the declaration of independence, ‗the genuine history‘ started to be taught. 
Second, the Russian invasion was ‗colonialist‘ and ‗imperialist‘.  Third, the 
Russian people are not guilty of that colonialism and there is no enmity among 
Turkmens towards Russians.
384
 Fourth, the Goktepe War was an ‗honourable‘ 
and ‗national‘ war.  Finally, the Goktepe War was the shared battle of 
Turkmens of all velayats (regions), rather than only Ahal velayat, where the 
Goktepe War occurred. Another important project of history writing is the 
planned book entitled Ruhnama (the soul book), which will include historical, 
cultural and other aspects of the ‗Turkmen soul‘.  Turkmenbashi has stated that 
‗Ruhnama will be the second landmark book of Turkmens (after the Quran)‘.385 
Ruhnama is also the name of Turkmenbashi‘s policy of cultural and spiritual 
revival.  This policy sometimes results in autocratic manipulation of historical 
facts.  For instance, in September 2000, Turkmenbashi ordered the destruction 
of 25,000 new histories textbooks, arguing that their authors had committed 
treason against the country‘s past by ignoring ‗the Turkmen origin and 
character‘ of Turkmenistan, overstating the role of other nations in its national 
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history and writing that Turkmens originated not in what is modern 
Turkmenistan but in the Altai mountains.  He criticized the authors as follows: 
‗You hardly mention the Turkmen people in your book.  You apparently did 
not listen to what I said in my speeches.‘386 Turkmenbashi and other Turkmen 
politicians, however, should not forget that ‗It is one thing to establish such 
traditions and ―discover‖ such history; it is quite another to ensure their lasting 
success and popular acceptance‘.387 
 
The Turkmen government focuses on the propaganda and indoctrination of 
national idealism and self-sacrifice to prevent egoistic tendencies, which are 
encouraged by severe economic problems.
388
 Turkmenbashi emphasizes the 
significance of the spread of national feeling as follows: ‗The country will 
flourish when each person in it, young or old, strongly develops the feeling of 
patriotism.‘389 Turkmenbashi has attempted to set up a direct relationship with 
citizens in order to ignite national consciousness by using such methods as a 
direct mail system and visits to urban and rural areas. Another source of contact 
between the President and citizens is dialogue meetings. The official press 
reported on one of these meetings in February 1999, describing it as a 
‗Presidential lesson of truth, courage, and love for the native land‘: Solving 
daily, hourly a lot of important public tasks, the President never forgets about 
this task too—to educate the people. He frankly says, ‗I could have put bread 
and butter on your table, but then nobody would like to work.  And who will 
develop and improve the land?‘ Silence is in the hall; a lofty truth is in the 
words of the leader. ‗We have to change our psychology‘, says the President, 
meaning the participants of the rural meeting and the people of the country. ‗To 
change the consciousnesses‘—what does this mean?  First of all, to learn to 
rely upon ourselves in everything—on our energy, will, love for the native land 
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and native people, beloved Motherland. When the hall in one breath 
pronounced the sacred oath of devotion to Motherland and President, not a 
shadow of doubt, no insincerity and falsity were in the voices of participants.
390
 
This ‗sacred oath‘ (kasem), which is recited each day in schools and frequently 
in public events, aims to consolidate the loyalty of citizens to the Turkmen 
nation and its President:  
 
Glorious Turkmenistan, my motherland, I would sacrifice my life for you! 
For the slightest evil against you, let my hand be lost! 
For the slightest slander about you, let my tongue be lost! 
At the moment of my betrayal, to my motherland, Turkmenistan, 
To my President, let my life be annihilated!
391
 
 
This oath reflects three governmental principles.  First, the Turkmen 
motherland, for which citizens could sacrifice their own life, and its President 
are glorified.  Second, collectivism is desired more than individualism.  Finally, 
the concepts of obedience and betrayal are understood in a monolithic and rigid 
manner. Education is crucial both to indoctrinate national imagination and 
feelings and to maintain social control.  There is a course called ‗The Policy of 
Turkmenbashi‘ taught in schools and universities, which aims to propagate 
official policies of national revival.  Turkmenbashi stresses the importance of 
patriotic and moral education.  In April 1999, for instance, he criticized the 
Minister of Education for his failure to attach satisfactory importance to these 
issues.
392
 Turkmen national education emphasizes the significance of 
citizenship to the members of the minorities.  One of the history course-books, 
for example, stresses ‗Dear students, you can be children of different nations, 
Turkmen, Uzbek, Russian, Kazak, Armenian, Belorussian, Azeri; but you are 
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all the young citizens of independent and neutral Turkmenistan.  Independent 
and neutral Turkmenistan is your country.‘393  
 
Nature of the State   
When Turkmenistan achieved its independence on October 27, 1991, the new 
independent Turkmen state under the leadership of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi 
did not bring freedom to the country but instead established one of the most 
isolated and authoritarian regimes of the contemporary world characterized by 
extremities and contradictions. The state, claiming to be the agent of revival, 
authenticity and emancipation against the notorious Soviet legacy; was indeed 
a political and structural continuation of the Turkmen SSR and was most of the 
time reproductive of Soviet-style socio-political modalities of public control 
and suppression, particularly regarding its authoritarianism, isolationism and 
intensive propaganda campaigns. The president of this state, claiming to be the 
father of the Turkmen; was not only among the most authoritarian leaders of 
the century but was also ignorant of the real social and economic needs of his 
people behind populist policies and investments. Despite the huge oil and gas 
reserves, Turkmen people could hardly make their livelihoods and were 
suffering from serious scarcities of basic public services.  The state was 
prosperous enough to construct public facilities like an ice-skating palace or a 
Disneyland, but it had to shut down all hospitals in rural areas to be able to 
finance the ones in the capital.
394
 Nevertheless, the future was painted in bright 
colours - as long as the Turkmen took the spiritual guidance of Ruhnama, the 
semi-religious book written by Turkmenbashi himself.  Beneath the surface, the 
peculiar regime of Turkmenbashi was a quest for his own self-survival against 
the challenges of an inherently fragmented social structure.  While he was 
benefiting from many traditional values and customs to justify his rule, the 
persistence of tribal identities over a unifying national identity was a challenge 
to legitimacy and continuity of his regime. The fragility of regime was pushing 
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for increased levels of suppression and oppression, which was in turn 
exacerbating the need for populist policies. 
 
Fig 13: (ice-skating palace) 
Source: http://oursurprisingworld.com/ashgabat-turkmenistanarchitectural-photo-part-3/ 
 
 
Niyazov’s Legacy 
Niyazov‘s more than twenty years in power set his country on a path towards 
self-destruction. Although its natural gas reserves provide great wealth, the 
regime used this to its own benefit, creating a cult of personality while 
systematically dismantling civil society, education, and health care.  Vast 
amounts of money from the export of hydrocarbons were kept locked away in 
special offshore accounts.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Turkmenistan quickly became one of the world‘s most isolationist and 
repressive states. Styling himself ‗Turkmenbashi‘ – ‗Leader of the Turkmen‘ – 
a title he later embellished with the epithets ‗Serdar‘ (Leader) and ‗Beyik‘ (the 
Great), Niyazov constructed a massive cult of personality.  His portrait was 
ubiquitous on banknotes, buildings and the corner of the screen of every 
television program broadcast by Turkmenistan‘s exclusively state-controlled 
television channels.  Most prominent was his fondness for erecting giant 
monuments to himself, including golden statues, sprawling palaces, two 
mosques, one accompanied by an enormous mausoleum dedicated to his family 
members in his native town of Gypchak.
395
 Niyazov renamed months of the 
year and days of the week.
396 
 He also inscribed his name on the landscape, 
renaming the Caspian Sea port city of Krasnovodsk Turkmenbashy in 1993. In 
2001, Niyazov published the Ruhnama (Book of the Spirit), which contained 
his musings on Turkmen history, culture, and traditions and soon became 
mandatory at all levels of education; those seeking driver‘s licenses or state 
employment were required to pass a test on the Ruhnama, which was also 
honoured as a month (September) and accorded a monument in the centre of 
Ashgabat. Phrases from it were inscribed beside Quranic verses on mosques. 
Niyazov said in 2006 that anyone who read his book three times was 
guaranteed to go to heaven. In 2004, he published a second volume of the 
Ruhnama, containing his poems. Casual statements by Niyazov – such as his 
reported dislike for the opera, lip synching during concerts, the wearing of 
beards and long hair by young men and of makeup by newscasters, and gold 
teeth – were haphazardly interpreted as law by officials anxious to ingratiate 
themselves with their leader.
397
 The foreign press often regarded such steps 
with amusement. However, the Niyazov personality cult was only the most 
visible manifestation of a stark fact: absolute power rested in his hands. He was 
simultaneously president and chairman of the Council of Ministers. His 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan was the only political party allowed, and all 
elected delegates to the two legislative bodies – the Halk Maslahaty, of which 
he was the head, and the Mejlis – belonged to it. Niyazov was well known for 
appointing and removing officials at all levels of government at a dizzying rate, 
with some remaining in office only a few months before being sacked – and in 
some cases sentenced to internal exile or lengthy prison terms for alleged 
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wrongdoings. His regular purges of the government, to which some of his 
closest supposed allies fell prey, kept many guessing as to who could possibly 
succeed him, even as he announced the possibility of presidential elections for 
2009.
398
   
 
Fig 14: (Ruhnama,) 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruhnama 
 
Religious Milieu 
The Turkic people in Turkmenistan are primarily Sunni Muslims. The current 
Muslim religious leader of Turkmenistan, headquartered in Chardzhou, is the 
Kazi-Imam Nasrulla Ibadullayev.  Although the former Soviet government 
promoted atheism as an official policy, and indeed attempted to destroy most 
religious practices, a religious revival has been underway since 1986, when the 
Soviet attitude toward Islam was relaxed. One consequence has been the 
increase of mosque construction. While there were only 4 officially recognized 
mosques in Turkmenistan in 1985, by June 1990, about 70 congregations 
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which had been operating underground or informally registered with the 
authorities as official Muslim congregations. These statistics only apply to 
mosques officially recognized by the government of Turkmenistan. Due to the 
decades-long ban on religious freedom, a number of `unofficial' mosques 
continue to exist; while their exact numbers are unknown, it is believed that 
they number in the hundreds. There are also a number of noted religious 
shrines in Turkmenistan, often cantered in Muslim graveyards or near tombs of 
prominent Muslims of the medieval period.
399
 The current government 
oversees ―official Islam‖ through a structure inherited from the Soviet period. 
Turkmenistan's Muslim Religious Board, together with that of Uzbekistan, 
constitutes the Muslim Religious Board of Mavarannahr. The Mavarannahr 
board is based in Tashkent and exerts considerable influence in appointments 
of religious leaders in Turkmenistan. The governing body of Islamic judges 
(Kaziat) is registered with the Turkmenistan Ministry of Justice, and a council 
of religious affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers monitors the activities of 
clergy. Individuals who wish to become members of the official clergy must 
attend official religious institutions; a few, however, may prove their 
qualifications simply by taking an examination. Some Turkmen do not 
regularly attend mosque services or demonstrate their adherence publicly, 
except through participation in officially sanctioned national traditions 
associated with Islam on a popular level, including life-cycle events such as 
weddings, burials, and pilgrimages.  However, since 1990, efforts have been 
made to regain some of the cultural heritage lost under Soviet rule. President 
Saparmurat Niyazov has ordered that basic Islamic principles be taught in 
public schools. More religious institutions, including religious schools and 
mosques, have appeared, many with the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Turkey. Religious classes are held in both schools and mosques, with 
instruction in Arabic language, the Quran, the hadith, and the history of Islam,
  
but Turkmenistan‘s government stresses its secular nature and its support of 
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freedom of religious belief, as embodied in the 1991 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and on Religious Organizations in the Turkmen Soviet Socialist 
Republic and institutionalized in the 1992 constitution. That document 
guarantees the separation of mosque and state; it also removes any legal basis 
for Islam to play a role in political life by prohibiting proselytizing, the 
dissemination of ‗unofficial‘ religious literature, discrimination based on 
religion, and the formation of religious political parties. In addition, the 
government reserves the right to appoint and dismiss anyone who teaches 
religious matters or who is a member of the clergy. Since independence, the 
Islamic leadership in Turkmenistan has been more assertive, but in large part, it 
still responds to government control. The official governing body of religious 
judges gave its official support to President Niyazov in the June 1992 elections. 
On the other hand, some Muslim leaders are opposed to the secular concept of 
government and especially to a government controlled by former communists. 
Some official leaders and teachers working outside the official structure have 
vowed to increase the population‘s knowledge of Islam, increase Islam‘s role in 
society, and broaden adherence to its tenets. Alarmed that such activism may 
alienate Orthodox Slavs, the government has drawn up plans to elevate the 
council of religious affairs to ministry status in an effort to regulate religious 
activities more tightly.
400
 It is the result that Turkmenistan has so far 
intriguingly remained unaffected by Islamic extremism spreading across the 
region. There have, of course, been several reports on the suppression of 
religious ideas and human rights by the autocratic government of President 
Niyazov. Arbitrary arrests, detentions and tortures in the prisons along with 
restrictions on freedom of movement through the draconian exit visa system 
have been reported extensively. These human rights violations have increased 
dramatically since 25 Nov, 2002, assassination attempt on President Niyazov. 
A large number of arrests especially of political opponents were reported after 
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the alleged assassination attempt.
401 
Such autocratic regimes are the rule rather 
than an exception in Central Asia. Turkmenistan‘s autocratic regime probably 
differs only in degrees from the repressive and centralised state systems under 
Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Emomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan, Askar 
Akayev in Kyrgyzstan and Nursultan Abish-uly Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. All 
of them are former members of the Soviet Communist Party and took over the 
leadership of their respective countries after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. Their regimes are intolerant of political dissent, have resorted to harsh 
and repressive measures to control ethnic and religious voices for more public 
space and exercise complete control over the media. However, such repressive 
policies have failed to prevent the inroads made by religious extremism in the 
other Central Asian States.
402
 The inability of the religious extremists to spread 
their activities to Turkmenistan so far cannot be attributed to its repressive 
policies alone. Niyazov has a natural aversion to religious fanaticism that 
would threaten his own political survival, but it is important to understand that 
he is not the sole arbiter of the secular ethos in Turkmenistan. In a region where 
the democratic state system remains elusive and radical religious ideas are 
gaining ground, Turkmenistan‘s religious and social systems have preserved 
the age old tribal and ethnic loyalties in a largely Muslim dominated country 
that has in turn effectively diluted the impact of radical Islam. The Turkmen 
identify more with their culture than with religion or nationality.
403
  The land 
between the Caspian sea and the Amu Darya, traditionally inhabited by the 
horse-breeding nomadic Turkmen tribes, has had a long history of being 
conquered by the Greeks, Romans, Seljuks and Turks and finally by the Tsarist 
regime of Russia. The proud Turkmen people struggled against their aggressors 
and managed to retain their pride through their strong cultural ethos and ethnic 
identities. The different Turkmen tribes are known to have lived in harmony 
through the ages. While the state strictly adheres to secularisation of public 
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spaces and enforces it by limiting activities of non-registered religious 
congregations, by prohibiting them from gathering publicly and proselytizing 
and disseminating religious material, the centuries old tribal loyalties have also 
softened the impact of religion in Turkmenistan. Even the most urbane 
Turkmen has a tribal allegiance and tribalism is visible in their dialects, styles 
of clothing, eating habits etc. Clan based loyalties in Turkmenistan do not come 
together with the Westphalian notion of a nation state. The plurality of the 
Turkmen way of life is also visible in its dominant religion. Islam in 
Turkmenistan did not arrive as a monolithic entity imported from the Arabian 
Peninsula through militarised and forced conversions. The Sufi saints from the 
10
th
 century onwards travelled everywhere into the heartland of Eurasia and 
incorporated the Islamic teachings into the tribal belief systems of the nomadic 
Turkmen tribes.
404
  These saints were later adopted as the patron saints of 
particular clans or tribal groups thereby becoming their founders. The teachings 
of Sufi ‗Sheikhs‘ or saints are accorded more importance in religious beliefs in 
Turkmenistan than the mosques and the high, written Quranic tradition.
405
 Thus 
Islam has a much localised identity. This is also visible in its national symbol 
which depicts the synthesis between Islamic and tribal identities. The national 
symbol is a horse with five carpet patterns representing the five main tribes of 
Turkmenistan. This pattern is headed by an Islamic crescent and 5 stars 
representing the five ‗velayats‘ or provinces of the country.406 Finally, in a 
country where ‗religion is not the state but the state is religion‘, there is more to 
its politics, society and religion, than the 35 feet high golden statue of 
Turkmenbashi, positioned on the arch of neutrality, rotating around the sun, 
and his eccentric laws against growing beards and hair. 
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Separation of Politics and Religion 
The independent government has declared a secular society, with separation of 
mosque and state. During the Soviet period, official Muslim affairs were 
administered by the Spiritual Administration for Muslims of Central Asia in 
Tashkent. At that time, the Spiritual Administration appointed a Qazi to 
supervise Islam in each republic. In Turkmenistan, the Qaziate is located in 
Chardzhou. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Muslim spiritual 
administrations collapsed also. On June 1, 1992, the Qazi Hajji Nasrullah ibn 
Ibadulla officially registered the Qaziate of Turkmenistan with the Turkmen 
Ministry of Justice. The condition under which it was registered was that 
Ministry of Justice officials maintain a working relationship with the religious 
representatives."
407
 According to Article 6 of Turkmenistan's Constitution, 
religious practices are free, but private religious instruction is forbidden.
408
 
There are also other conditions placed on the practice of religion. Under Article 
3, which guarantees freedom of conscience, it is stated, ―exercising the freedom 
to profess a religion or other convictions is subject only to those restrictions 
which are necessary to safeguard public safety and order, life and health of the 
people, and morale.‖409 The vagueness of the wording permits the government 
enormous latitude in interpreting the concepts of public safety and order, 
morale, etc. The Turkmenistan Government Council for Religious Affairs is the 
final arbiter of religious activity in Turkmenistan. Following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, various forms of missionary activity began to be conducted. In 
line with the prevention of the uses of religions for the purpose of anti-state and 
anti constitutional propaganda, spelled out in Turkmenistan‘s law on ―Freedom 
of Worship and Religious Organizations,‖ a member of the Council for 
Religious Affairs has noted, ―missionary activity is, in fact, illegal.‖410 This 
limitation applies to both Muslim and non-Muslim religious activity. 
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Society of Turkmenistan 
Independent Turkmenistan under the rule of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi was a 
rigidly closed society whose interaction with the outside world was strictly 
controlled by any possible means restricting the flow of information and people 
both inwards and outwards.  All institutions and facilities of mass media were 
financed by the state and their content was shaped in accordance with official 
discourse and government policies.  Internet access was severely limited, and 
when it was accessible, the flow of content was closely monitored by the state. 
Means of private communication, such as telephone calls and fax 
transmissions, were also under record.  Foreigners, were hardly admitted visa 
upon invitation letters from Turkmen citizens or institutions, were regarded as 
potential agents of both espionage and missionaries and therefore received a 
particular KNB attention.  In addition to the tight visa regime, which Turkmen 
government employed for the foreigners, it was equally difficult for a Turkmen 
citizen to receive an exit visa, which had to be issued upon a cabinet 
decision.
411 
Reinforced by Soviet-fashioned policies and institutions, the extent 
of isolationism and government control makes it very difficult to assess the real 
extent of Turkmenbashi‘s authoritarianism and its effects upon the country.  
However, the apparent face of policies carried out by Turkmenbashi and their 
outcomes were striking enough to give an idea about arbitrariness of his rule at 
the expense of social and economic development of his people. The 
authoritarian regime of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi was generously financed by 
the oil and natural gas revenues of the country, which possesses the fourth 
biggest natural gas reserves in the world after Russia, the United States and 
Canada.
412
 Although exports of oil and gas did not bring back tangible benefits 
during the Soviet rule, they made Turkmenistan, together with Russia, a net 
donor of transfers among the union republics and therefore let the successor 
Turkmen state leave the union as the only ex-Soviet republic that did not have 
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any debt to Russia.
413
 After the independence, energy sector continued to 
dominate the overall economic production of independent Turkmenistan, while 
state preserved the monopoly on both the ownership and revenues of gas and 
oil resources. Accordingly, Turkmenbashi‘s regime was able to provide public 
services including almost-free supply of water and energy without demanding 
taxes from the citizens, besides engaging in many other populist investments 
such as reconstructing the capital in marble and gold together with magnificent 
public facilities including an ice-skating palace, olympic swimming facilities, 
and a Disneyland.  Furthermore, rich oil and gas deposits also favoured 
Turkmenbashi respectful treatment from foreign governments in spite of the 
notorious human-rights crimes of his regime, and thus enhanced his hand to 
advance his authoritarian policies even more.
414
 Despite the wealth acquired 
through oil and gas revenues, most of the population remained in poverty. 
Although the official statements recognized only 1% of the population as living 
in poverty, according to the World Bank 44% of the population had to maintain 
their livelihoods with earnings less than $2 per day.
415
 The agricultural sector, 
which was the major provider of employment opportunities together with the 
public services sector, remained heavily controlled through a centralized 
structure which dictated cultivation of cotton and wheat crops to meet 
particular quotas while providing inputs and subsidies for this end. However, 
the requirement to sell the harvest in officially set prices left the farmers with 
annual incomes of around $100.  Overall unemployment was estimated at over 
70% and aggravated by public-sector layoffs.
416
 Even more exacerbating the 
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situation, in 2006, Turkmenbashi considered pension allowances, which were 
often below $20 per month, to be excessive and suspended all pension 
payments until they were recalculated according to new rules. According to the 
ministry for Social Welfare Provision, the new regulations would result in a cut 
down in pensions of 200,000 people while it would totally deprive 100,000 
people of their pension rights by declaring them ineligible.
417
 Moreover, in 
Turkmenbashi‘s Turkmenistan, most of the population did not have access to 
proper health services while the public education system of the country 
collapsed. Policies carried out by Turkmenbashi regime regarding these two 
vital public services was rather destructive of what had been inherited from the 
Soviet era instead of aiming at their modernization and improvement.  Public 
health policies of Turkmenbashi were mainly focused on restricting both 
availability and the quality of the overall medical services with an excuse of 
funding scarcities.  In 1997, he ordered the closure of rural hospitals and 
suggested the rural people to go to the capital city for treatment.
418
 He argued 
that this policy would provide them a better care in the capital through 
redirecting all the funds to the centre to establish strengthened medical 
facilities.  Following his orders, most hospitals outside the capital were closed 
and few remaining ones were suffering from lack of staff, equipment, and 
medicines.  Thousands of rural people lost their lives due to treatable illnesses 
such as tuberculosis; however, it led to no tangible improvement of health 
services. In contrast, Turkmenbashi announced further health reforms in 2006, 
including dismissal of an estimated 15,000 healthcare workers and employing 
military conscripts in their place.
419
 Remaining health services were made even 
more inaccessible by adding new charges.
420
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Education 
Education system of the country was equally malfunctioning. For 
Turkmenbashi, the primary function of public education was political 
indoctrination. Intellectual development of individuals was regarded of lesser 
importance, if not openly declared undesirable for the regime. Accordingly, 
basic education was reduced to nine years. In the autumns, students were 
frequently employed in the cotton fields for harvesting
 421 
and a great 
proportion of schooling time was devoted to getting prepared for ceremonies to 
celebrate national days and official events, which were abundant. Finally, the 
remaining lecture hours had to be divided between learning passages from 
Ruhnama, the semi-religious book written by Saparmurat Turkmenbashi 
himself, and the rest of the curriculum. As a result, the basic education received 
by the new generation, which constituted almost half of the population, was far 
below being adequate to enable development of a sufficient level of general 
knowledge and critical thinking.
422
 The higher education system similarly 
collapsed. The duration of graduate programs was reduced from four years to 
two years, and enrolment was cut down to a tenth of the pre-independence 
figure.
423
 Standards of education were so poor that diplomas were unacceptable 
abroad. In order to prevent Turkmen students being influenced by foreign 
ideas, their possibilities to study abroad were remarkably reduced as well, and, 
upon Turkmenbashi‘s orders, foreign degrees were not recognized within the 
borders of Turkmenistan.
424 
 
 
Meanwhile, the arbitrary and despotic policies of Turkmenbashi were 
infiltrating almost any dimension of the social life. After he had to quit 
smoking because of his health problems in 1997, he ordered prohibition of 
smoking in all public places.
425
 A decree issued in February 2004 banned 
young men from having long hair or beard. Some other interventions in social 
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life were the ban of opera, ballet and circus which was supposed to be 
incompatible with Turkmen culture, and listening to the radio while driving.
426
 
Most of the time, these political decisions were simply random without 
following a certain logical framework or sequence. Even more concerning was 
the restrictions upon basic rights and freedoms. Turkmenbashi‘s regime was 
declared as ―one of the most repressive and abusive governments in the world‖ 
in records of many human rights organizations.
427
 The basic rights recognized 
by the constitution were never put into practice. Ethnic and religious minorities 
were under a harsher pressure, while every Turkmen citizen was closely 
watched by KNB. Movement of the citizens within the country was strictly 
limited to reinforce KNB control over the people. Internal visas were required 
particularly when travelling to border regions, though movement of the citizens 
were traced and controlled by countrywide checkpoints located at the exit and 
entrance points of all towns and cities. Working and living in a city different 
form the registered residence, which was based on the birthplace and 
occasionally allowed to be changed, was discouraged and bound to special 
permission. Although Turkmenbashi succeeded in maintaining his rule through 
enhanced means and policies of suppression and oppression, regime‘s 
legitimacy remained quite low and was further diminished in respect to serious 
social and economic problems persisting over years. Like many other rentier 
systems, Turkmenbashi sought to make up for the deficiencies through 
enhancing his investments in populist projects and public campaigns.
428 
 
 
Health Care Sector 
Health care is likewise on the verge of a grave crisis.
429
 Like the education 
sector, it has been stripped of much of its funding; a December 2004 decree in 
effect privatized the system, requiring that local hospitals and clinics fund 
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themselves. At the same time, Niyazov spent millions to ensure his own access 
to the latest medical treatments; it is not clear whether he paid for this out of his 
own pockets or from state coffers. The results of the privatization decision have 
been catastrophic. Patients now have to pay half the costs at the point of 
delivery (with the other 50% from medical insurance). Rural clinics have been 
downgraded and now have only one trained doctor – if any. District hospitals 
have been shut, so patients must travel to regional hospitals. Even there are 
number of specialist services, which have been withdrawn and are now only 
available in Ashgabat.
430
 In stark contrast to these massive spending cuts, the 
new ministry of health building in the capital is a futuristic $12 million 
creation, though it has been characterized as merely a ‗facade‘.431 The 
deformed ‗free-market‘ health-care system also gives specialist doctors an 
interest in prescribing expensive procedures from which they make substantial 
profits. At the same time, the wages of anesthetists, nurses and general 
surgeons have fallen.
432
 Corruption has led to reduce vaccination rates, since 
funds meant to procure supplies are often diverted.
433
 It is extremely difficult to 
get accurate information about the state of health care due to the government‘s 
refusal even to admit that there are a number of serious diseases in the country. 
The Turkmen Helsinki Fund reported the suppression of information about 
cases of aids, typhoid, plague, tuberculosis, anthrax and cholera. Doctors are 
ordered to diagnose such diseases as minor ailments.
434
 The approach is 
potentially catastrophic one in an area of the world where rates of HIV/AIDS 
infection and tuberculosis (including multiple drug resistant forms) are growing 
rapidly. A recent ministry of health decree ordered the compulsory redundancy 
of all doctors over pensionable age. Pension cuts mean they will receive very 
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few benefits.
435
 Many Turkmen leave the country for treatment in neighbouring 
Uzbekistan.
436
 Some doctors who have lost their jobs have gone there or as far 
away as Russia.
437
 
 
Human Rights 
The human rights record under Niyazov was one of the most abysmal in the 
world. Freedom of movement of citizens was severely restricted, both inside 
and outside the country, with thousands on an official blacklist that denied the 
right to travel abroad.
438
 Religious freedom was severely restricted.
439
 Ethnic 
minorities (mostly Russians and Uzbeks, but also including smaller numbers of 
Kazakhs, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Iranians, and Baluchis) were in effect 
subjected to forced Turkmenification, denied native language education and 
required to dress in Turkmen national dress and observe Turkmen customs.
440
 
Access to information was tightly limited; no independent media was 
permitted, and the internet was available only through a single government 
provider and closely monitored. Property rights were regularly violated; entire 
residential neighbourhoods of Ashgabat and other cities were routinely 
destroyed to make way for Niyazov‘s massive construction projects, often with 
little or no warning or compensation for those displaced.
441
 Prisoners of 
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conscience swell the prison population, and were often held in remote, isolated 
jails with no hope of family contact.
442
 Forced confinement in psychiatric 
institutions for regime opponents, a holdover from Soviet times, was widely 
employed.
443
 Torture and drugging with psychotropic substances were common 
means of extracting confessions from suspects.
444
 A wave of repression 
following an apparent coup attempt in November 2002
445
 moved the OSCE to 
invoke its rarely-used ‗Moscow Mechanism‘, which allows creation of an 
adhoc commission of independent experts to investigate human security issues 
in a member state. Professor Emmanuel Decaux, reporter for the OSCE‘s 
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, produced a 53-page 
report but was not allowed to visit Turkmenistan to complete his work.
446
 
Moreover; the case of three journalists and human rights activists – 
Annakurban Amankylychev, Sapardurdy Hajiyev and Ogulsapar Muradova – 
has attracted particular attention in the West. Their arrests in June 2006 came 
as Niyazov announced he had uncovered a vast spy ring, including the OSCE 
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and the French embassy in Ashgabat. The three had been assisting a group of 
French journalists preparing a documentary on Turkmenistan. Muradova, 58, a 
correspondent for RFE/RL‘s Turkmen service, was apparently tortured to death 
in custody in September. Amankylychev and Hajiyev were each sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment; their current whereabouts and health are unknown. 
 
Economy 
The domestic economy is in deep crisis. While government figures have 
consistently shown a growth in annual GDP of over 20%,
447
 the Economist 
Intelligence Unit estimates the real rate was 6% in 2005 and again in 2006.
448
 
However, even this primarily represents profits from the export of 
hydrocarbons. The exact amount of Turkmenistan‘s hydrocarbon reserves, 
particularly natural gas, is a closely kept secret, as is the amount of money 
generated by their export. The Russian giant, Gazprom, which then sells it to 
Ukraine and Western Europe, purchases virtually all the gas. Proposals to build 
a pipeline linking Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan received only lukewarm support 
from Niyazov, who in effect controlled all gas and oil deals himself.
449
 Their 
profits went into the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund and the Oil and Gas 
Fund, controlled by Niyazov and senior ministers and used for personal gain 
and grandiose projects.
450 
The isolation of the hydrocarbon sector from the rest 
of the economy has meant that its revenues have not benefited the people of the 
country: 
 The infant mortality rate of 80 per 1,000 live births is similar to that of 
Pakistan (80) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (81), despite the fact 
that Turkmenistan has a per capita income more than twice that of the 
former and nearly five times that of the latter.
451 
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 Turkmenistan ranked 105th out of 177 countries on the UN Human 
Development Index (HDI) in 2006, down from 83 as recently as 2001, 
when oil and gas revenues were substantially lower.
452 
 GDP per capita peaked in 1988 at $6,585. In 2004, it was $4,584,453 despite 
the great increase in oil and gas revenues, indicating that actual earnings of 
average citizens have declined substantially. While living standards in 
Ashgabat and other urban centers are good by Central Asian standards, life 
in rural communities has grown steadily worse. Transparency International 
rates Turkmenistan as the third most corrupt country in the world.
454
 Mass 
layoffs in the education and healthcare systems and even the energy sector 
have led to unemployment. Military conscripts are often used as free labour 
to fill the gaps.
455
 Foreign investment has fallen steadily; the EIU estimated 
a 10 % reduction in 2005. There is an ongoing process of demonetization, 
particularly in rural areas, where shortages of cash have led to a rise in 
barter among state enterprises and the public.
456
 In February 2006, Niyazov 
added to the economic misery by cancelling the pensions of 100,000, as 
well as ending maternity and sick leave payments.
457 
 
The agricultural sector is likewise in a state of disarray. Though a limited land 
reform has been in place, by and large farmers can only grow the two most 
important crops – wheat and cotton – subject to state orders: the state decides 
how much of each crop shall be planted, by whom, and when, and it is the sole 
purchaser of the harvest, at a low price. As a consequence of poor planning and 
a lack of incentives for farmers to produce, crop yields have been devastatingly 
low in recent years. One example is the wheat harvest of 2005. In July it was 
reported at 3.1 million tons, a record and easily enough to feed the entire 
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population.
458 
However, by November, massive shortages and huge price 
increases were reported for flour all over the country. The discrepancy was 
widely attributed to officials‘ fear at admitting they had not met targets.459 The 
agricultural crisis continued into 2006, when Niyazov‘s admission of a poor 
harvest caused panic buying of flour that drove prices up by a reported 25 %.
460
 
The major export crop is cotton, though harvest failures, coupled with the 
growth in gas prices, reduced its share of export earnings for 2005 to an 
estimated 1%.
461
 As in other Central Asian countries, the cotton industry causes 
widespread political, economic, social and environmental problems.
462
 The 
estimated harvest for 2005 was around 720,000 tons, about a third of the 
official target.
463
 In October 2005, a number of officials were sacked for failing 
to reach that target.
464
 The disastrous 2006 harvest yielded less than half the 
planned two million tons, and the governors of all five provinces were fired.
465
 
The government continues to import modern agricultural technology: a $55 
million contract was signed with the U.S. Case Corporation on 15 August 
2006.
466
 However, Turkmen sources note that one reason for the low yields is 
that expensive foreign harvesting technology generally stands idle, as nobody 
has the skills to use it. Children were still manually harvesting cotton in the 
fields for two months of the school year in 2005.
467
 Child labour was also used 
in the 2006 harvest, in violation of a 2005 law banning the practice.
468
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Islam on the Eve of Independence 
The Soviet Union disintegrated suddenly, without warning or preparation, at 
the end of 1991. In Central Asia, Islam was still largely a marker of a cultural 
identity. The vast majority of the population still had very little knowledge of 
the doctrines and practices of faith. Yet there was by this time a palpable sense 
of pride in the region‘s Muslim heritage and preparedness - almost expectancy 
- that Islam would assume an increasingly important role in public life. This is 
indeed what happened in the early years of independence. Since independence, 
there has been a revival of Islam. The number of mosques has increased from 4 
to 398. Still, most Turkmen do not attend mosque services on a regular basis or 
demonstrate adherence to the faith publicly except in such life passage public 
events as weddings, funerals and burials. They have long been regarded as 
practicing a form of ―folk Islam‖ rather than the stricter variant observed in 
Middle Eastern countries. This determination is based partly on the number of 
rituals Turkmen perform which do not have their origins in Islam.  For 
example, Shrine or holy site worship remains an important part of daily life 
despite the fact that veneration of saints (in the place of God) is not permitted 
according to Islamic teaching. Many Turkmen, particularly residents of rural 
areas, continue to pray at shrines through appeals to its patron saint.
469
 In 
addition, the concept of the ―evil eye‖ is an important one in Turkmenistan. 
Due to which bazaars are full of goods marketed to ward off the evil eye. Most 
accidents, which do not have an obvious cause, are attributed to the powers of 
the evil eye. As a precaution, Turkmen hang a shrub with spherical twigs over 
their doorways that are thought to have the power to ward off the effects of this 
unwelcome spirit.
470
 
 
Post-Soviet Islamization  
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused massive social and economic 
dislocation in the Central Asian states. It also created a psychological vacuum, 
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raising the specter of societal implosion. In an effort to counter this threat, the 
ruling elites (who had all come to power under the patronage of the Soviet 
system) moved swiftly to promote Islam as the basis of new ―state ideologies‖. 
Party officials throughout the region began to distance themselves from 
Communist doctrine and use Islam as a means of furnishing themselves with an 
alternative, national source of legitimization. Public opinion was mobilized 
through articles in the press and the pronouncements of leading public figures 
that emphasized the need for a return to Islamic ethics. President Saparmurat 
Niyazov of Turkmenistan, Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and Karimov of Uzbekistan 
took their respective oaths of office on both the Quran and the Constitution to 
underline the dual importance of religion and law in society. The following 
year President Niyazov proposed that the new Turkmen Constitution should 
reflect the moral values of Islam. In Uzbekistan, in the immediate aftermath of 
independence, President Karimov reputedly went so far as to promise to 
establish an Islamic state. Over the next few years, all the Presidents of the 
Central Asian states performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. There was a new 
sensitivity (at least in public) regarding the observance of dietary prohibitions; 
Islamic gestures (e.g. the downward stroking of the face) and pious utterances, 
once confined to the private sphere, became a regular feature of public 
discourse. During Ramadan, it became acceptable to admit to keep the fast. 
 
In all the Central Asian states, the separation of mosque and state was 
enshrined in the new, post-Soviet constitutions. Yet the promotion of Islam by 
some of the presidents intensified to the point where it began to threaten this 
principle. Thus, for example, as early as 1994, a Turkmen academic 
commented, ―Islam in Turkmenistan will be what the president wants it to 
be.‖471 In the other states, too, there were indications of a blurring of the 
boundaries between secular and religious authorities. In all the Central Asian 
states, the form of Islam that is propagated by the government sponsored 
religious bodies is orthodox Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. 
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However, the sphere of application is strictly limited. The introduction of 
sharia law (Muslim canon law) into the legal framework of these states is not 
under consideration. The main concern of the government is to promote ―good‖ 
Islam, regarded as beneficial to the development of the state; and to eliminate 
―bad‖ Islam. ―Bad‖ Islam, it is emphasized is to blame for the conflicts in 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Yet, there is no public debate in any of the Central 
Asian countries as to the criteria that determine ―good‖ and ―bad‖ Islam. Thus, 
the dividing line tends to be drawn arbitrarily. For example, men who grow 
beards (a traditional Muslim sign of piety) and women who wear Islamic-style 
dress are regarded with suspicion, particularly in Uzbekistan and same is the 
case with Turkmenistan, where women wearing headscarves and men with 
beards were banned from state universities in 1997.
472
 Yet the making of pious 
gestures in public (such as the downward stroking of the face) is considered 
acceptable. Most people seem prepared to accept these anomalies without 
question (or at least without openly voicing reservations). This may be out of 
fear, but it is noteworthy that even educated Turkmen Muslims show an almost 
total absence of curiosity regarding modern debates on Islam. There is still a 
striking lack of intellectual engagement with Islam. There are no Turkmen 
Muslim thinkers expounding a coherent vision of Islam. Equally, there is 
virtually no awareness of the existence of contemporary thought in other parts 
of the Islamic world. The writings of Mohammed Arkoun, Rashid al-Ghangohi, 
Taha Husayn, Imam Khomeini, Abul A‘la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Fazlur 
Rahman, Zia Sardar and Ali Shariati, to mention but a handful, are almost 
entirely unknown. 
 
Re-Creating an Islamic Infrastructure 
In the immediate aftermath of independence, the re-instatement of mosques, 
centers of worship and community life became a priority. In Turkmenistan, for 
example, there were only four mosques open for worship in the 1980s; by 1994 
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there were 181 and 100 more were at the planning stage.
473
 Schools and 
voluntary bodies began to teach the Arabic script and give instruction in 
reading the Quran. The numerous Madrasas and Islamic centers that began to 
appear throughout the region provided opportunities for more advanced 
Muslim education. Particular attention was paid to the provision of training for 
girls. Madrasa courses for women were opened in many places. ―Leagues of 
Muslim Women‖ were established in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
(though most disintegrated within a few months) but not in Turkmenistan. The 
physical proximity of places of worship encouraged people to attend services 
on a regular basis, and in the early 1990s mosque congregations grew rapidly. 
However, by 1994, the novelty had begun to fade, and a marked drop in 
attendance was observed throughout the region. Moreover, Madrasa entrants 
were not always motivated by a desire to pursue religious studies; some were 
more interested in benefiting from the free tuition in Arabic and other 
languages in order to improve their prospects in business. Nevertheless, there 
has been a gradual but distinct rise in numbers of those who profess a genuine 
devotion to Islam. Some researchers believe that this trend is to be found 
mainly in villages, among males in the 17 to 25 year old age group. Others 
insist that it is more typical of the emerging entrepreneurial class and of 
university students. The institutional control of Islamic activities in Central 
Asia today largely follows the Soviet model. The chief difference is that 
separate national administrations (Muftiats) have now replaced the Soviet-era 
unified administration (i.e. the former Muslim Board of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan). The work of these Muftiats is closely monitored by a Committee 
or Council for Religious Affairs, a body that serves as the interface between the 
government and the religious communities - another Soviet-era survival. 
Nevertheless, in Turkmenistan, the Muftiat and the Committee have virtually 
merged into a single entity, as the Chairman of the latter body is the Deputy 
Mufti, while the Mufti is Deputy Chairman of the Committee. The interests of 
Muslims as well as adherents of other established faiths - chiefly Orthodox 
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Christianity and Judaism - are officially represented in these 
Committees/Councils. The ‗non-traditional‘ faiths such as Bahais, Pentecostals 
and Jehovahs Witnesses are regarded with suspicion and given little 
opportunity for official representation. Laws regulating freedom of conscience 
obligations and responsibilities of religious organizations have been passed in 
all the Central Asian states. Political parties of a religious orientation are 
proscribed everywhere except in Tajikistan, where the IRF, outlawed in 1993, 
was in mid-1999 legalized again in the run-up to parliamentary elections. The 
new national Muslim administrations are responsible for the formal 
examination and registration of the ulma. Unregistered preachers are liable to 
criminal prosecution. The ostensible aim of registration is to disbar unqualified 
individuals from holding religious posts. At the same time, registration enables 
the state authorities to keep a close check on the ideological orientation of the 
religious establishment. Clerics, who hold views that do not conform to the 
official line, or who are felt to be lacking in loyalty to the government, can be 
excluded from the system or exiled from the country.  
 
Muslim Missionaries 
The main external influence on Central Asian Islam in recent years has been 
that of visiting missionaries. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
they arrived from many parts of the Muslim world to preach and to open 
schools. At first, they were welcomed, but gradually resentment and suspicion 
set in. Ordinary believers objected to attempts to replace local customs by more 
orthodox procedures (in Kyrgyzstan, for example, foreign missionaries were 
shocked by the traditional funeral rites, which they regarded as pagan rather 
than Islamic). The state authorities were equally displeased by the introduction 
of alien ideas and practices. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the first to 
impose restrictions on Muslim missionaries from abroad. Similar concerns 
emerged in the other states and throughout Central Asia, the activities of 
foreign Muslims are now carefully monitored. Foreign commentators initially 
expected that Iran would play the leading role in the re-Islamization of Central 
Asia. In fact, Iranian clerics have been conspicuous largely by their absence. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, delegations from Iran began to visit the 
Central Asian states and to acquire firsthand familiarity with the region. They 
soon realized that an Islamic revolution along the lines of the Iranian model 
was not a realistic prospect. This was partly because of very low level of 
knowledge of Islam among the population at large, but more especially because 
of the lack of a trained, independent-minded ulma. The fact that the Iranians 
represent the Shia tradition also placed them at a disadvantage. By contrast, 
Sunni Muslim missionaries were active from the first years of independence. 
Turkish missionaries have played a special role in Central Asia. According to 
Kyrgyz official statistics, for example, there were 55 Turkish Muslim 
missionaries in the country in 1999; missionaries from Pakistan, the second 
largest group, numbered less than 40.
474
 The great majority of the Turkish 
missionaries were Nurcus, followers of Said Nursi and of his disciple Fethulla 
Gulen. The Nurcus opened many schools and commercial enterprises in the 
Central Asian states. Their teaching programmes concentrated on scientific 
subjects, technical skills, and they appeared to be advocating a moderate, 
modernized form of Islam. However, their extra-curricular activities conveyed 
a more radical message. There were increasing concerns that their ultimate 
political project was the creation of an Islamic state. The Turkmen authorities 
have since claimed that some of the Central Asian students who studied in 
Turkey received ‗terrorist training‘. The Turkish missionaries are also accused 
of having a pan-Turkic agenda. As a result of such suspicions, their newspaper 
Zaman (Time) was banned; several Turkish teachers were expelled at around 
the same time. In other Central Asian states, a similar sense of unease is 
emerging concerning the activities of this group; their work is now being more 
closely monitored, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
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Revival of Islam                 
In much of Central Asia, the broad process of re-Islamization that took place in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was accompanied by the emergence of political 
movements that espoused a greater adherence to Islamic tenets. In 
Turkmenistan, however, there has been no movement to introduce elements of 
Sharia or to establish parties based on Islamic principles. The vast majority of 
the population prefers to disassociate religion from politics altogether, and 
would be unlikely to lend any support to replace secular rule with religious 
rule, especially if it were to involve a political struggle. Perhaps more than any 
other factor, the desire to perpetuate religious beliefs and practices that are 
widely regarded as ‗national‘ traditions in Turkmenistan has disempowered 
Islamism—an ideology calling for change—as a potent force for social 
mobilization. Turkmens generally view Islam as a crucial part of national 
culture, encompassing a set of local customs that sets them apart from 
outsiders. As such, Islam has a significant secular component that has made it 
relatively immune to politicization and the penetration of Islamist ideologies. 
‗Folk‘ Islam (Islam-i halq) rather than orthodox Islam (Islam-i kitab) is 
dominant, and is primarily concerned with the celebration of life cycle rituals, 
the observation of the principle of sacrifice and the preservation of mystical 
beliefs. The practice of shrine pilgrimage (ziyarat) is at the heart of Islam in 
Turkmenistan. To be sure, some of the most widespread practices among 
Turkmen believers are considered heretical by purist Muslims, such as warding 
off the evil eye by plants and amulets or performing pilgrimages to the graves 
of local Sufi saints. As Central Asian expert Ahmed Rashid pointed out, 
fundamentalists have criticized Sufi followers to little avail for diverging from 
the commands of the Quran and tolerating non-Islamic influences.
475
 The 
inherent tension between folk Islam and an Islamist ideology that calls for 
greater orthodoxy has served to bewilder any potential popular support for the 
latter. Despite the apparent dearth of Islamist activity, the closed nature of 
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polity and society in Turkmenistan has made it difficult to ascertain the 
presence or absence of Islamist groups, and has given rise to speculation that 
Islamist activity may exist within the former Soviet republic. For example, 
official reports on an unexpectedly fierce two-day battle that broke out in a 
northern suburb of Ashgabat in September 2008 provided little information, 
prompting Russian media and some Western wire services to make 
unconfirmed assertions that the violence was instigated by Islamist 
extremists.
476
 Similarly, despite reports that the Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
has won converts in Turkmenistan‘s labor camps and prisons, a significance 
presence in the country has yet to be established.
477
 
 
In addition to the popular nature of Islam, the durable changes to religious 
practice experienced by the population during the Soviet period provides a 
second explanation for the limited appeal of Islamist groups in Turkmenistan. 
Some analysts have argued that the Soviet legacy is the key factor hindering 
the present-day development of Islamism in Central Asia, given that the region 
was isolated from the rest of the Muslim world—including its intellectual 
centers—for more than seventy years.478 During Soviet rule, Islam in particular 
was rejected as contrary to modernization, with the consequence that all but a 
handful of mosques were either closed or turned into museums of atheism. The 
clergy was persecuted and religious literature was destroyed, all Islamic courts 
of law, waqf holdings (Muslim religious endowments that formed the basis of 
clerical economic power), and Muslim primary and secondary schools were 
liquidated. Local shrines acted as the real centers of religious life in the absence 
of functioning mosques during the Soviet period, thereby ensuring that they 
have remained an important part of worship in Turkmenistan.  However, while 
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it is undeniable that the aggressive anti-religious campaign launched by the 
Soviet authorities placed even greater distance between Central Asian Islam 
and the Islam practiced in ‗mainstream‘ Muslim countries in the Middle East, 
South and Southeast Asia or Africa, Islamic doctrine had never taken as firm 
root in Turkmenistan as it had in other Muslim areas, including the old 
sedentary territories of Central Asia. Well before the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
Turkmen, like other nomadic people, preferred to pray in private rather than 
visit a mosque.
479 
A mobile lifestyle necessarily favoured a non-scriptural, 
popular version of Islam while naturally curtailing the presence of professional 
clergy. As the expert Adrienne Edgar noted, any man who could read and recite 
prayers was given the title of mullah, or cleric.
480
 Particularly in the nomadic 
regions, teachers of Sufi orders, or ishans, played a more influential role than 
the ulma (Muslim scholars). The independent Turkmen tribes lacked Muslim 
Qazis who judged in accordance with Islamic law, with the result that sharia 
only held sway in the sphere of family law, and was implemented by mullas at 
birth, circumcision, marriage, and funeral ceremonies.
481
 In the twenty-first 
century, Turkmens continue to be governed less by Islamic law than by tribal 
customary law, or adat, which has been passed down for many centuries. As 
the majority of Turkmens do not practice their religion in a formal or 
institutional way, mosques remain conspicuously empty, including Central 
Asia‘s largest and grandest mosque, the Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque in former 
President Niyazov‘s hometown of Gypjak, which is only visited by a 
significant number of male worshippers on Fridays.  
 
The strict state control of religion is a third, albeit less important, reason why 
Islamism has thus far failed to attract a significant following in Turkmenistan. 
Were Islamist groups to appear in Turkmenistan, state security forces would 
most certainly act swiftly and firmly to repress all manifestations of activity? In 
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order to prevent the emergence of Islam as a locus of oppositional activity, the 
Turkmen leadership has acted thoroughly to co-opt the official religious 
establishment. Beginning in the late 1980s, Turkmenistan‘s iron-fisted ruler, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, thoroughly co-opts the official religious establishment. 
He was the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Turkmen SSR from 
1985-1991 and the country‘s first president from 1991 until his death in 2006, 
sanctioned the revival of Muslim practices while simultaneously striving to 
keep religion within official structures. Thus, Niyazov endorsed the 
construction of mosques, the teaching of basic Islamic principles in state 
schools, the restoration of holy places and the restitution of Islamic holidays. 
Whereas in 1987 there were only four functioning mosques in the Turkmen 
SSR, by 1992 that number had risen to 83, with another 64 mosques under 
construction.
482 In 1991, Turkmenistan‘s first Madrasa was founded in 
Dashoguz to alleviate the country‘s acute shortage of trained religious clergy. 
Shrine pilgrimage was acknowledged by Niyazov as a fundamental component 
of Turkmen identity and even as an expression of patriotism. Seeking to 
improve their Islamic credentials, both Niyazov and his successor, Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhammedov, have made pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, thereby 
adding the title of hajji to their already long lists of distinctions. Yet, even 
while taking limited measures to promote Islam, the Turkmen leadership 
required all religious communities to obtain legal registration and banned all 
religious parties. In April 1994, Niyazov set up a Council for Religious Affairs, 
the Gengesh, within the presidential apparatus ―to ensure the observance of the 
law.‖ In July 2000, a long-serving official in the Gengesh acknowledged that 
his organization controls the selection, promotion, and dismissal of all clergy in 
Turkmenistan, thereby allowing the state to exert control on religious matters 
right down to the village level.
483
 In 1997, the leadership initiated a crackdown 
on Islamic activity by closing many of the mosques that had been opened just a 
                                                 
482  Paul Georg Geiss, Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment And Political Order In 
Change (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.38. 
483 Alexander Verkhovsky, ed., Islam i politicheskaya bor’ba v stranakh SNG [Islam and political struggle in 
the СIS (Сommonwealth of Independent States)] (Moscow: Panorama, 1992), p. 27. 
few years earlier (mostly in Mary Oblast), shutting down virtually all 
institutions of Islamic learning, halting the importation of foreign religious 
literature, and tightening restrictions on the legal registration of religious 
communities. These restrictions endure to this day. Congregations, are not 
registered with the Ministry of Fairness (formerly the Ministry of Justice) are 
prohibited from gathering publicly and disseminating religious materials, with 
violators subject to penalties under the country‘s administrative code. The 
Dashoguz Madrasa was closed in 2001, and in 2005, cutbacks were made at 
the Faculty of Muslim Theology at Magtymguly Turkmen State University, 
which remained the only official institution for training imams. To an even 
greater degree than other Central Asian Muslims, Turkmens have been unable 
to travel and receive an education in Madrasa abroad. The government has 
aimed to restrict the population‘s contact with fellow believers abroad by 
limiting the number of Turkmen Muslims—including secret police and state 
officials—performing the hajj to Mecca each year to 188 pilgrims, which 
represents less than 5% of the quota allocated by the Saudi authorities.
484
 As in 
other Central Asian states, Turkmen authorities have sought to limit unwanted 
Islamist trends by promoting a vision of Islam that is concerned with the 
preservation of tradition. In similar fashion to neighbouring Uzbekistan, the 
leadership has attempted to capitalize on the popularity of Sufism in order to 
encourage religion to conform to local popular practices as well as to combat 
the emergence of Islamism. As far as orthodox Islamic doctrine rejects and 
condemns as idolatrous some Sufi practices, such as the veneration of local 
saints and local shrine pilgrimages,
485
 it is held that the promotion of Sufism 
will serve to dampen any inclination among Turkmen believers to support the 
more purist and potentially Islamist-forms of ideology.
486
 Consequently, the 
Turkmen leadership has taken some steps to foster the Sufi tradition and 
incorporate it into the regime‘s larger nation-building project. Thus, Niyazov 
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leadership provided the mosque and mausoleum complex of the twelfth-
century Sufi scholar, Hoja Yusuf Hamadani, with a modern-day reconstruction. 
Located in the Mary Region, this holy site is one of the most important places 
of shrine pilgrimage in Turkmenistan, even remaining open during the Soviet 
period, albeit under strict control. Likewise, rather than seeking to prohibit 
local pilgrimages to sacred places, both Niyazov and Berdimuhamedov 
governments have encouraged it, even providing free accommodation for 
pilgrims in some instances.
487
 In 2009, citing fears concerning the spread of 
swine flu, Turkmen authorities barred aspiring Muslim pilgrims from making 
the hajj to Saudi Arabia altogether, urging them instead to sojourn to 38 sacred 
sites across the country, although most of the sites had historical or cultural 
rather than religious significance.
488
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 Fig 15: (Dashoguz Madrasa) 
Source: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/47817689 
 
Under Niyazov, the state-sponsored form of Islam in Turkmenistan underwent 
an unusual twist when the president made his extensive cult of personality a 
centerpiece of religious practice by configuring himself as a prophet with his 
own sacred book, the Ruhnama (Book of the Soul). Niyazov regularly urged 
his country‘s citizens to study and memorize passages from it, and knowledge 
of the Ruhnama was made a requirement for university entrance and for work 
in the public sector, which remained the main source of employment. Imams 
were obliged to display the Ruhnama inside mosques and to quote from it in 
sermons or face possible removal or even arrest. In direct violation of Sharia, 
Niyazov even ordered that passages from the Ruhnama be inscribed alongside 
passages from the Quran on the walls of the cathedral mosque in Gypjak; an 
inscription above the main arch reads, ―Ruhnama is a holy book; the Quran is 
Allah‘s book.‖ In 2003, the country‘s long-serving senior Muslim cleric and 
deputy chairman of the Gengesh, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, was replaced for 
expressing dissent by repeatedly objecting to the de facto status of the 
Ruhnama as a sacred book on a par with the Quran, and to its extensive use in 
mosques. In 2004, he was sentenced to 22 years in prison on treason charges, 
but was released in August 2007. Upon his release, he thanked the president 
and accepted a post as an adviser at the president‘s State Council for Religious 
Affairs, thus remaining under the close supervision of administration officials. 
Since coming to power in 2007, President Berdimuhamedov has gradually 
phased out the cult of Niyazov‘s quasi-spiritual guidebook for the nation, 
although its study remains part of the education curriculum.
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 Fig 16: (Turkmenbasynyn Ruhy Metjidi) 
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/ryan_roxx/4643767659/?q=turkmenbashi ruhy mosque 
 
Radical Islamic Movements 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several small Islamic groups emerged in 
Central Asia. Most were very short-lived and little is known of them other than 
their names.
164
 The great majority was located in the Fergana Valley. In 
Kazakhstan, a xenophobic nationalist group, Alash (named after the legendary 
ancestor of the Kazaks), advocated a return to Islamic precepts; however, it 
found few supporters and by 1995 had all but ceased to exist. There are 
occasional reports of other Islamic groups in southern Kazakhstan, but 
information is very scanty. No radical movements have so far been noted in 
Turkmenistan (though this does not necessarily mean the absence of such 
movements, merely that information is more tightly controlled there than 
elsewhere). Moreover, the pervasive nature of folk Islam, together with the 
Soviet-era repression of religion and the authoritarian nature of the country‘s 
political system, have acted as barriers to the growth of Islamist ideology in 
Turkmenistan. Thus, the leadership has sought to capitalize on the popularity of 
Sufism in order to encourage religion to conform to local popular practices as 
well as to combat the emergence of Islamism. As in other parts of Central Asia, 
the distinction between religious and ‗national‘ rituals is blurred in 
Turkmenistan; since the perestroika period of the late 1980s, the leadership has 
attempted to co-opt Islam as a fundamental component of its overarching 
nation-building campaign. 
 
State’s Policy towards Religion       
As in most political affairs, Turkmenistan has taken radically a different course 
from other Central Asian states in its policy on religion. There is effectively no 
separation between state and religion. President Niyazov has promoted his own 
personalized pseudo-religion as the official religion of the state. Although 
Sunni Islam is the official religion of ethnic Turkmens, most incorporate 
shamanistic beliefs dating from the nomadic period of their history to create 
their own form of popular Islam. The government has encouraged this, while 
taking strict control of all organized religious activity. Niyazov has spent 
millions on constructing huge mosques and religious buildings. There were 
only four mosques in Soviet times, but an estimated 318 were in operation in 
2003.
490
 However, many mosques are primarily aimed at his own glorification, 
rather than the religious needs of the people. Few Turkmens go to mosques; 
mostly they pray at home, or visit sacred sites. Pre-Islamic rituals combining 
shamanistic, Manichean, Zoroastrian, Nestorian and Parthian elements are still 
observed. Moreover, radical forms of Islam found little ground in 
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, although the government has suppressed any sign of external 
influence, expelling hundreds of foreign Muslims, mostly Iranian teachers, in 
2000. Some have suggested that young people could be attracted by more 
radical forms of Sunni Islam, largely as a result of repression and socio-
economic decline, but there is little basis for it in traditional religious beliefs.
492
 
In place of religious pluralism, Niyazov has developed a pseudo-religious cult 
centered on his own personality. His book, the Ruhnama, is not only the main 
text for schoolchildren and university students but is also read in mosques and 
treated on a par with the Quran. He has apparently made enquiries in the 
Islamic world about the possible reaction to declaring himself a new prophet of 
Islam. 
 
Laws on religious belief 
Although the Constitution provides freedom of religious belief, but the practice 
of any religion is severely restricted, except for two officially registered 
groups, Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox. The 1991 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and on Religious Organizations also guarantees freedom of belief 
but requires all religious activity to be registered by the Ministry of Justice. A 
1995 amendment requires religious groups to have at least 500 members in 
each locality in which they wish to register in order to gain legal status. In 
practice, this means that – unlike Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox 
believers – members of the Armenian Apostolic, Baptist, Pentecostals, 
Seventh- Day Adventist, Jehovah‘s Witnesses, Bahai and Hare Krishna 
churches are unable to register and are therefore severely persecuted. Naturally, 
any Muslim community wishing to establish an independent congregation is 
similarly outlawed. 
 
The main government body used to control religious affairs is the Council 
(Gengesh) for Religious Affairs under President Niyazov. Although described 
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as playing an ‗intermediary role‘ between the government bureaucracy and 
registered religious organizations, it is purely a controlling organ for the state. 
There is little distinction between the CRA and the religious hierarchy. The 
Imam of the Goek Tepe Mosque chairs it, and the three deputy chairmen are 
the Mufti of Turkmenistan, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a 
government representative. The CRA controls the activities of official clergy 
through Turkmenistan‘s Muslim Religious Board, which employs all Muslim 
clerics. According to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 
the CRA oversees the ‗selection, promotion, and dismissal of all Sunni mullas 
and Russian Orthodox clergy‘.493 This strict control structure provides no 
opportunity for legal religious activity outside the boundaries set by the state. 
The main instruments of repression are the National Security Committee and 
the regular police. The KNB is particularly involved in monitoring Muslim 
clergy and unofficial religious activity. Any clergy opposing the government or 
propagating religious ideas not in conformity with the official position risk 
dismissal or worse. In 2000, police arrested Hoja Ahmed Orazgylych, an 
Islamic cleric who had criticized the government. He was sentenced to internal 
exile.
494
 There is no scope for any political opposition in general, and 
particularly from within religious structures: Muslim clergy are required to 
accord due respect to Niyazov and the Ruhnama during services. Unregistered 
religious groups face constant harassment and sometimes arrest. In November 
1999 security forces destroyed a church belonging to the Seventh Day 
Adventists in Ashgabat, and members of the congregation have been regularly 
harassed ever since. Baptists have also faced constant pressure and sometimes 
been detained. In April 2002, the government closed all Sunday schools run by 
the Bahai. The U.S. government reports a sharp drop in cases of harassment of 
Christians in 2002, and in January 2002 Shageldy Atekov, a Baptist who had 
been in prison since 1999, apparently because of his religious beliefs, was 
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released. Nevertheless, there is no sign of real liberalization, and the situation is 
unlikely to change while President Niyazov remains in power. 
 
In June 2001, Niyazov ordered the closure of a Madrasa in Dashawuz, the last 
independent Islamic education facility in the country,
495
 
 
leaving the Faculty of 
Muslim Theology at Magtymguly Turkmen State University in Ashgabat as the 
only authorized academic institution in Turkmenistan to train imams. In 2002, 
the president set limits on the number of students who could study there. 
Foreign lecturers, who were all Turkish, were forced to leave the country to be 
replaced by local, less qualified teachers. Under a decree issued by the 
education ministry on 5 July, 20 students were expelled from the preparatory 
department of the Theological Faculty which results the decline in the level of 
education among practicing imams has led to a growth in respect for the 
traditional religious leaders. ―They have preserved their authority and people 
go to them for weddings and funerals, the authorities don't attack them.‖496 
However, Muslims are not allowed to travel abroad for religious education, 
Russian Orthodox men from Turkmenistan are allowed to study for the 
priesthood at the Tashkent seminary. All education establishments are forced to 
study the Ruhnama, the basis of Niyazov‘s cult of personality. It is a mixture of 
folk sayings, Turkmen history and pseudo-spirituality that lays the basis for an 
effectively alternative state religion. Its use in mosques on a par with the Quran 
is in direct contradiction with Islamic teachings, and must cause considerable 
difficulty to clergy and other believers. The president of Turkmenistan, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, has ordered that his own words be inscribed alongside 
verses of the Quran on a new mosque being built just outside the capital 
Ashgabat, intended to be the biggest in all Asia. He also announced that 
craftsmen would add lines from his book called ―the Ruhnama‖ on the 
immense facade. His absolute temporal power is now taking on an ever more 
spiritual overtone. It is the latest stage in what seems like a blurring between 
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Turkmenbashi‘s earthly power and religious authority. Ruhnama is now often 
placed in the doorway of mosques so that worshippers can touch it on their way 
in. In an echo of the practice in Sunni Muslim mosques, Orthodox priests 
reportedly received instructions from the end of 2000 to quote from the 
Ruhnama in sermons and to preach to devotee about the virtues of living in 
Turkmenistan and of the policies of Turkmenbashi.  Niyazov only wanted to 
implement his own personality cult for which he imposed Article 205 of the 
Code of Administrative Offences, which dates back to the Soviet period, 
specifies fines for those refusing to register their religious communities of five 
to ten times the minimum monthly wage, with typical fines of 2,50,000 
Turkmen Manats (363 Norwegian Kroner, 44 Euros or 48 US Dollars at the 
inflated official exchange rate). Registration represents total state control over 
each religious community. Believers who want to receive information from 
fellow-believers abroad face virtually insurmountable obstacles. Access to the 
Internet is possible only via state providers that exert strict control over what 
information can be accessed. The majority of international religious websites 
are simply not accessible by an Internet user. Moreover, a special computer 
program searches emails for coded words that could be used to send 
―unreliable information‖, while "a suspicious message" will simply not reach 
the addressee. Religious literature is no longer published; Mosques and Russian 
Orthodox churches often have small kiosks where a limited quantity of 
literature is available. A typical Orthodox church bookstall might have a few 
prayer books, small icons and calendars, with the Bible available only 
erratically - and often, at about 12 US Dollars [62,400 Turkmen Manats, 78 
Norwegian Kroner, or 10 Euros], too expensive for the badly-paid local people. 
Supplies of religious literature and articles to Orthodox churches are equally 
erratic, with no official distribution of books, icons, candles, and baptismal 
crosses. Customs officers sometimes allow travelers returning to the country to 
bring in a small quantity of religious literature for personal use. However, 
Orthodox priests had taken literature from them at the border on their return to 
the country. Hare Krishna devotees, Protestants and Jehovah's Witnesses 
cannot import religious literature.  Religious literature is routinely confiscated 
from members of unregistered religious minorities during police raids on their 
homes. Orthodox believers trying to receive alternative information are in a 
more difficult situation than Sunni Muslims. Under a September 2002 
presidential decree, direct subscription to Russian newspapers and magazines, 
including religious publications such as the Journal of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, is banned. Even Orthodox priests do not receive the Journal 
regularly and are forced to rely on old copies they pick up when they are 
visiting Moscow or Tashkent. Officials have not simply restricted themselves 
of banning the receipt of political information from the former metropolis. 
Purely religious communications between local Orthodox believers and Russia 
have inevitably also been obstructed. As Turkmenistan has become even more 
isolated from Russia, individual Orthodox believers have become more isolated 
from the Moscow Patriarchate. Much religious activity has of necessity to be 
shrouded in secrecy, with believers of having to hide their faith and worship 
from the knowledge of intrusive state officials. In response to the pressure, all 
unregistered communities have seen the numbers of their active members fall. 
Yet despite the severe controls and the threat of punishment, the religious 
believers practice their various faiths as best they can, while waiting for better 
times.
497  
 
President’s cult imposed on religious communities 
Amongst pressures on religious communities is a government-enforced cult of 
President Niyazov‘s personality. Muslims face mounting pressure to venerate 
the president‘s two-volume ideological book, the Ruhnama, while Russian 
Orthodox churches must have a minimum of two copies of the Ruhnama. One 
government minister claimed that the Ruhnama would make up for 
shortcomings in both the Bible and the Quran, neither of which was, he 
claimed, fully adequate for the spiritual needs of Turkmens. The personality 
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cult includes a massive mosque decorated with quotations from the Ruhnama, a 
gold statue in Ashgabat that revolves to follow the sun and a monument to the 
Ruhnama. It was a priority task for clergymen to disseminate the lofty ideas in 
the leader‘s sacred books on the duties of parents and children. Registered 
religious minorities are often pressured into hanging the country‘s flag, state 
emblem and portraits of Turkmenistan‘s President Saparmurat Niyazov at their 
places of worship and other restrictions are also imposed.
498
 As part of the 
grotesque government-enforced cult of President Niyazov‘s personality, 
Muslim community faces mounting pressure to venerate the president‘s two 
volume ideological book, the Ruhnama, while Russian Orthodox churches 
must have a minimum of two copies of the Ruhnama in parish libraries. The 
massive mosque built at taxes in the president‘s native place (Kipchak) in 
central Turkmenistan which has been decorated with quotations from the work 
and up to a quarter of the book stands for copies of the Quran are taken up with 
the Ruhnama and other presidential publications. An apparently full-time 
official at the massive Saparmurat Hajji mosque in the village of Geok-tepe 
near the capital Ashgabat is present to ‗remind‘ the imam which pages of the 
work he is to read from at prayer times.  Although the president's cult of 
personality – which includes a gold statue in Ashgabat that revolves to follow 
the sun and a monument to the Ruhnama – began in the mid-1990s, the cult 
was stepped up after the publication of the first volume of the Ruhnama in 
2001, which Niyazov described at the launch ceremony as a ―holy book‖. 
Officials later likened it to the Quran. The second Ruhnama volume was 
ceremonially launched in September 2004. In 2000, one government minister 
claimed that the Ruhnama would make up for shortcomings in both the Bible 
and the Quran, neither of which was, he claimed, fully adequate for the 
spiritual needs of Turkmens. Controversy was stirred among Muslims when 
news spread that the Kipchak mosque– named after the president - was 
decorated with quotations from the Ruhnama. Indeed, to enter the main 
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entrance of the mosque, visitors have to walk through a gateway over which is 
written in Turkmen: “Ruhnama is a holy book; The Quran is Allah's book‖. On 
one side of the gateway is the text of the oath of allegiance to the president 
carved in stone and on the other the text of the national anthem. On 11 
February, Muslim leaders across the country attended a meeting in Ashgabat at 
the government‘s Gengeshi for Religious Affairs jointly hosted by the office of 
the Mufti under the slogan ―Our esteemed leader President, Saparmurat Hajji is 
a true protector of clergymen‖. There imams were enjoined to preach from the 
Ruhnama. ―Speakers at the meeting emphasized the need for unity and accord 
in order to reach great heights,‖ state television reported the same day. ―It was 
mentioned that it was a priority task for clergymen to disseminate the lofty 
ideas in our great leader‘s sacred books on the duties of parents and children.‖ 
State television said speakers described the volume as ―an indispensable help in 
giving honest and pure education to the young generation of Turkmenistan‘s 
golden age‖. Given the large proportion of school children‘s time that is taken 
up studying the president‘s works and learning them (even the English 
translation of the Ruhnama is used to teach English), the endorsement by 
imams can only be helpful for the president. All imams in state-approved 
mosques are appointed by the Gengeshi. One registered Sunni mosque in 
Ashgabat, like most government offices, schools, factories and some places of 
worship, has a "Ruhnama room" honouring the president's book; just as in the 
Soviet period, space was set aside to honour Lenin and the communist 
movement. Unlike the new Kipchak mosque, which was inaugurated amid 
great fanfare in October 2004, the mosque in Geok-tepe – completed in 1996 – 
is not carved with inscriptions by Niyazov. However, the layman based at the 
mosque responsible for overseeing the teaching of the Ruhnama told recent 
visitors it is ―quite normal‖ to teach from the book. Neither the Kipchak nor the 
Geok-tepe mosques have visible portraits of Niyazov. Some other registered 
religious communities have bowed to pressure to display the president‘s 
portrait at their places of worship, even if they find this unnecessary or 
offensive. In some ways, the Russian Orthodox Church has been able to escape 
the worst aspects of the cult of president. Other Orthodox sources insist that 
their priests are not required to quote from the Ruhnama or even mention it in 
sermons but most parishioners work for the state and get the Ruhnama there. 
Pressure from officials on Muslims and the Orthodox to accept the cult of 
personality is reportedly strong in the northeastern Dashoguz region, where 
ethnic Uzbeks make up about half the population. The authorities have forced 
imams to place the Turkmen flag above mosque entrances and every sermon 
delivered by imams has to begin with a eulogy to ―Turkmenbashi‖. A copy of 
the Ruhnama is placed prominently at the entrance to every mosque and 
believers have to touch it as if it were a sacred object.
499 
Similar instructions 
have been given to Sunni Muslim mosques elsewhere and to Russian Orthodox 
churches. In other places too, including the southern town of Tedjen, local 
officials have pressured the Orthodox to put up the national flag and 
presidential portraits on church land on state holidays. Orthodox believers 
insisted there are no written rules on what national symbols must be displayed 
in places of worship and how the Ruhnama must be used. However, some local 
officials – especially in towns away from Ashgabat – like to show ―excessive 
zeal‖ in promoting the president‘s cult of personality.500 Those who cannot 
accept the cult of personality denied registration or deciding not to apply 
because of what they regard as the unacceptable conditions attached to 
registration, scorn the cult of personality and believe other faiths have wrongly 
accepted as a condition of registration, like hanging the country‘s flag and a 
portrait of the president in places of worship. These were unacceptable 
demands when the constitution is clear: religion and the state are separate;
501
 
even then, religious communities are being forced to accept national symbols, 
presidential portraits and treat the president‘s writings almost as sacred texts.  
Intermittent protests took place in summer 2004 against the enforced 
imposition of the Ruhnama on mosques. Anonymous anti-government leaflets 
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circulating in Ashgabat in early July contained calls for Muslims not to go to 
mosques where the Ruhnama is cited together with the Quran.
502
 Sunni Muslim 
Mosques are reported to have seen attendance slump as, in response to 
government orders, imams placed copies of the Ruhnama in mosques with 
equal prominence as copies of the Quran. Imams are, at least in theory, 
required to recite the oath of loyalty to the president and country at the end of 
the Namaz. President Niyazov told Muslims in 2000 that they were to renounce 
the Hadith, sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) that do not 
appear in the Quran but are valued by devout Muslims only. One Mosque was 
closed down and four Ashgabat mosques were demolished in the autumn 2004 
campaign of mosque destruction by the State Security Ministry secret police 
for not putting the Ruhnama on the same reading stand as the Quran and for the 
refusal of Imams to read the Ruhnama in their mosques.
503
(
504
)
 
Niyazov ousted 
the Chief Mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, an ethnic Uzbek who had led 
Turkmenistan‘s Muslims for the previous ten years, for his lack of enthusiasm 
for the campaign to promote the Ruhnama in mosques, and had him sentenced 
to 22 years‘ imprisonment in March 2004.505 Although, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah 
had gone along with earlier official‘s move related to the cult of personality, 
removing several imams from mosques in the late 1990s - including a leading 
imam in Dashoguz - for refusing to recite the special verses in praise of the 
president that imams are supposed to recite during Friday prayers. Religious 
minority prisoners – including Jehovah‘s Witnesses and Baptists - have not 
benefited under successive presidential prisoner amnesties, as they refused to 
confess their guilt and swear the national oath of allegiance to the president and 
country on a copy of the Quran in the local mosque. The oath is considered by 
many to be blasphemous and reads: ―Turkmenistan, beloved homeland, my 
native land, both in my thoughts and in my heart I am eternally with you. For 
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the slightest evil caused to you, let my hand be cut off. For the slightest 
defamation against you, may my tongue lose its strength. In the moment of 
treachery to the fatherland, to the president, to your holy banner, let my 
breathing cease.‖ 
 
Fig 17: (Golden statue in Ashgabat) 
Source: http://www.galenfrysinger.com/turkmenbashi.htm 
 
Religious Freedom in Turkmenistan 
President Niyazov was elected to office by the TCP on 27 October 1990 and 
retained his position throughout the process of independence. Since that date, 
numerous and regular human rights violations have occurred. Although the 
country's constitution guarantees religious freedom still, the government‘s 
Council for Religious Affairs and the secret police have discouraged all 
religious activities. Critics of the party or the president are suppressed and 
censorship utilized to support government ideology. Religious minorities, 
especially those that do not fit the president‘s ideal of Turkmen culture, are also 
suppressed. Vitally Ponomarev of the Moscow-based Central Asia Human 
Rights Information Centre states that ‗Turkmen authorities have increasingly 
used falsified criminal charges to combat minority religious groups‘.506 
Baptists, Jehovah‘s Witnesses and Pentecostal Christians, other Protestant 
denominations, and Bahais have been particularly targeted, usually on the 
spurious grounds of holding unregistered religious gatherings. A 2001 US State 
Department report on religious freedom in Turkmenistan claims that the 
governmental harassment of unregistered religious groups has intensified in 
recent times. However, the report makes the important point that this 
harassment is not present at a societal level.
507
 Socially the vast majority of 
interactions between religious traditions appear to have been peaceful, tolerant 
and inclusive. Turkmenistan‘s constitution provides for freedom of religion, as 
does the 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 
which was amended in 1995 and 1997. In practice, however, the law has been 
interpreted to control religious life tightly and to restrict the activities of all 
religions severely. Article 6 of Turkmenistan‘s Constitution states that people 
are free to practice religion;
508
 Article 11 states: ‗Everyone has the right 
independently to determine her or his own religious preference, to practice any 
religion alone or in association with others, to practice no religion, to express 
and disseminate beliefs related to religious preference, and to participate in the 
performance of religious cults, rituals, and ceremonies‘.509 The government‘s 
legal justification for discrimination against religious groups comes from 
Article 3. This ensures freedom of conscience and states that the freedom to 
profess a religion is subject only to restrictions necessary to safeguard ‗public 
safety and order, life and health of the people, and morale‘.510 The vagueness in 
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the wording provides the government enormous latitude in interpreting the 
concepts of ‗public safety, order, and morale‘. As a result, the government 
seeks to maintain a close relationship with religious representatives and 
institutions. It does so by exercising control over all religious activities. All 
religious organizations must register with the government, although only two 
religious organizations have had an easy time doing so: the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the state-approved Spiritual Directorate of Muslims. In order to 
attain registration, an organization must have at least five hundred adult 
citizens in each locality in which it wishes to operate. This makes the position 
of minority religious traditions almost impossible, as they may not have five 
hundred members nationwide, and effectively prevents all but the state-
approved Islam and Orthodox Christianity from registering. There are for 
example only an estimated one thousand Jews in Turkmenistan. The situation is 
further exacerbated by government officials‘ harassment of those who do 
publicly sign documents pertaining to their religious beliefs. Non-registered 
religious groups are prohibited from conducting religious activities, including 
gathering, disseminating religious materials and proselytizing. The Baptists 
actually meet the numerical criteria for registration in some regions, yet were 
long denied recognition.
511
 When citizens openly proclaim their attempt to 
register, authorities regularly harass signatories in order to make them 
withdraw their support.
512
 Members of religious groups not approved by the 
state have faced harassment, imprisonment, loss of employment and 
confiscation of property. These measures have typically been carried out by the 
National Security Council (KNB, formerly KGB), which appears to have long 
been under the direct control of the president. In February 2000, authorities 
arrested Muslim religious leader Khoja Ahmed Orazgylych for criticizing the 
government and the president in a Radio Liberty broadcast. Subsequently, they 
demolished the mosque he operated and burnt copies of his translation of the 
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Quran that the government itself had commissioned and approved.
513
 In June 
2001, a family of Jehovah‘s Witnesses was evicted from their home for 
conducting Bible study meetings there.
514
 Members of Jehovah‘s Witnesses 
who had been imprisoned for conscientious objection were not released at the 
end of their term because they refused to swear an oath of loyalty to the 
president.
515
 The International Society for Krishna Consciousness has also been 
the target of harassment and in 2001 the government demolished their temple 
in Mary. The Keston News Service reported in February 2001 that local 
authorities of the Niyazov district of Ashgabat  had sealed the country‘s last 
functioning Baptist church. In March 2001, the authorities reportedly broke the 
seals and removed the church‘s contents. The church had been in existence for 
20 years, was corporately owned by the congregation and had been registered 
under the Soviet Union, but had lost registration in 1997 under the new law.
516
 
A further, unregistered Baptist congregation was also evicted in March 2001, 
this time from the private house in which it had held religious services for over 
twenty years.
517
 Finally, in early May 2002, Protestants in a Turkmen village 
were ordered to swear an oath on a copy of President Niyazov‘s ‗spiritual 
book‘, the Ruhnama, renouncing the Bible and their faith in Jesus.518 Niyazov‘s 
rule is characterized by a grotesque cult of personality, with ever-present 
statues and portraits. Turkmenistan‘s deliberate isolation from the outside 
world and the punitive measures taken against those engaged in unauthorized 
religious activity make religious freedom reporting very difficult. Believers 
often fear retribution for reporting their difficulties. Religious activity is 
overseen by KNB for work with social organizations and religious groups. 
People known to be active in religious communities are recorded with the 
security agencies locally and can be summoned at any moment for 
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interrogation. Young men are restricted to go to the mosque, five times a day, 
for prayers. They (secret police) also summoned the parents of a devout 
Muslim conscript who prayed regularly in his military unit and warned that 
they should extract a statement from him declaring that he was renouncing his 
faith. Local MSS secret police officers regularly summon Muslim and 
Orthodox clerics to report on activity within their communities and also run 
―spies‖ in each Muslim and Orthodox community, sometimes as many as half a 
dozen. In addition to their spies - who attend the religious community solely at 
MSS behest to gain information - there might be another ten or fifteen believers 
who are regularly interviewed by MSS Officers and forced to reveal details of 
the community‘s religious life. Moreover, a religious board, Gengeshi,  is made 
for Religious Affairs - which is headed by an imam, Yagshimurat Atamuradov 
- has nominal responsibility for religious affairs, and has headquarters in 
Ashgabat and branch offices in each of Turkmenistan‘s five velayats (regions). 
The Gengeshi‘s main job appears to be approving clerical appointments in the 
Sunni Muslim and Orthodox communities. ―Imams are chosen by the Gengeshi 
and are then approved by the president,‖ Niyazov confirmed this in March 
2004, when he instructed Gengeshi officials to make sure they appointed all 
imams, warning them not to allow local believers to do so. Places of worship of 
a variety of faiths have faced demolition - as with numerous mosques most 
recently in 2004, as well as the Adventist church in Ashgabat in 1999 and two 
Hare Krishna temples in the eastern Mary region in 1999 - and confiscation - as 
with the Baptist and Pentecostal churches in Ashgabat in 2001. The six 
mosques were demolished in Ashgabat in autumn 2004 and one was turned into 
a police outreach post. Interestingly, the one minority religion that has so far 
been able to practice quasi-legally and without harassment has been the 
Catholic Church. Its three priests enjoy diplomatic immunity.
519
 These are just 
some of many continuing examples of restrictions and violations of religious 
freedom the people of Turkmenistan have faced in recent years. Those 
particularly active in unauthorized religious groups are regularly detained on 
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fabricated charges, and university students have been threatened with expulsion 
if they continue ‗illegal‘ religious activities. The Gengeshi (Council for 
Religious Affairs), Justice Ministry, the police and local authorities, in addition 
to the KNB, have all been involved in these acts. These institutions are 
understood to have been under the direct command of President Niyazov. It 
must be noted, however, that keeping an up-todate account of the state of 
religious freedom in Turkmenistan is difficult, as no locally based human rights 
groups are allowed to operate in the country. The government also restricts and 
controls access to religious education. Critical of religious schools in the past, 
President Niyazov ordered all remaining madrasas in the country closed in 
2001. This measure relates to the government‘s position on parents who raise 
their children according to their religious beliefs, which it sees as detracting 
from a nationalist upbringing. An Adventist priest was detained in 
Turkmenabad in October 2000 because the children of congregation members 
were present at the prayer service.
520
 Further restrictions have been placed on 
‗non-traditional‘ religious traditions by the ruling that foreign missionary work 
is prohibited. Ethnic Turkmen found to be disseminating the religious material 
of unregistered religious groups have been found to receive harsher physical 
and legal treatment than non-ethnic Turkmen,
521
 further highlighting the 
president‘s peculiar aim (unsettlingly reminiscent of Nazi policies) to create a 
national Turkmen identity In 1997 the government passed a new version of the 
Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which effectively 
banned all religious movements apart from the two state sanctioned religions – 
over which the government exerts a great deal of control in the selection of 
religious clergy.
522
 Many religious groups that had been registered for some 
time, including Baptists,  Bahais, were suddenly ‗deregistered‘ and prevented 
from reregistration due to the onerous requirements. This law appears to be an 
attempt to rid Turkmenistan‘s religious groups which were deemed to be ‗non-
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traditional‘ by the president. The legal position of religious movements is made 
more tenuous by corruption in the legal system in Turkmenistan. The president 
appoints most judges and oversees the functioning of the courts in the interests 
of the regime. Public prosecutors are given broad powers, whilst defendants are 
often denied due process rights, such as the right to a public hearing, the right 
to access evidence, the right to call witnesses to testify on their behalf and the 
right to legal counsel and representation. Compounding this, most of the 
available lawyers are employed by the state, while as  many defendants are 
coerced into confession.
523
 As a result the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has for a number of consecutive 
years recommended that Turkmenistan be designated a ‗Country of Particular 
Concern‘ for ‗egregious, ongoing, and systematic violations of religious 
freedom‘.524 The perception of the government is best expressed by former 
Commissioner Firuz Kazemzadeh of the USCIRF: ―The government lives in 
fear.it is frightened of events that have overtaken Afghanistan‘.525 In 2004, 
President Niyazov issued decrees decriminalizing unregistered religious 
activity and easing some requirements for registration.
526
 Nevertheless, the 
government continues to see religious organizations as a potential threat to its 
own power and stability. 
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CHAPTER - 5 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian republics, which had not 
really sought independence, found themselves independent. Unlike what 
happened in some other parts of the former Soviet Union, the regimes in power 
under the Soviet Union remained in power, and endeavoured through 
authoritarian means and trying to identify themselves with nascent nationalisms 
to suppress opposition and seek an aura of legitimacy. These regimes sought to 
suppress expressions of Islam and Islamic revivalism outside of state-
sponsored Islam. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Turkmenistan entered a 
period of severe crises, decline of the production, dissolution of internal and 
external economic relations, expansion of poverty, loss of jobs, political 
disposition and deterioration. Unemployment has spiraled, education and 
medical care have been severely affected, and standards have fallen 
dramatically. During the Tsarist period, Muslims underwent unprecedented 
persecution; mosques were destroyed or used for non-religious purpose. Early 
marriage was common practice and marriage between minor girls and aged 
men was wide spread. Childlessness was regarded as the greatest shame. 
Mostly women remained the property of the family even after her husband‘s 
death. She suffers most from Tsarist capitalists landowner‘s exploitation and 
from the patriarchal condition prevalent in the family. The communist 
authorities of the Soviet Union, later on, inherited Central Asia from the Tsarist 
Russia, which collapsed during the First World War. The society in 
Turkmenistan presented a gloomy picture during the Soviet occupation of the 
country. Majority of the population predominantly Muslim had to bear the 
brunt of the communist rule. With the end of Soviet power, the world 
witnessed resurgence of Islam in Central Asian Republics. The rising influence 
of Islam on Turkmen society can be seen from the substantial increase in the 
performance of religious rituals and practices. People in general follow strict 
Islamic rules in marriage, circumcision and burial only. After the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, former Communist Party leader, Saparmurat Niyazov, 
became the country‘s first President, and he ruled Turkmenistan with an iron 
fist until 9 December 2006. His legacy was a regime of totalitarian control, 
paranoid (fearful) dictatorship and an absence of basic freedom and human 
rights for the citizens of Turkmenistan. During the rule, his government gutted 
the country‘s educational system and destroyed the medical system. He erected 
gold plated statues of himself all over the country, his portrait hung in every 
public room and on every public building.  He also built enormous government 
buildings at the expense of ordinary citizens, most of whom lived in extreme 
poverty, and systematically isolated Turkmenistan by outlawing foreign 
publications, maintaining full control over the Internet, and censoring all 
media.  Freedom of association was extremely limited and he maintained full 
control over the political system, outlawing opposition and suppressing all 
forms of expression. Moreover, all missionaries were expelled and all religious 
activities have been highly repressed. He created an unrivalled cult of 
personality, even renaming the months of the year after members of his family. 
He wrote a book called Ruhnama, which rules much of the daily life instead of 
Quran. He also decreed that the Ruhnama, a spiritual guide, be taught in 
schools throughout the country and, often, be recited from memory as a 
precondition of obtaining jobs. Although one might expect the Turkmen case to 
bear some resemblance to that of the Kyrgyz, given the common significance 
of nomadic tribal organization in their history, in fact political and religious 
developments since Independence in Turkmenistan have been very different. 
Whereas Kyrgyzstan liberalized, Turkmenistan remained under the rule of a 
single party TDP and a leader whose personality cult was more extreme than 
anything was since the cult of Stalin. The nomenclature system remained 
largely unchanged and acceptable political activity continued to be understood 
in terms of ‗unreserved popular support for the leadership‘. State functionaries 
were expected to contribute to the glorification of President Niyazov, who in 
1993, following the precedent of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, assigned 
himself the title Turkmenbashi. As in Stalinist times, state functionaries 
devoted much time and energy to fawning over their great leader. 
Turkmenbashi, like other statesmen of his sort, regularly appeared on television 
urging his subjects to be more restrained in their displays of glorification.  
If Stalin‘s goal of ‗Socialism in One Country‘ has been perversely renewed in a 
new form in contemporary Turkmenistan, this was due largely to the fact that 
vast oil and gas fields allowed the regime to go its own way and ignore 
international pressure. Yet the new forms of authoritarianism differed from the 
old. It was not just that Marxist notions of class and labour vanished: the Soviet 
ideal that its republics should be ‗national in form and socialist in content‘ was 
radically reconfigured. As Edgar concluded, the Soviet project to construct a 
unified Turkmen nation and modern, socialist society enjoyed more success 
with the former goal than with the later. After 1991, the Turkmen elite quickly 
abandoned atheist and socialist ideology and incorporated ideas about 
spirituality that were imagined to be in line with the ‗national spirit‘. 
Turkmenbashi had an early sense of the important role that Islam could play in 
his project, as his Hajj in 1992 testified. Initially it seems that the political 
leadership looked to Islam to exert a civilizing force, a policy attested in the 
promotion of educational and architectural ties with internationally recognized 
Islamic centers. At the same time though, the concept of a distinctively 
Turkmen Islam became very prominent. The Turkmen government promoted 
its vision of Islam as an intrinsic part of the country‘s national identity, as 
conducive to stability and progress, and above all as a means of sacralising the 
power of the president. What emerged was a state-imposed version of Islam 
centered on the god-like figure of Niyazov-Turkmenbashi. The leader went so 
far as to cast himself as a new Prophet, and set his own sacred book, the 
Ruhnama (book of the soul) almost on a par with the Quran. The longest 
portions of the book are devoted to presenting Turkmen history from its most 
flattering side and to outlining the moral obligations of the citizens. Key 
historical sections deal with the Quran, God and the Prophet Muhammad 
(s.a.w). Niyazov mentions differences between the Ruhnama and the Quran. At 
one point, he writes, ―The Turkmens‘ Ruhnama is not a religious book…. 
God‘s book, the Quran is sacred and cannot be replaced or compared to any 
other book‖. However, in the text the Ruhnama is in fact compared to the 
Quran repeatedly: its author is described as interpreting and translating the 
Quran and even as carrying out God‘s will. Moreover, the public dissemination 
of the Ruhnama as a sacred book and the inscription of experts from it on 
minarets of newly built mosques underlined Turkmenbashi‘s attempt at 
sacralising secular power. 
 
The Ruhnama is not to be dismissed as an idiosyncrasy of eccentric self-
indulgence: it has been a powerful means of disseminating ideological 
messages. By trying spiritual heritage to Turkmen heroes, national monuments, 
and of course to the Muslim qualities of the country‘s president, the regime 
promoted a vision of ‗Turkmen Islam‘ analogous in principle to that of ‗Kyrgyz 
Islam‘ but yet very different in practice, above all because there was little or no 
scope to put forward other points of view. To disseminate this spiritual agenda 
among the population the Ruhnama was made obligatory teaching material in 
schools and universities, where it infiltrated the curriculum in virtually every 
subject. Knowledge of this text became a prerequisite for obtaining any official 
position; it was often considered more important than professional knowledge. 
While in Kyrgyzstan, the promotion of the Manas epic ran parallel to religious 
structures, in Turkmenistan a concerted effort was made to fuse official 
ideology with religious teachings. Imams were obliged to display the Ruhnama 
inside mosques and incorporate it into their religious teachings. Resistance to 
this defamation of Islam was suppressed through arrests replacing key figures 
with Turkmenistan‘s Muslim Religious Board (the controlling organ for all 
official Muslim clerics).  
 
Finally, it is apparent that Muslims underwent unprecedented persecution 
During the Tsarist period and same happened in Soviet period. Now after 
independence, it was expected that the people will get some relief from tyranny 
but unfortunately, it became worst. The president who assured people to give 
complete freedom in religious observances deceived them, because he did all 
this just to gain the faith and impose his personality cult. As by the study it 
became clear that the four republics did not deteriorate the position of Islam to 
that extent as he did. 
 
To avoid future instability, Turkmenistan needs to re-examine their policies 
towards Islam and step back from reliance on repression. In order to ensure the 
stable position, Turkmenistan needs to take measures in order to comply with 
its international obligations:- 
1. They should take serious steps to reduce the present level of human rights 
abuses including by releasing prisoners convicted for their political or 
religious beliefs or arrested because they are relatives of opposition 
members, and allowing international observers such as UN reporters and 
OSCE representatives to monitor trials and prisons. 
2. Permit political pluralism by: 
a. amending the constitution and authorising the registration of other political 
parties besides the National Democratic Party; 
b.  allowing peaceful demonstrations and public expression of criticism; 
c. allowing the exiled Turkmen opposition to return and participate in 
political life, provided it seeks political power via democratic and non-
violent means; 
d. Conducting elections for both parliament and the presidency under 
international observation. 
3. Allow local and international media to operate freely, and improve access 
to media by: 
a. allowing registration of independent print and electronic media; 
b. allowing uncensored access to international electronic and print media, 
particularly Russian-language newspapers; 
c. guaranteeing the protection of all journalists and their right to inform; and 
d. providing uncensored access to the Internet; 
 
4. Strengthen civil society by providing a proper legal basis for independent 
NGOs, permitting the free flow of information and lifting travel 
restrictions on Turkmen and foreign NGO representatives. 
5. Reverse the decline in educational standards by: 
a. reintroducing an eleven- or twelve-year school curriculum and five-year 
courses in higher education; and 
b. ending the use of the Ruhnama as the key text for schoolchildren and 
students; 
6. Establish a sound economic environment by: 
a. creating a legal basis that protects and guarantees domestic and foreign 
investment; 
b. changing the Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) from a personal 
presidential fund to a normal budgetary mechanism, and establishing an oil 
fund for future generations; and 
c. Privatising the oil and gas industry. 
7. Undertake a wide-ranging review of legislation on religion, reforming 
existing laws that violate international conventions on religious freedom 
and adopting new laws that should: 
a. permit religious education within mosques; 
b. provide clear guidelines on registration of religious organisations and 
allow appeals in courts against refusal to register religious groups; and  
c. liberalise censorship of religious publications, providing clear guidelines 
on what is not permitted and why. 
8. Restore the credibility of the Muftiate among believers by increasing its 
independence. 
9. Accelerate amnesties for religious prisoners, end the practice of seeking 
confessions before release, and provide social support for those released. 
10. End the abuse and torture of religious prisoners, which merely creates 
greater resentment in the wider community. 
11. Introduce religious specialists into government structures, dealing with 
religious issues, provide training for all officials on religious affairs, and 
give believers opportunities to practice their beliefs in state service. 
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